Mohammed Yousuf, Advocate (AMICUS)

Go to the People.

2012-01-14T22:01:00.000+05:00

Mohammed Yousuf
Saturday, January 14, 2012 at 9:49pm
The Supreme Court has made it clear that it would not bestow legitimacy to any extra-constitutional act of taking over the government and the military establishment has given assurance that it does not intend to derail the democratic process.Pakistan Muslim League (N) has shown great maturity by declaring that it will oppose any military intervention. Almost all important political parties have supported the democratic process. Same is the stand taken by the media in general and representatives of the civil society in particular.But then this leads us to the question: what next?
For the PPP leadership it is the time for introspection and soul-searching. It needs to reform itself and become more responsive to people’s demands and aspirations. No one can challenge the authority of the government if it is able to command popular trust and respect.
Obviously the best course for the ruling coalition is to address the grievances of the people and focus on improving the quality of governance. It should address the complaints of corruption, favouritism, nepotism, breakdown in law and order, energy crisis, mismanagement in state corporations, inflation, economic meltdown and other issues. It also has to show that it respects the other institutions of the state as “as it desires to be respected.
If the present slide continues, the people may get completely tired and ultimately become fed up of the civilian rule. The fatigue is already visible. To be frank, it is largely due to the Imran Khan factor that a considerable segment of masses has retained some hope in democratic process.
The PPP should understand that, despite all proclamations in the favour of democracy, there is a thresh hold of tolerance and the army or the Supreme Court may perforce decide to wind up the system in national interests if there is a further deterioration in governance and if the government continues on the collision course.
The possibility of such an eventuality is highly pronounced, despite the clear and forth right announcement by both the institutions, given the propensity of the incumbent Zardari-Gilani dispensation to provoke confrontation with these state institutions.
Such an eventuality will be a reality if they were to indulge in any ill-conceived adventurism against the Army and Judiciary. They ought to take a leaf from the contemporary instances of such adventurism by Nawaz Sharif in 1993 and again by Nawaz Sharif in October 1999.
For the government the best course would be to resign and go to the people for a fresh mandate, but it is a tall order for the incumbent government, although the entire dispensation is crying hoarse thatit believes in the power of ballot.
Hence, given the prevailing environment, for the opposition, the best course available is to resign from the assemblies and force the government to go for the fresh polls.
After the resignations the opposition should simultaneously press for having an independent Election Commission, preparation of fool proof voters’ list as directed by the Supreme Court and peaceful conduct of polling on the day of elections.
It should not insist on resignation or removal of President Zardari as a prerequisite for transparent and fair general elections. Any such demand would be unconstitutional and would set a bad example. As for the President, let the cases before the Supreme Court run its course and the President should honour, abide and bow before the outcome of those cases.
Asfar as the controversial memo is concerned, let there be an inquiry commission by the Supreme Court and let it submit its report to the Supreme Court and let the Supreme Court decide the future line of action and if anyone is found responsible, the laws should take its own course, may it be Haqqani or even the President.
The army has already got over stretched. Its primary responsibility is to defend the country against foreign aggression and internal insurgencies. It should not offer an opportunity to the PPP leaders to go down as martyrs. Any reckless adventurism will bring bad name to the army and it would be thoroughly discredited in a short span.
It is not in the interest of the country to upset the applecart when elections are possible constitutionally and that is the only democratic way to go forward.
There’s certainly a lot of legitimate debate about what exactly government is supposed to be expected to do, and what is the best way to go about doing it. Perhaps you in fact think it appropriate to take some people’s money at gunpoint to give to poor folks (like YOU, no doubt). But recognize this is what you are doing, and don’t kid yourself that it’s something truly different than if you just walked into the bank with a gun — other than you’re getting someone else to do your dirty work. The stick-up artist is just cutting out the middleman. As HL Mencken memorably put it, “Every election is a sort of advance auction sale of stolen goods.”
That said, Mr President and Mr Prime Minister, seize the moment and go to the people, your government has run out of steam. Live up to what you preach and let the change come through the ballot, the power of the ballot is what we need in sheer defence; else what shall save us from a second slavery?
However, do not misunderstand and think that ballots are the opposite of bullets. They are not. They are just a substitute for muting direct violence, not the elimination of violence.

The Politics of Uncertainty

2011-12-27T12:23:00.000+05:00

The Politics of Uncertainty

By amicus • Dec 27th, 2011 • Category: Lead Story •
On 25th December, the nation celebrates the 135th Birth anniversary of Quid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan was, “There is no doubt that the future of our state will and must greatly depend upon the type of education and way in which we bring up our children as the future servants of Pakistan…What we have to do is mobilise our people and build up the character of our future generations…”.

President Zardari said today in his message, “it will not allow any change through “force and intimidation and respect the power of ballot as an instrument of change.” He goes on to say; “The Quaid believed that any change must be brought about by ballot and reject change by bullet”.

Very true Mr President; let us bring change through ballot before it is too late.

Let us first take a look at the State of Affairs in Jinnah’s Pakistan.

Early October 2011, the Pakistan People’s Party-led coalition government appeared set to complete its term and there were indications that, if no spanner was thrown, the PPP might secure majority in the Senate as a result of elections in March 2012 and, if the coalition partners made seat adjustments, even emerge as the largest party in the National Assembly in the general elections likely to be held in March 2013.

All of a sudden the situation changed after Mansoor Ijaz, an influential American citizen of Pakistani ancestry, disclosed in an article published in The Financial Times on October10, 2011 that about a week after the Abbottabad Operation of May 2, 2011, in which Osama Bin Laden was hunted down, “a senior Pakistani diplomat” contacted him in the name of President Asif Ali Zardari, to send a message to the White House national security officials, seeking US assistance to prevent military takeover in Pakistan and offering to appoint a new national security team that would eliminate Section ‘S’ of the ISI, which maintained relations with the Taliban, Haqqani network and other militants.

According to Ijaz, a memo to the effect was duly drafted and sent to Admiral Mullen on May 10, 2011. Later on, former US National Security Advisor James L. Jones disclosed that the memo was sent through him.

After Foreign Policy magazine published the full text of the alleged memo, it became known that the memo contained provisions of far serious implications for Pakistan’s defence establishment and national security interests, including its nuclear programme, than what had been initially stated by Ijaz.

In quick developments subsequent to the publication of Ijaz’s Financial Times article, DG ISI General Ahmed Shuja Pasha met Ijaz in London to seek more details and then briefed Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani about the memo; General Kayani conveyed his concern to Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani about the alleged role of Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani in the memo affair; Gilani summoned Haqqani to Islamabad to clarify his position; Haqqani denied the charges that he had anything to do with the memo; Ijaz publicly maintained that Haqqani was the senior diplomat who had approached him for sending the memo and produced some ‘evidences’ in the form of Blackberry data and messages which he had exchanged with Haqqani; after initial rejection, Mullen’s spokesman confirmed that he had received the memo but had ignored it; Gilani obtained resignation from Haqqani and announced to hold inquiry into the whole affair. The inquiry was to be conducted by a parliamentary committee.

However, not satisfied with Gilani’s announcement, on November 23, 2011 Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the principal opposition party, Pakistan Muslim League (N) and many others, took the matter to the Supreme Court, praying that the “dreadful conspiracy to demonise, ridicule, malign and consequently demoralise and terrorise and resultantly to destroy the invaluable and valiant Armed Forces of Pakistan; to trade away the sovereignty of Pakistan and to barter away the very existence and the future of Pakistan which also amounts to waging a war against Pakistan, should be unearthed.”

Lead Petitioner Sharif arrayed Zardari, Haqqani, Ijaz, General Kayani, and General Pasha, Foreign Secretary and Interior Secretary and others as respondents to explain the “detestable, despicable and treacherous memorandum.”

The proceedings in the Supreme Court, where more petitions were filed, exposed many things, including some intriguing aspects of relationship between the civilian and military leadership, although, in the meantime, the attention was partly diverted to the dastardly blatant ISAF / NATO attack on Pakistani posts in the tribal area near Afghanistan’s border in which 24 soldiers were killed and many more seriously wounded.

December 1, 2011 the Supreme Court ordered the formation of a one-man inquiry commission, directed Haqqani not to leave the country and asked Zardari, General Pasha and General Kayani to explain their position.

The same day the PPP reacted with much venom.

In a hurriedly called press conference addressed by the PPP leaders, Babar Awan lashed out: “This time the PML (N) leaders have chosen strong shoulders to play their game, which I call the first act of the Bangladesh model.”

He referred to Sharif’s petition as a conspiracy to pitch state institutions against each other to come to power through back door. He contended that under the Constitution only the executive had the authority to set up a commission and wrongly complained that the Supreme Court did not allow the federation to present its argument on the subject. He also criticised restrictions imposed on Haqqani without hearing him.

The PPP leaders’ tone in the press conference was very harsh and sarcastic. Awan played the old game: “The judicial history of the country is witness to the fact that PPP was never given justice, but at the same it has also become a known reality now that rulers of the Punjab have always got relief from the courts.” Awan’s outburst indicated that the PPP intended to use Sindh card and pose as an innocent victim of highhandedness if collision between institutions could not be averted.

On December 3, 2011 Newsweek published another article by Ijaz on a website in which Ijaz claimed that Haqqani had prior knowledge of the US “stealth mission to eliminate bin Laden that would violate Pakistan’s sovereignty.” Haqqani denied having any prior information of the Abbottabad Operation.

In another development, on December 4, 2011 President Zardari’s spokesman Farhatullah Babar announced that the president would address the joint session of the parliament after Ashura, which was falling on December 6.

It was understood that Zardari intended to speak about the proceedings subjudice before the Supreme Court on the controversial memo and the ISAF / NATO attack on Pakistani border posts, which had strained relations with the United States. Significantly the announcement of President Zardari’s address referred to him also as the Co-Chairman of the PPP and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This was unusual.

In a surprising development that created breath-taking suspense, on the day of Ashura (December 6) President Zardari suddenly left for Dubai. The statements of the PPP leaders about his departure compounded the confusion and confounded the nation.

The presidential spokesman stated that Zardari had gone to Dubai to visit his children and also to undergo some tests. Another PPP source stated the president needed “some time off from this madness.”

Late night reports said that Zardari had been admitted to hospital after he had a heart attack. A blog story claimed that the president was incoherent while speaking with President Barrack Obama on Sunday (December 4) because he felt that the noose was tightening around his neck.

In this back drop, the speculation became rife that he had left under some kind of deal offering safe passage and would submit his resignation soon. However, when asked about a possibility of soft coup in Pakistan, the US State Department said: “We have no concerns; we think it is health-related.”

In an emergency meeting of the PPP leaders in Islamabad on December 8 jointly chaired by Prime Minister Gilani and chairman of the party Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the PPP leaders decided to close their ranks in the face of growing challenges for the party. It seemed something critical was in the offing.

The next day, Zardari called Gilani and some journalists from hospital in Dubai. Reportedly he was his usual self. He stated that he left for Dubai because he did not trust hospitals in Pakistan and would be back soon. He dispelled the idea that he would resign. Now the questions that bothered the people were: Why did Zardari not trust hospitals in Pakistan? Was there any threat to his life and from whom? Was the military establishment or any of its agencies after him?

The same day (December 9) in his reply to the Supreme Court Haqqani, inter alia, submitted that Nawaz Sharif’s petition was not maintainable because it failed to highlight any violation of (his) fundamental rights and was based on allegations made by a dubious individual.

He also challenged the Supreme Court’s Order dated December 1. His petition challenging the Supreme Court Order was returned by the Registrar Supreme Court’s Office with some objections. Haqqani challenged the Registrar Supreme Court’s decision the following day.

In an interview with BBC on December 10, Gilani denied that Zardari had suffered from any stroke or that he had written a letter of resignation. He also dismissed speculation about any quiet coup.

Within 72 hours, things again appeared uncertain. This time it was a meeting on December 13 between Prime Minister Gilani and Chairman Senate Farooq H. Naek who was serving as acting president. The official press release said that they discussed the memo scandal.

On December 14 Gilani told the Senate that there had been a threat to President’s life if he had gone to Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences when his father was admitted there and, therefore, the president was persuaded to go to Dubai [instead of PIMS].

In the same speech Prime Minister stated: “Parliament, and not the government and the prime minister, should complete the term. It does not make any difference if I sit on opposition benches.”

Glani claimed that he had two-third majority in the National Assembly and if he resigned the opposition would not be in a position to form the government. He added: “In that case both of us will have to go and there will be no elections in our life time.” Gilani further said that there was a procedure in the Constitution to impeach the president and that the Constitution should be followed to keep the country intact.

Gilani again called the memo controversy a conspiracy against the parliament. He stated: “What is the purpose of taking to the court an incredible document authored by a person having a history of writing articles against Pakistan, its government and establishment.”

On December 14, Independent, a British newspaper published an article titled “Pakistan’s memo gate: was there ever going to be a coup?” by Omar Warriach based on Mansoor Ijaz’s, alleged, claim that General Pasha had visited Arab countries for discussion on a possible coup in Pakistan.

In the blog posted on Independent newspaper’s website Ijaz was quoted as having explained the following Blackberry message which he claimed to have sent to Haqqani: “I was just informed by senior US Intel that GD – SII [DG ISI] Mr. P asked for, and received permission, from senior Arab leaders a few days ago to sack Z.”

In the message, Intel stood for Intelligence Officer, P for Pasha and Z for Zardari. Reportedly Pasha had gone on a secret foreign trip on May 6, 2011.

December 15, 2011 was the last date for submission of reply to the Supreme Court in the memo case. The Supreme Court received the replies of all respondents except President Zardari.

In its reply the federal government requested the Supreme Court to dismiss Nawaz Sharif’s petition. It said that it was essential that the Parliamentary Committee on National Security should proceed with the probe to determine the issue and give its recommendations.

The reply stated: “It is the stance of the federation that the federal government (including the constitutional head of the state, the constitutional chief executive of the country or any other component of the federal government) has neither conceptualised nor initiated or, in manner, has anything to do with the alleged memo or the allegations or views expressed therein.”

Intriguingly, the federation’s reply attached a downloaded copy of Omar Warraich’s article published in Independent of December 14. This was an indication that the PPP government was prepared to counter attack the military establishment.

In his somewhat circumspect reply General Kayani stated: “There may be a need to fully examine the facts and circumstances leading to conception and issuance of the memo.” He also said that the matter had an impact on national security and the morale of Pakistan Army.

General Pasha in his reply called for a thorough investigation and stated that “access to unadulterated truth and justice” was the right of the people of Pakistan, “the real sovereign masters of this country.”

Both, the Army Chief and DG ISI, initially, held Haqqani responsible for the controversial memo.

In his submission spread over 81 pages, Mansoor Ijaz gave his version of the events since he was first time allegedly contacted by Haqqani for the drafting and communication of the memo.

On December 16, Jones came in support of Haqqani stating that he had no reason to believe that Haqqani had any role in the preparation of the memo. He did not elaborate what was the basis of his belief vindicating HH, and did not spell out the reasons for such vindication, when the matter is subjudice before the apex Court in Pakistan.

The same day Gilani and Kayani met and, according to the statement issued by the prime minister’s office, agreed that their replies to the Supreme Court should not be misconstrued as “a standoff between the army and the government.”
It was reported that during the meeting Gilani received a phone call of Zardari and Kayani also talked to the president. Next day prime minister was upbeat and told the media that both army and judiciary were with democracy and they would not derail the system.

In the early hours of December 19 President Zardari landed in Karachi.

It appeared that the tense moments were over.

But the optimism was quite short-lived. The Supreme Court took up the memo issue in the morning and at the outset of the hearing the Chief Justice, after referring to the press conference of the PPP leaders held on December 1, observed: “If the prime minister is of the opinion (that whatever uttered was not the stand of the government) he should tell what action he has taken knowing well that the matter is pending before the court.”

The Supreme Court noted that Zardari had not submitted his reply and told the attorney general that when allegations were not rebutted, these were normally considered to be true. The Supreme Court also sought para-wise comments from the respondents on petitions and replies.

The same day (December 19) Inter Services Public Relations issued a statement to dispel the impression that there had been any deal between Zardari and Kayani. The statement clarified that the President and the Army Chief talked for about a minute. “Hence, attributing anything more to this conversation is unfounded and unnecessary.”

Temperature in Islamabad rose again.

On December 20, the Ministry of Defence submitted to the Supreme Court that it exercised only administrative control and no operational control over the armed forces of Pakistan as well as the ISI.

The sign of friction between the civilian set-up and the military establishment became more evident.

In an important development on December 21, the ISPR denied that the DG ISI had met any Arab leader between May 1 and 9 and that stated that visits to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates prior and after these dates were of routine nature. This had become imperative because a petition had been filed in the Supreme Court seeking removal of Pasha as ISI Chief.

When others were complying with the directive of the Supreme Court, the PPP leaders held a meeting on December 21 to deliberate if Zardari should submit his reply or not. The PPP appeared to be on collision path.

December 22 was the worst day of the crisis.

While addressing at a function to commemorate the birth anniversary of the Quaid-i-Azam, Prime Minister Gilani stated that a conspiracy against his government was being hatched. He said that “a state within state” would not be tolerated and added: “all institutions, including the ministry of defence, should be answerable to parliament and the chief executive, who is the prime minister.” Obviously he was upset with the reply submitted by the Secretary of Defence to the Supreme Court and wanted to assert the authority of the civilian arm of the government over the military.

Later in the day he spoke in the National Assembly and pointedly said that he had set up a commission to know about those who were responsible for allowing Osama bin Laden to live in Abbottabad for six years. He repeated: “All institutions of the country are answerable to parliament and nobody is above law.”

It was a full-blown crisis. It seemed the point of no-return had been reached and the military may act any moment to wind up the civilian set-up.

At this juncture some western diplomats became active to defuse the crisis.

Next day the things settled down to a considerable extent.

Quite unusually, Chief of the Army Staff during his visit to forward posts in Mohmand and Kurram agencies stated: “Pakistan Army has and will continue to support democratic process in the country.” But he accused the government of diverting attention from the memo affair by raising alarm of coup. “Irrespective of all other considerations, there can be no compromise on national security,” he clarified.

During a hearing in the Supreme Court, Chief justice Chaudhry also made it clear that unlike in the past, there would be no validation of military takeover. “The (amended) code of conduct demands the judges to preserve and protect the Constitution at all cost. The system will run according to what the Constitution commands,” he stated.

This was not the first time that uncertainty gripped the country.

On a number of occasions since the PPP came to power it appeared that the civilian and military leaderships were on a collision course or the executive and the judiciary were on a war path. Every time the PPP played on the front foot, directly or indirectly, accusing the army and judiciary of hatching conspiracy against democracy and the civilian set-up.

The truth is that all these three institutions have failed to fulfil their responsibilities within the parameters of the Constitution in varying degrees. The executive has not fully complied with the orders and directives of the Supreme Court issued in different cases. Although on several occasions the prime minister has assured the nation that the orders of the Supreme Court would be implemented in letter and spirit, the facts do not substantiate his claim. Often it appeared that the executive was dodging the Supreme Court or playing hide and seek with it.

On its part, the superior judiciary has also given the impression that it has been a bit selective in taking up cases. There is the petition of Asghar Khan concerning the distribution of money by secret agencies to political rivals of the PPP.

There is the case questioning the legitimacy of Shabaz Sharif as Chief Minister of Punjab. There are a large number of cases against the leaders and workers of the MQM for committing violence, including murders, which should have been reopened or restored after the NRO was declared null and void.

There is the case against the MQM for creating mayhem in Karachi on May 12, 2007 in which at least 40 people were killed. When Sindh High Court tried to take up the matter of May 12 the MQM workers threateningly surrounded the Sindh High Court. The High Court was brow-beaten by the MQM thugs but the Supreme Court did nothing.

It is also a truth that the military establishment and its agencies – Military Intelligence or Inter-Services Intelligence – have to live with lot of past baggage. In every general election, the military establishment historically resorts to pre-poll, polling day and post-poll manipulations.

It jealously and exclusively controls the defence and foreign policies of the country. At time people get the impression that the armed forces have monopolised patriotism and do not consider the civilians trustworthy.

Having said all this, one should take it as a good omen that the Supreme Court has made it clear that it would not bestow legitimacy to any extra-constitutional act of taking over the government and the military establishment has given assurance that it does not intend to derail the democratic process.

Pakistan Muslim League (N) has shown great maturity by declaring that it will oppose any military intervention. Almost all important political parties have supported the democratic process. Same is the stand taken by the media in general and representatives of the civil society in particular.

But then this leads us to the question: what next?

For the PPP leadership it is the time for introspection and soul-searching. It needs to reform itself and become more responsive to people’s demands and aspirations. No one can challenge the authority of the government if it is able to command popular trust and respect.

Obviously the best course for the ruling coalition is to address the grievances of the people and focus on improving the quality of governance. It should address the complaints of corruption, favouritism, nepotism, breakdown in law and order, energy crisis, mismanagement in state corporations, inflation, economic meltdown and other issues. It also has to show that it respects the other institutions of the state as “as it desires to be respected.

If the present slide continues, the people may get completely tired and ultimately become fed up of the civilian rule. The fatigue is already visible. To be frank, it is largely due to the Imran Khan factor that a considerable segment of masses has retained some hope in democratic process.

The PPP should understand that, despite all proclamations in the favour of democracy, there is a thresh hold of tolerance and the army or the Supreme Court may perforce decide to wind up the system in national interests if there is a further deterioration in governance and if the government continues on the collision course.

The possibility of such an eventuality is highly pronounced, despite the clear and forth right announcement by both the institutions, given the propensity of the incumbent Zardari-Gilani dispensation to provoke confrontation with these state institutions.

Such an eventuality will be a reality if they were to indulge in any ill-conceived adventurism against the Army and Judiciary. They ought to take a leaf from the contemporary instances of such adventurism by Nawaz Sharif in 1993 and again by Nawaz Sharif in October 1999.

For the government the best course would be to resign and go to the people for a fresh mandate, but it is a tall order for the incumbent government, although the entire dispensation is crying hoarse thatit believes in the power of ballot.

Hence, given the prevailing environment, for the opposition, the best course available is to resign from the assemblies and force the government to go for the fresh polls.

After the resignations the opposition should simultaneously press for having an independent Election Commission, preparation of fool proof voters’ list as directed by the Supreme Court and peaceful conduct of polling on the day of elections.

It should not insist on resignation or removal of President Zardari as a prerequisite for transparent and fair general elections. Any such demand would be unconstitutional and would set a bad example. As for the President, let the cases before the Supreme Court run its course and the President should honour, abide and bow before the outcome of those cases.

As far as the controversial memo is concerned, let there be an inquiry commission by the Supreme Court and let it submit its report to the Supreme Court and let the Supreme Court decide the future line of action and if anyone is found responsible, the laws should take its own course, may it be Haqqani or even the President.

The army has already got over stretched. Its primary responsibility is to defend the country against foreign aggression and internal insurgencies. It should not offer an opportunity to the PPP leaders to go down as martyrs. Any reckless adventurism will bring bad name to the army and it would be thoroughly discredited in a short span.

It is not in the interest of the country to upset the applecart when elections are possible constitutionally and that is the only democratic way to go forward.

There’s certainly a lot of legitimate debate about what exactly government is supposed to be expected to do, and what is the best way to go about doing it. Perhaps you in fact think it appropriate to take some people’s money at gunpoint to give to poor folks (like YOU, no doubt). But recognize this is what you are doing, and don’t kid yourself that it’s something truly different than if you just walked into the bank with a gun — other than you’re getting someone else to do your dirty work. The stick-up artist is just cutting out the middleman. As HL Mencken memorably put it, “Every election is a sort of advance auction sale of stolen goods.”

That said, Mr President and Mr Prime Minister, seize the moment and go to the people, your government has run out of steam. Live up to what you preach and let the change come through the ballot, the power of the ballot is what we need in sheer defence; else what shall save us from a second slavery?

However, do not misunderstand and think that ballots are the opposite of bullets. They are not. They are just a substitute for muting direct violence, not the elimination of violence.

Pakistan and the Endgame in Afghanistan

2011-11-09T13:44:00.000+05:00

Pakistan and the Endgame in Afghanistan

By amicus • Nov 9th, 2011 • Category: Lead Story • 3 Comments
After completing the review of America’s ongoing ‘war on terror’ and related situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Barack Obama addressed the nation from West Point, New York, on December 1, 2009, to announce: “.. as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined to send an additional 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.”

In order to comply with the timetable set for starting the withdrawal of American troops, the US Administration stepped up military operations against the Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan and built pressure on Pakistan to do the same in different parts of Federally Administered Tribal Areas where allegedly there were safe havens of the militants.

Although Pakistan opened new fronts against the Taliban in the tribal region, it was selective in choosing its targets. In particular, Pakistan was not prepared to act against the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan and denied the existence of the so-called Quetta Shura. Pakistan’s military establishment regards them as strategic assets to be used to safeguard Pakistan’s interests in post-American Afghanistan. There is divergence of goals in Afghanistan between Pakistan and USA.

The US-Pakistan cooperation received a setback in January 2011 when Raymond Davis, a CIA operative, killed two Pakistanis in Lahore and was caught. The incident exposed some clandestine CIA activities that were in conflict with Pakistan’s national security interests and the Pakistan security establishment decided to impose certain restrictions on the CIA operatives and private contractors hired by the agency.

As if the Raymond Davis Case was not enough, on May 2, 2011, the US Navy Seals conducted an operation in Abbottabad hunting Osama bin Laden. The Abbottabad Operation was highly secret and the Pakistan military establishment was not taken into confidence even at the highest level. At least two US helicopters and a C-130 plane blatantly violated Pakistani airspace to conduct the operation deep inside Pakistani territory.

The Abbottabad Operation led to breakdown of trust between the United States and Pakistan. The US Administration suspected the ISI or some of its officers of harboring Osama bin Laden and other high value targets. On the other side, the Pakistani military establishment was jolted out of its slumber to realize the nature of threats that existed to Pakistan’s status as a sovereign state.

On 22 May terrorists played havoc in the Mehran Base of Pakistan Navy in Karachi, further heightening the sense of insecurity and vulnerability of the armed forces.

All these incidents cast aspersions on the preparedness and ability of Pakistan Armed Forces to defend the country and their own installations. They also raised questions about the costs and benefits of Pakistan’s role in what was essentially an American war.

Pakistan had been cooperating with the United States to the utmost limit commensurate with its security interests. It had allowed the US to use drones at will to attack targets in FATA, which had enabled the US forces to eliminate a number of Al-Qaeda operatives. More than 30,000 Pakistani civilians and 3,500 armed forces personnel had lost their lives in ‘war on terror’. Pakistan’s economy had suffered a loss of nearly $60 billion since 9/11 and here was the United States that did not trust it or adequately compensate it and only demanded that Pakistan should ‘do more’.

Inside Afghanistan, there was a resurgence of the Taliban and, although the US Administration was reluctant to admit, the things were not working as planned. The incompetent and corrupt Karzai regime was not able to expand its writ effectively or strengthen its national security apparatus to the requisite extent. Counter-insurgency (COIN) needed popular support which was not forthcoming.

Notwithstanding the grim scenario, President Obama was determined to go ahead with what he had promised to the American people in his West Point speech of December 1, 2009.

Addressing the nation from White House on June 22, 2011, Obama referred to his West Point speech and recalled that there were clear objectives of the surge: to refocus on Al Qaeda; reverse the Taliban’s momentum; and train Afghan Security Forces to defend their own country, and that American commitment in Afghanistan was not to be open-ended.

Obama also declared that starting next month i.e., July, the American troops would start withdrawing from Afghanistan and by the summer of 2012 a total of 33,000 troops would have returned home. He said that after this initial reduction American troops would continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces moved into the lead. He added that American mission would change from combat to support. By 2014, the process of transition would be complete and the Afghan people would be responsible for their security.

Obama claimed that the United States was starting the drawdown from a position of strength. He said that Al Qaeda was under more pressure than at any other time since 9/11 and, working, together with the Pakistan, the Americans had taken out more than half of Al Qaeda’s leadership.

Emphasizing upon the need for a political settlement in Afghanistan, Obama stated that as the United States strengthened the Afghanistan government and security forces, it would join initiatives to reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban. “Our position on these talks is clear: they must be led by the Afghan government, and those who want to be a part of peaceful Afghanistan must break from Al Qaeda, abandon violence, and abide by the Afghan Constitution”, he added.

Obama made it clear that the American goal was to ensure there were no safe havens from which Al Qaeda or its affiliates could launch attacks against American homeland or American allies. He said that the United States would build an enduring partnership with the Afghan people to ensure that it was able to continue targeting terrorists and supporting a sovereign Afghan government. This implied that some American forces would continue to stay in Afghanistan for an indefinite period.

Alleging the presence of terrorist safe-havens in Pakistan, Obama stated: “. . . we will continue to press Pakistan to expand its participation in securing a more peaceful future for this war-torn region. We will work with the Pakistan government to root out the cancer of violent extremism, and we will insist that it keeps its commitment.”

While defining these broad features of American plan for endgame in Afghanistan, Obama said that as there would be dark days ahead in Afghanistan, the light of secure peace could be seen in the distance.

Soon after Obama’s speech, there was a marked surge in the Taliban activities in Afghanistan.

On June 28, 2011, there was an attack on Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul in which at least ten people were killed. On August 19, at least sixteen people lost their lives and twenty-two were injured in a suicide attack on the British Council in Kabul. On September 10, there was a truck bombing at a NATO outpost in Wardak province that killed four civilians and wounded seventy-seven American troops. On September 13, the militants targeted US Embassy, NATO headquarters and some other high profile installations with rocket-propelled grenades, gunfire and suicide bombings. In the assault which continued for 20 hours sixteen people lost their lives and six NATO troops were wounded.

This was too much for the Americans. The US officials blamed the Haqqani network for these attacks and started brow-beating Pakistan.

On September 15, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told the Senate Committee on Armed Services that the US could take “operational steps” to eliminate the threat emanating from terrorist sanctuaries which he alleged were situated in the Pakistani tribal belt. “I think the message they [Pakistanis] need to know is we’re going to do everything we can to defend our forces.”

US Military Chief Admiral Mike Mullen hurled the accusation during the Congressional hearing: “The Haqqani network, for one, acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Internal Services Intelligence agency. With ISI support, the Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy.” He claimed: “We also have credible intelligence that they were behind the June 28 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller, but effective operations.” He warned: “In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the government of Pakistan – and most especially the Pakistan Army and ISI – jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership, but also Pakistan’s opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence.”

In an interview to Radio Pakistan, Ambassador Cameron Munter also blamed the Haqqani network for Kabul attack and said: “There is evidence linking the Haqqani network to the Pakistan government. This is something that must stop.”

Subsequently US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton gave a long lecture to Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar on the possible consequences of Pakistan’s failure to rein in the Haqqanis.

Perhaps the US objective was to make Pakistan a scapegoat for its failure in Afghanistan. The Americans were conveniently forgetting that if the militants had their bases on Pakistani soil, they must have travelled a long distance inside Afghanistan to reach Kabul to carry out the assault without any check on the part of NATO/ISAF.

The US officials were also ignoring the fact that there had been attacks inside Pakistan from across the border with Afghanistan which the NATO/ISAF or the Afghan security forces had failed to prevent.

Implicit in the US posturing was the threat that it could retaliate against Pakistan for its failure to act against the Haqqani network. It could resort to air-raids against alleged targets inside Pakistan or the NATO/ISAF could cross the Durand Line in hot-pursuit of the militants. This obviously created a sense of emergency in Pakistan.

On September 16, Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, while addressing the meeting of NATO Chiefs of Defense in Seville, Spain, stated that Pakistan was committed to struggle against terrorism but it was Pakistan’s sovereign right to formulate its policy “in accordance with its national interests and the wishes of the Pakistani people.”

The situation took yet another nasty turn.

On September 20, a Taliban suicide bomber killed Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik and a former President of Afghanistan, who was the head of the High Peace Council formed by the Afghanistan Government to work for a political settlement in the country. Reportedly Burhanuddin was working on a plan that included offering amnesty and jobs to Taliban fighters and asylum to Taliban leaders in third countries.

Some quarters in Afghanistan pointed fingers towards Pakistan claiming that the assassin had come from FATA.

In this backdrop, Pakistan Government and the military establishment felt the need to demonstrate national unity and consensus on the Afghanistan policy and a firm resolution to face American threats and challenges to Pakistan’s sovereignty and security.

On September 29, 2011, an All Parties Conference was convened in Islamabad in which the Chief of Army Staff General Kayani and ISI Chief Shuja Pasha were also present.

Among other things the APC recognized that there had to be “a new direction and policy with focus on peace and reconciliation.” It called for initiation of dialogue with a view to negotiate peace with “our own people” in the tribal area.

The APC made it clear that defense of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity was a sacred duty which should never be compromised. It said that national interests were supreme and should guide Pakistan’s policy and response to all challenges at all times.

The APC rejected the assertions and baseless allegations made [by the United States] against Pakistan. It called them of no substance and derogatory to a partnership approach. The APC declared: “The Pakistani nation affirms its full solidarity and support for the armed forces of Pakistan in defeating any threat to national security.”

The message was loud and clear to the United States: This time Pakistan had decided to show spine.

The Haqqanis were not Pakistan’s headache; they had done no harm to Pakistan; if they were involved in attacks against the occupational forces in Afghanistan, it was their problem.

If the United States opted for any military adventurism inside FATA or stopped aid, Pakistan could withdraw from the so-called American war on terror; it could bring to a halt nearly 75% of supplies to the NATO/ISAF that passed through its territory. If the United States sought Pakistan’s continued cooperation, it had to take Pakistan’s legitimate interests and security concerns into consideration.

Perhaps the United States had not expected Pakistan to take a tough stand. It understood that if Pakistan withdrew its cooperation, the Afghan tangle would become far more difficult to resolve. It was essential to have Pakistan on board for the timely endgame in Pakistan. As a result the US officials changed their tone.

On September 30, Obama stated that Mullen was expressing “frustration” over alleged safe havens when he referred to the Haqqani network as an arm of Pakistan’s ISI. “The intelligence is not as clear as we might like in terms of what exactly that relationship is”, he added.

In order to sort out Pakistan-United States differences, Clinton visited Pakistan on October 20-21. Although the mantra of terrorist safe havens on Pakistani territory and Pakistan’s responsibility to eliminate them continued, her mission included cooling down of the temperature and improving the US image in the Pakistani media.

Significantly Clinton urged Pakistan to play the role of a peacemaker in Afghanistan. She stated: “We think that Pakistan for a variety of reasons has the capacity to encourage, push, to squeeze . . . terrorists, including the Haqqanis and Afghan Taliban, to be willing to engage in the peace process.”

She declared that the United States respected Pakistan’s sovereignty and would not take any unilateral action against the terrorists on Pakistani soil.

On her return home, Clinton clarified that the United States had asked Pakistanis to squeeze the Taliban and the Haqqani network but that did not necessarily mean “overt military action” against them. She also admitted that there were safe havens of the Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan.

As of today certain dimensions of the Afghanistan tangle are clear.

The United States is prepared to negotiate with the Taliban, including the Haqqani network and Mulla Umar-led so-called Quetta Shura, for the formation of a broad-based government in Afghanistan but insists that these negotiations should be (apparently) led by the Afghanistan Government.

In fact, according to US State Department the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to hold a trilogue with the Taliban and operational details are being worked out.

The United States intends to withdraw the bulk of its forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Its NATO allies are even in greater hurry to wind up their operations. However, the US Administration wants an unspecified number of American troops to stay at selected places, bases and installations in Afghanistan. This is to enable the United States to monitor the situation in Afghanistan and the region as a whole.

Simultaneously, the United States is inclined to give an important role to India in Afghanistan. Due to China factor there is substantial compatibility of the US-India interests in the region.

At present the Taliban are reluctant to negotiate with the American until foreign troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. Pakistan has some clout over the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban. It can serve as bridge and facilitator between the two but cannot guarantee the success of the negotiations.

The United States should also understand that there cannot be pre-conditions. The Taliban cannot be asked to lay down arms, sever ties with the Al Qaeda or declare respect for the Afghan Constitution before the start of negotiations.

The Haqqani network has declared itself a part of the Taliban. It has asked the Americans to establish contact with Mulla Umar, whom the Taliban regard as the commander of the faithful (Amir-ul Momineen). It has rejected previous overtures of the United States for talks on the suspicion that they aimed at creating fissures and divisions among the Taliban.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, it considers Afghanistan, particularly its Pashtun-dominated southern and eastern parts, as of vital interest.

Pakistan believes that India is aspiring to have a foothold and say in Afghanistan which is not commensurate with what it rightly deserves. There are reports that India plans to train Afghan forces and have some military contingents and advisors permanently stationed in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan-India strategic alliance with provision for cooperation in the field of defense is a nightmare for Pakistan.

India can ask for extension of proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline to its territory. It can also aspire to have transit trade facilities across Pakistani territory to Afghanistan and beyond. But a permanent Indian military presence in Afghanistan is an unacceptable security risk for Pakistan.

Pakistan’s claim for a say in Afghanistan’s future is based on solid grounds. No other country has so close ethnic affinity with Afghanistan as Pakistan. Not only is the Afghanistan-Pakistan border long and porous, traditionally there has been free movement of Pashtun tribesmen across it. Since independence, Pakistan has provided transit trade facilities to Afghanistan. There are still nearly three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. India’s interests in Afghanistan do not match Pakistan’s legitimate claims.

There are irrefutable evidences of Indian interference in Pakistan’ Baluchistan province and FATA. The Indian consulates on the Afghanistan side of the Durand Line are responsible for master-minding several terror attacks inside Pakistan. They support Baloch insurgents to destabilize the province. If Pakistan’s security concerns about post-American Afghanistan are not addressed now, it would have no option other to use militant organizations to target Indian interests in Afghanistan and the peace in the region would remain elusive.

It is heartening that Clinton has shown understanding of Pakistan’s position and complexity of the situation.

On October 27, she told the Congress Committee on Foreign Affairs: “There is no solution in the region without Pakistan and no stable future in the region without a partnership.”

She insisted that the US aid to Pakistan should not be made conditional on disbanding of Lashkar-i-Taiba and that the real game-changer in the region would be a stronger relationship between Pakistan and India.

“You can always count on Americans to do the right thing – after they’ve tried everything else.” . . . Winston Churchill.

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Tagged as: FATA, Haqqani Network, Hillary Clinton, Lashkar-i-Taiba, War on Terror

Detailed Judgement Supreme Court of Pakistan-Karachi Situation

2011-10-06T20:15:00.000+05:00

A Five Member Bench of Supreme Court of Pakistan, headed by Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, announced detailed Judgment on Suo-Moto Case No. 16 of 2011 and other petitions Regarding Suo-Moto action on Law and Order situation in Karachi.

The Karachi Crisis

2011-09-29T18:42:00.000+05:00

The Karachi Crisis

By amicus • Sep 29th, 2011 • Category: Politics • No Responses

As a result of the on-going discourse and proceedings in the Supreme Court on the Karachi crisis, there has emerged a general consensus that the various mafias involved in extortion (bhatta-taking), kidnapping for ransom, drug peddling, arms proliferation, land grabbing and target-killings are either part and parcel of different political, ethnic and sectarian parties or enjoy their patronage, protection and blessings.
It has also been further confirmed that the three principal stake-holders – the PPP, the MQM and the ANP – are largely responsible for the ineffective role of law enforcement agencies in stemming the tide of crimes in the metropolis. They are reluctant to look beyond narrow party interests and their leaders have insatiable lust for material gains.
DG Rangers has informed the Supreme Court that the armed groups belonging to different political and religious parties hide their illicit weapons in their respective party offices where law-enforcement personnel are denied access. According to him, the situation in Karachi is worse than Waziristan. The DG Rangers is not exaggerating.
Extremely alarming is the recent phenomenon of abduction of innocent people on the ground of their ethnic or linguistic identity and their execution through beheading or torturing to death in the most heinous manner. The uploading of gory scenes shot in torture cells on You-tube has terrorized the people in Karachi. The involvement of foreign powers with local political forces cannot be ruled out.
The questions are: Where is the city of Karachi heading to? Is there any solution?
It would be of great worth if the Supreme Court is able to dig out the root causes of the lawlessness in Karachi and set some general guidelines to overcome the crisis. However, judicial process has its limitations and judiciary cannot act politically.
It is time the principal stake-holders and political forces, in particular the PPP, the MQM and the ANP, resolved their differences in the light of ground realities and took necessary steps to restore law and order in Karachi.
A sensible and patriotic course for the civilian government and political forces would be to forge understanding broadly on the following lines:
•    Recognition of demographic changes that have taken place in Karachi since 9/11 and power-sharing on its basis.
•    Fresh delimitation of National and Provincial Assembly constituencies to make them reflective of Karachi’s current demography.
•    Restoration of the City District Government of Karachi (with commensurate changes in Hyderabad) and holding of local bodies elections.
•    Making the Election Commission of Pakistan completely independent, preparation of fool proof voters’ lists and taking of appropriate steps to ensure that the general and local bodies’ elections are held freely, fairly and transparently.
•    Cleansing of political parties of criminal elements, disbanding of their armed groups/wings and renunciation of violence as an instrument of policy by all political parties.
•    Stern across the board and indiscriminate action by law enforcement agencies – police and rangers – against criminal groups and mafias, including those affiliated with the political parties, particularly the PPP, the MQM and the ANP.
•    If required, imposition of Governor’s rule or calling of the armed forces to civilian help under Article 245 of the Constitution.
•    Strengthening of prosecution process and improvement in collection of evidence, especially forensic evidence.
•    Offering adequate protection to judicial officials and witnesses.
•    Holding of trials of terrorists without any political interference.
•    Necessary and practical steps to check flow of arms and seizure of unlicensed arms. Cancellation of arms licenses given on political consideration.
•    Across the board accountability in all government departments to check corruption and mismanagement. Improvement in the quality of governance.
Karachi has turned into a jungle and as a part of long-term solution its civic infrastructure would have to be restored, rebuilt and upgraded.
A people psychologically shattered due to electricity outages, disruption in water and gas supply, poor and inadequate transport, health and education systems, housing problems, under-nourishment etc. become prone to committing violence at the slightest instigation and fall an easy prey to anti-social and anti-state propaganda.
If the civilian authorities and political forces fail to forge understanding on taking effective measures, ultimately the Pakistan Armed Forces may have to act to rescue the situation in Karachi on its own.
In other words, the army would have to take-over the whole country.
But the army intervention is likely to have far-reaching positive and negative consequences for the country.
On the positive side, there would be marked improvement in law and order situation in Karachi and elsewhere, due to military action, at least in the short run. The reason: the criminal elements would find themselves without protection of civilian authorities and political parties.
The armed forces would involve technocrats in the administration of the country. This would improve the quality of governance, including decision-making, planning and execution of projects.
The civic agencies would provide relatively better service to the people and respond to their complaints to the possible extent.
There would be reduction in corruption and wastage of resources.
On the negative side, the first casualty would be the country’s Constitution. The nascent democratic process would be wound up and representative institutions, including the National and Provincial Assemblies, would stand dissolved.
The military administration would have to take on board self-serving politicians to serve as a bridge to the people and, as in the past, a King’s Party would have to be formed.
The army that is deeply involved in Baluchistan and FATA would be further over-stretched at the cost of the defence of Pakistan’s western and eastern frontiers.
The centrifugal forces would get strengthened and find an opportunity to intensify its propaganda against the Pakistan Armed Forces. This would become easier for the centrifugal forces, if some mishap happens or extra-judicial killings take place during the military operation.
The professionalism of the armed forces would be compromised and ultimately there would be search for an exit strategy.
At the end of the day the armed forces would decide to hold general elections and transfer power to the same corrupt politicians, whom they are going to remove, to complete another vicious cycle in Pakistan’s chequered political history.
As such, the army intervention would only be justified if the military establishment is prepared to transform the structure of the society by introducing drastic land and taxation reforms and heavily investing in physical infrastructure and social sectors. In other words, the intervention would be beneficial only if the military establishment is prepared to become the torch-bearer of revolutionary change in Pakistan. It should not leave the country in a worse position.
The two stark options have been mentioned above. If neither the civilian government nor the Pakistan Armed Forces address the Karachi situation with sincerity of purpose, the consequences would be disastrous.
Already a considerable part of Karachi has got divided into areas belonging to different ethnic groups. Some localities belonging to Pashtuns or Sindhis and Balochis have become no go areas for Mohajirs. Similarly some Mohajir dominated localities are considered as dangerous by other ethnic groups. In sensitive areas, people belonging to minority communities are feeling unsafe. They are selling their properties at throw-out prices and moving away. There have been reports of ethnic cleansing taking place. The process may be slow but it is there to be observed.
Karachi is on the precipice. Further aggravation in law and order may cause irreparable loss. In the worst case scenario the city may plunge into civil war leading to massive dislocation and indiscriminate killings in hundreds or even thousands.
Demography of Karachi is such that combined population of Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Sindhis and Balochis is almost equal to that of Mohajirs. The symmetry of power may increase the ferocity of the conflict if it becomes free for all.
There are apparently elements within different political parties who do not seem to be sincere with the country. They are likely to work for disintegration of Pakistan. Killings on massive scale would allow them to solicit support of foreign powers, including India and NATO.
Karachi is strategically located. In the context of ‘war on terror’, it has assumed great importance for the United States. The bulk of supplies to NATO/ISAF stationed in Afghanistan first arrive at the port of Karachi. Karachi is the southern gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, hence very self-serving point of view too, the United States cannot afford Karachi’s destabilization.
As the first option, the United States and Britain are using their clout to resolve the differences between the PPP and the MQM and want the MQM to re-join the federal and provincial governments. If they fail in their task, they may not remain averse to the Pakistan army taking-over the country to ensure that stability is restored in Karachi. However, if Karachi plunges into civil war and situation becomes extremely critical, they may as a last resort ask NATO to intervene in Karachi to protect their vital interests.
Some political analysts have speculated that the United States is interested in acquiring a corridor from Gwadar to Chaman or some other appropriate point in Baluchistan to have access through land route to Afghanistan and beyond for construction of gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia.
In this manner, the United States would also be able to block China from acquiring access to the Gwadar Port which is situated near the mouth of the Gulf in the Arabian Sea and may acquire presence all along the Pakistan-Iran Border, which would entail horrendous consequences for the region.
Even if this, apparently, far-fetched idea gets materialized, the importance of the port city of Karachi would not diminish in foreseeable future and the United States would go to any extent to restore peace and stability in Karachi. It would love to ensure that there is a proper power-sharing and cooperation between stake-holders / political forces through whatever options available, including military intervention by NATO.
It is about time we the people of Pakistan rise to the occasion and bring peace to Karachi by persuasion, prodding and if necessitated, even by force.

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Tagged as: Afaq Ahmad, karachi, Karachi Target Killing, mqm, Nato

Making of Mohajir Political Entity and City of Karachi

2011-08-24T12:19:00.000+05:00

Making of Mohajir Political Entity and City of Karachi

By Guest Blogger • Aug 24th, 2011 • Category: Lead Story • 5 Comments

Mohajirs constitute a part of the population, which migrated from India to Pakistan after partition in 1947. A majority of migrants came from East Punjab In West Punjab. They got relatively assimilated with the native population within a generation.

On the other hand, Mohajirs came from areas further east, south and west in India and settled mainly in urban Sindh. They remained largely unassimilated with the local population even after two generations.

Patterns of Migration Number of Share of Ratio in Total Refugees Population

1. Pakistan7.22 million 100 10%

2. East Bengal.7 million9.67%1.7%

3. W. Pakistan6.52 million 90.3%20%

4. Punjab5.3 million73%25.6%

5. Sindh (ex K).55 million7.6%11.7%

6. Karachi.61 million8.53%55%

Source: Census of Pakistan 1951, Vol. I, Table 19-A, Vol. 6, p. 65.Unlike in Punjab, refugees in Sindh deified integration in the local society because of their linguistic, cultural and historical remoteness from Sindhis.

These differences were patterned along sectoral lines. 63.9 percent of refugees in Sindh lived in urban areas, 86.16 percent in Hyderabad district and 71 percent in Sukkur.

In Karachi, there were only 14.28 percent speakers of Sindhi in 1951 as opposed to 58.7 percent who spoke Urdu as their mother tongue. Thus, Karachi overnight became a Mohajir city.

The government of Pakistan carved the city out of Sindh in July 1948. It became a federally administered area as capital of Pakistan. The process of refugee rehabilitation in Karachi and Sindh generally remained far from satisfactory.

Even in 1954, i.e. 7 years after partition, no less than 2,40,000 out of a total of 7,50,000 refugees in Karachi were still to be rehabilitated.

While in Punjab, immigration had virtually stopped in 1948, in Sindh it continued even after the passport and visa system was introduced for travel between India and Pakistan.

About 1,00,000 refugees from India continued to come to Pakistan each year, with a majority belonging to ‘urban classes’ who generally came straight to Karachi. This created an immense problem of settlement, which in turn led to gross frustration among refugees.

Census of Pakistan, Karachi, 1951, Vol. 6, Statement 3-R, p. 36.13Ibid. Vol. 1, Statement 5-C, p. 87.14Debates (CAP), 23 March 1954, p. 405.

Mohajirs constitute a privileged community on the decline. Initially, they dominated the All India Muslim League in British India and later the government in Pakistan.

However, they occupied an inherently insecure position in terms of electoral politics. Prime Minister-designate Liaqat Ali Khan who was a Mohajir was inducted into the Constituent Assembly in place of an elected member from East Bengal.

The Mohajir leadership chose to bypass the Constituent Assembly which had been elected by the Muslim members of the legislative assemblies of Muslim majority provinces comprising Pakistan, and which was therefore dominated by ‘locals.’ It shunned elections, which would lead to its exit from power.

Instead, it operated through the higher bureaucracy that was also dominated by migrants of both Punjabi and Mohajir extraction.

Mohajirs who were only 3 percent of the population had 21 percent jobs. Among senior jobs, Mohajirs had 33.5 percent in federal bureaucracy in 1973 and 20 percent in the Secretariat group in 1974;however, their share came down to 18.3 percent in 1986 and 14.3 percent in 1989 respectively.

Mohajirs not only dominated politics and bureaucracy but also business. The Gujrati-speaking migrants from Bombay in India, especially Memon, Bohra and Khoja communities, were in the vanguard of industrialization in Pakistan. Gujrati-speaking Mohajirs controlled seven of the twelve largest industrial houses.

In 1972, when Bhutto nationalized industry in the ten leading sectors including electrical engineering, petrochemicals, iron and steel as well as rudimentary automotive assembly plants, Mohajirs were dealt a severe blow.

The Mohajir-led political leadership in the immediate post independence period sought to identify Pakistan with the Islamic world. Political loyalties in Pakistan were thus ‘externalized’ in the name of religion.

Mohajirs also continued to be deeply involved in the fate of Indian Muslims across the border. They were acutely sensitive to the latter’s needs to get jobs and tried to help them migrate to Pakistan.

Indeed, Mohajirs interpreted the Two Nation Theory itself in the context of the right of Indian Muslims to migrate to Pakistan. This led to a general deification of the state, accompanied by a cult of unity of the nation in the face of the perceived Indian bellicosity, largely at the cost of provincial autonomy, indigenous cultures.

Both the first Governor general and the first prime minister of Pakistan were Mohajirs. Similarly, Mohajirs also dominated the Central Working Committee of the Muslim League.

Mohajirs’ political attitudes were typically based on a paternalistic vision of the society, enhanced commitment to ideological mobilization and lack of tolerance for provincial and ethnic aspirations.

Three broad areas of change adversely affected Mohajirs: First, One-Unit was conceived to counter the weight of Bengalis in the National Assembly of Pakistan in view of the latter’s share of 55 percent in the country’s population.

However, under One Unit, it was Punjabis not Mohajirs who expanded their job circuit. Secondly, the 1958 coup put Punjabi generals in control of key positions in the corporate sector, opening up jobs for their co-ethnics.

Finally, the shift of capital to Islamabad in the vicinity of the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi pointed to the centrality of Punjab-based army in the new dispensation, largely at the expense of Mohajirs.

Pakistan was a state infused with a dominant migrant ethos, couched in an ideological framework of the Two-Nation Theory as the raison d’etre of Pakistan.

The ruling elite took pride in the achievements of the Indo-Muslim civilization over a thousand years and appropriated its symbols such as Urdu language, Mogul architectural monuments and the Indo-Iranian tradition of art.

The 1970 election was to change all that. The elite was unable to take into account the massive currents of indigenous revival in East Bengal, Punjab and Sindh. In (W) Pakistan, the Indus Valley overtook the Indo-Muslim civilization as a source of cultural symbols. Territorial nationalism pushed aside ideological nationalism as the dominant mode of thinking.

The popular refrain in the 1970s was that Pakistan was the home of four cultures, Sindhi, Punjabi, Baloch and Pakhtuns. This gradually legitimized the thesis that Pakistan consisted of four nationalities. The new populism flourished at the cost of the cherished worldview of the migrant elite rooted in a Unitarian model of politics.

In 1970, the state of Pakistan, which was originally conceived in non-Pakistan areas, finally took roots in the languages and cultures of the country itself. The indigenous revival put a new generation of Sindhi leadership in power.

It represented popular aspirations identified with historical and cultural identity of Sindh and was committed to the goal of cultural preservation against the perceived onslaught of Mohajirs.

It criticized the fact that only one fourth of the material in school text books reflected indigenous Pakistani cultures and their heroes while three fourths represented northern Indian cultural symbols and that making of Pakistan was attributed predominantly to Muslims of minority provinces while the role of majority provinces, especially Sindh which voted for Pakistan before others, was ignored.

The land question was another major source of Sindhi nationalist sentiment. Out of the land brought under cultivation by Ghulam Mohammad, Guddu and Sukkur. For a discussion of the migrant ethos, see Mohammad Waseem, op. cit., pp. 110-11.21Aftab Kazi, ‘Ethnic Nationalities, Education and Problems of National Integration in Pakistan-II’, Sindh Quarterly, 1989, No.1, pp. 21–27.

Barrages, 1.48 million, 0.64 million and 0.28 million acres respectively, ex-military officers and bureaucrats among others—mostly Punjabi but also Mohajirs—were allotted .87 million, 0.32 million and 0.13 million acres in that order.

The standard Mohajir response to Sindhi protest was that Sindhi waderas were too much given to a life of luxury and Sindhi haris were far too condemned to a life of misery to cultivate lands irrigated by Sukkur Barrage and that Mohajir domination in education and services was the product of inability or unwillingness of Sindhis to fill the vacuum created by the departing Hindus.

Mohajirs favored an open system of recruitment to educational institutions, jobs and businesses through competition on the basis of merit. Sindhis wanted protection through a fixed quota for jobs and services.

During the second quarter century after independence, Mohajirs’ social vision was effectively ‘nativised’. They now looked at themselves as belonging to Sindh and, especially, Karachi.

This happened due to arrival of new migrants who challenged their cultural, economic and political interests. During the last half century, Karachi experienced four major waves of migration, comprising Mohajirs (1940s–50s), Punjabis and Pathan (1960s–80s), Sindhis (1970s–90s), and foreigners including from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Thailand and Philippines, among others (1980s–90s).

The Mohajir mass public, which represented the bulk of the first wave migrants, squatted in kachi abadis (Shanty Towns), in conditions of acute residential and income insecurity. This situation reflected their helplessness with the local government for provision of tenure and civic amenities.

During the 1980s, the popular idiom shifted away from the two traditional sources of Mohajir identity formation, Islam and Pakistan to ethno-linguistic.

The second wave of migrants representing Punjabis and Pathan has been defined as ‘circular migration’ as opposed to the ‘permanent migration’ of Mohajirs. The former kept relations with family back home and visited home at varying intervals. It was estimated that out of 350,000 new inhabitants of Karachi every year, 150,000 were migrants from upcountry.

Punjabi migrants entered jobs in the new industrial units. Pathan construction workers, diggers of soil, retail sellers and transport workers, followed them.

At least half of them behaved as working-life migrants tied with home. Unlike the first wave migrants, the second wave migrants tended to keep their upcountry identity and loyalty intact.

As Linguistic Groups Karachi comprised, Urdu, Punjabi Pushtoon, Sindhi, Balochi, Hindko and Others 54.3%13.6%8.7%6.3%4.4%1%11.7%, respectively.

Source: 1981 Census Report of Karachi Division.

In Karachi, ethnicity emerged as the dominant theme in the 1980s as the mass of humanity living off the mainstream ‘planned’ social and political life developed its own rules of game for survival.

Ethnic groups were huddled together into informal security structures woven around vested interests such as jobs, houses, security against eviction or bulldozing of illegal tenements and other psychological support mechanisms.

Mohajirs started developing a sense of nationalism about Karachi and Sindh as a bulwark against Punjabi and Pathan migrants.

Previously, Punjabis had joined hands with Mohajirs and Pathan to form the Mohajir-Punjabi-Pashtun Muttahida Mahaz, which sought to safeguard the rights of the three migrant communities in Sindh.

However, as Mohajirs sought to co-operate with Sindhis against Punjabis, the latter reacted by closing their gap with Sindhis. The third wave of migration brought Sindhis into Karachi and Hyderabad.

Re-integration of Karachi with Sindh in an administrative and ‘political’ sense in 1970 and installation of a PPP government led by nationalist elements under Mumtaz Ali Bhutto as well as acts such as passing of the Language Bill and introduction of the quota system made the presence of Sindhis felt in the city.

The quota system provided jobs for the nascent Sindhi middle class. Moreover, the late arrival of Green Revolution in Sindh in the 1980s displaced many Sindhi tenants and haris from land and pushed them to Karachi.

The fourth wave of migration emerged in the 1980s when nationals of the neighboring countries started coming to Karachi.

A huge market in manpower transport emerged in the east of Arabian Sea extending to India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Indonesia and Philippines up to South Korea. Karachi became an important mid-way stop on the route to the Gulf, often becoming the hub of under ground activity surrounding traffic in workers, drug and women from Bangladesh and Philippines.

The number of political refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq (Kurds), Iran (Bahais), Burma (Muslims), and Sri Lanka (Tamils) and economic 27 Ibid. pp. 25–27.28.

Akbar Zaidi, ‘Sindhi vs Mohajir in Pakistan: Contradiction, Conflict, Compromise’, Economic and Political Weekly. May 16, 1991, p. 1297.

Refugees from Philippines, Bangladesh, Thailand, Somalia and Ethiopia in 1995 rose to 1,626,324.29. The first wave migrants—Mohajirs—resent the second, third and fourth wave migrants, and now considered themselves ‘natives’ of Karachi and Sindh.

They view Punjabis and Pathan as migrants of fortune who earn in Karachi but send back their earnings to their families’ upcountry, and invest money there in property and education of children, involving a net transfer of resources from Karachi. Mohajirs also object to the Sindhis’ practices of earning in Karachi and spending in the interior, (which is erroneous as it is other way around in large measure.

MQM: A POLITICAL PROFILE Squatter settlements provided a fertile ground for the ethnic message of Mohajir student activists. Universities and colleges crystallized Mohajir consciousness. Mohajir students had to contend with student association’s organized on linguistic and regional lines, including the Punjab Students Association, Pashtun Students Association, Baloch Students Organization and Jiye Sindh Students Federation.

This led to formation of the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organization (APMSO) in 1978. APMSO was a product of the perceived Mohajir grievances in terms of non-delivery of promises of the PNA leaders to eliminate the quota system and to secure the lives of Mohajirs against the perceived tyranny and violence. These student leaders later formed the MQM in 1984. In the new party, blind faith in the leader provided a string binding different participants of the movement. The MQM created a strong cult of personality of Altaf Hussain.

The non-elite character of the MQM leadership gave it a certain level of legitimacy to call itself a party of the poor. It claimed that it had broken the spell of traditional drawing room politics of capitalists and feudal and brought the poor and middle class leadership into assemblies.

It observed that masses could not vote according to their own choice because jagirdars, waderas, sardars and nawabs held them down under their cruel and dictatorial system.

It vowed to establish a system in the country under which there would be the rule of not the 2 percent privileged but the 98 percent poor and middle class.

However, despite its progressive rhetoric, the MQM lacked any policy structure, reform program or legislative proposals, observes Mohammad Suleman Sheikh, in ‘The Issue of Migration in Pakistan’, Unpublished paper, Islamabad, 1995.

Imran Farooq, Imperatives of Discipline and Organization, (Urdu), MQM document, Karachi, pp. 10–17.31 Reply Statement of the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Sindh in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, 5 June 1995, Petition No. 46/94, pp. 32-33.

MQM is the Symbol of Being Oppressed, (Urdu), MQM document, Karachi, 1994, pp. 6, 13.33Ibid. p. 14.34The Rule of the Poor, (Urdu), MQM document, Karachi, n.d., p. 7.

Not surprisingly, the MQM’s self-image as a party of the poor lacked credibility in the eyes of non-Mohajirs everywhere. In the public view, the MQM pitted the poor of one community against the poor of the other community across the street, not against the rich from the other side of the city.

The MQM can be considered as a policy-neutral, ideologically agnostic and pro-status quo party despite claims to the contrary. The quota system has been at the heart of the MQM politics.

After the Sindhi-dominated PPP government took power in Karachi in 1971, the issue of the share of Sindhis in education and jobs re-emerged on the political agenda.

The MQM points to a deliberate policy of discrimination against Mohajirs. Similarly, the fate of a quarter of a million Biharis in Bangladesh is a constant reference in the MQM’s literature.

The party has strongly criticized the government of Pakistan for not accepting its own citizens back into the country. A closely related issue is population because it has implications for jobs and elections.

The MQM has claimed that Mohajirs constituted 60 percent of the population in Sindh and that the 1961, 1972and 1981 census figures were manipulated to reduce the population of Mohajirs by more than half.

The MQM defined Mohajirs as those who (i) migrated to Pakistan from Muslim minority provinces of the sub-continent at the time of the partition, (ii) are not considered to belong to any of the nationalities of Pakistan—neither Punjabi, nor Sindhi, nor Balochi, nor Pakhtun, and (iii) migrated from those areas of East Punjab whose language and culture was not Punjabi.

The MQM took exception to the fact that the four provinces of Pakistan were constantly being declared as four brothers, excluding those who did not originally belong to any of these provinces.

Altaf Hussain declared that the slogan of Mohajir nationality was indeed the product of reaction to the slogan of four nationalities.

It was claimed that Mohajirs had now aligned themselves with the destiny of Sindh and become de facto sons of the soil. The MQM demanded rationalization of the prevalent domicile system so that only those locals should be issued domicile that had lived in Sindh along with their whole family for at least 20 years. It defined ‘locals’ as those who lived a family life, earned, spent, died and got buried in, and linked their interests with, the interests of Sindh.

This was essentially a nativity idiom rooted in a part of the territory of Sindh. The MQM leadership’s hobnobbing with the Sindhi nationalist leadership reflected its political stand against the upcountry migrants. Herald, Karachi, February 1988, p. 58.36MQM, Constitutional Petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Part 1.

The Punjabi Pakhtun Ittehad (PPI) came in to being on 7 March 1987. However, the PPI never really took off. In the 1988 elections, MQM and PPP bagged almost all Mohajir and Sindhi seats representing the two ethnic nationalisms respectively. The MQM and PPP formed a coalition and signed the Karachi Accord as a basis for co-operation.

However, soon their distinct party profiles on the issue of implementation of the Accord led them apart.

The downhill march of the coalition culminated in a secret alliance between the IJI opposition and MQM, which was disclosed and signed on 24 October 1989, but negotiated and signed much earlier in July 1989, on the eve of the no-confidence motion against Benazir Bhutto. Violence increased on the street and so did army’s involvement in civil administration.

The MQM’s partnership in the IJI government from 1990–92 represented the high point in its street power whereby it sought to maintain an iron grip on all Mohajir public activity.

The press was a special target of the MQM workers who burnt thousands of copies of the daily Dawn and stopped its distribution, looted the offices of daily Jang, and attacked the houses of journalists.

It demanded full coverage of its activities on prominent places on the papers, condemned critical views about the party and sought to punish those who would not oblige.

As long as some sections of the Mohajir population stayed outside its fold, the MQM felt that its legitimacy as an exclusively Mohajir party remained less than total.

These people were called traitors to the Mohajir cause and were sometimes beaten, abducted and tortured to teach a lesson to others.

Mohajirs were still far from integrated into a community because of their different linguistic, geographic and cultural backgrounds. In order to bind them together and put them immediately at the front of the political stage, unity by command rather than by persuasion was considered to be the way out.

In 1989-90, the MQM played the local bully for a national level political alliance, with a larger political objective of destabilizing the PPP government.

The MQM kept the momentum of its street politics high when it was a partner in Jam Sadiq Ali’s government in Sindh. Its share in state power, combined with its unchallenged street power, produced an inordinately high level of confidence in the party workers. Again in 1994-95, the MQM’s strategy focused on destabilizing the PPP government by exposing its inability to control street violence.

Moving beyond the rival ethnic groups and internal dissidents as targets of their action, the party workers abducted and tortured a serving army officer, Major Kaleem Ahmad. That was the last straw, which brought the army into play with full force. On 19 June 1992, army started Operation-Clean up in Sindh. It claimed that it had got hold of maps of ‘Jinnahpur’ or ‘Urdu Desh’ meant to be carved out of Sindh including Karachi, Hyderabad and some coastal area as an independent country by the MQM. It also unearthed 22 MQM torture cells, including one in Abbasi Shaheed Hospital.

Many of the top leaders of the MQM including Altaf Hussain were declared proclaimed offenders. Many others, including MNAs and MPAs of the MQM went underground.

The latter resigned from membership of the two assemblies. The army allegedly sponsored a rival faction within the MQM, called Haqiqi, comprising opponents of the Altaf group.

The MQM boycotted the 1993 elections for the National Assembly but it participated in the Sindh Assembly elections three days later and won 27 out of 100 seats. The new Benazir Bhutto government started a dialogue with the MQM, especially after the latter voted for the PPP nominee Farooq Leghari as president. However, each round of talks ended in failure. In June 1994, the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Court to a 27-year jail term sentenced Altaf Hussain.

In a series of open letters addressed to armed services chiefs, Altaf Hussain accused the military unit FIT and ‘officials of the armed forces’ in general of perpetrating atrocities on Mohajirs, extracting bribes from people worth millions of rupees and becoming ‘wealthy but devoid of moral fiber and patriotism’.

In end November 1994, the civil armed forces took over from the regular army units in Sindh. In the aftermath of the army withdrawal, the MQM launched its major attack on the institutions of civil administration and sought to create a law and order situation out in the street. In July 1995, a new Operation Clean-up was started in Karachi under the supervision of Interior Minister General Babar.

It was a coordinated effort between elite security and intelligence agencies, which used sophisticated monitoring equipment, network of informers, evaluation and corroboration of information acquired through interrogation and intelligence links within the MQM.

In the process of the operation, the PPP government allegedly carried out extra judicial killings, especially in fake police encounters, torture of the MQM’s workers and persecution of the latter’s families.

The humiliating searches inside households and brutish behavior of the police vis-à-vis the Mohajir youth alienated the community still further. Not surprisingly, Mohajirs continued to look towards the MQM for safeguarding their rights and interests.

By the second quarter of 1996, the MQM’s movement had been largely contained. While the MQM had intensely lobbied human rights organizations in and outside Pakistan, no generalized protest campaign against the government’s strong-arm tactics against it emerged in the country.

The MQM’s failure lay in its inability to challenge the legitimacy of the elected PPP government at any stage from 1993–96 either at Karachi or in Islamabad.

Rise of ethno nationalism, without incorporating the possibility and the nature of decline in its scope and intensity. An absolute majority of such movements have indeed been contained in the postwar era. It is unlikely that this trend will reserve in near future.

In this context, one can point to the Pushtoon, Baloch and Sindhi nationalist movements in Pakistan, which have been relatively contained within the framework of the political system of the country.

One can hope that the Mohajir nationalist movement will be reoriented towards a constitutional form of struggle and a parliamentary way to negotiating an ethnic bargain with other communities living in Sindh. It is significant to note that it is the state at the non-policy level, which created a situation of ethnic explosion in urban Sindh.

Various macro-level issues revolving around conflicts between politicians and army, federalist and provincial forces, Islamist and secularist elements and, externally, India and Pakistan seriously circumscribed the state’s capacity and will to pursue micro-level issues such as urban planning, educational and manpower strategies, as well as rural-urban and inter-provincial migration.

What is immediately required is the expansion of the service-giving network of the state in order to incorporate large sections of the population.

As the state defaulted on various counts such as citizen orientations, legal protection and security of life and property, ethnicity emerged as the new source of definition and categorization of interests and identity formation.

In other words, it was not too much of the (Jacobin) state, as primordial would have us believe, but rather too little of it which produced the Mohajir ethnic movement.

MQM has, since 2002, when General Pervez Musharraf opted for inclusive politics and rehabilitated the, MQM and MQM responded coming in to mainstream politics and since then is in the power corridors.

The PPP government opted for the same policy with MQM, although definitely for altogether different considerations, indispensability of MQM for formation and since then sustainability of Federal Government.

Hence in the Sindh Province MQM is a necessary evil for PPP, it is indispensable in keeping Zardari led PPP Government in Islamabad.

In this backdrop it is Karachi, which has become Achilles’ Heel-the vulnerable spot for the Mr. Zardari and Gilani. In the case of Karachi read MQM, the Peoples Party Sindh clearly appears to be at odds with its own Federal Government. The state is bearing the cost for the indecisiveness of incumbent dispensation in Islamabad.

One may seek guidance from Jinnah to address the contemporary issues of Karachi.

KARACHI–A CITY WITH BRIGHT FUTURE

Reply to the Civic Address presented by the Karachi Corporation on 25th August, 1947:

“I thank you Mayor and Councilors of the Corporation of the City of Karachi for your cordial address of welcome and all the kind thoughts and personal references you have been good enough to make with regard to myself and my sister. I appreciate the noble sentiments and ideals, which you have referred to and I assure you that it is my desire and hope that they will be cherished and lived up to. I am very glad that I have had this opportunity of meeting you all and the citizens of Karachi.

Undoubtedly, I have great love and regard for this beautiful town not only because of my old associations with it, or because it is my birthplace, as you have said, but because it has now become the birthplace of the free, sovereign and independent state of Pakistan. For all freedom - loving people, Karachi will on that account not only be symbol of special significance but will occupy a place in history for which there is no parallel, and I feel it my good fortune that I have the honor to be the first to receive this Civic Address.

Karachi is no ordinary town. Nature has given it exceptional advantages, which particularly suit modern needs and conditions.

That is why starting from humble beginnings it has come to be what it is, and one could say with confidence that the day is not far hence when it will be ranked amongst the first cities of the world. Not only its airports, but also the naval port and also the main town will be amongst the finest. There is one especially pleasing feature about Karachi –while most of the big cities are crowded and cramped with over towering structures, Karachi has large open spaces and hill station style roofs which give to the visitor a feeling of space and ease.

It has also got the advantage of a salubrious climate and is always blessed with healthy and cool breezes throughout the year. I visualize a great future for Karachi –it always had immense potentialities. Now with the establishment of Pakistan’s Capital here and the arrival of Pakistan Government and its personnel and the consequent influx of trade, industry and business, immense opportunities have opened out for it. So let us all strive together to make this beautiful town a great metropolis, a center of trade, industry and commerce, and a seat of learning and culture.

As you have said, the responsibilities of Karachi and its Corporation have increased along with its importance. I hope that the Corporation will prove equal to the task. There would be an extra strain on all phases of Corporation activities, but under the wise and able guidance of the City fathers, and with the co-operation of all the citizens, this would be, I trust, borne with alacrity and willingness. The help of the Government, I feel, will be available in your difficulties and problems and I am sure that the authorities concerned will in time deal appropriately with question of the power and status of the Corporation and its Mayor, questions which appear to worry you just now a great deal.

Karachi has the distinction of being the only town of importance where, during these times of communal disturbances, people have kept their heads cool and lived amicable, and I hope we shall continue to do so.

Pakistan is grateful to the Sindh Government and the Corporation and people of Karachi for welcoming its Central Government to have its headquarters here and for providing all facilities. With the arrival of Pakistan’s staff, Karachi already has, as its citizens, people from all parts of Pakistan and Hindustan. They will all live here together like true citizens and devote their energies to and avail themselves of the great opportunities that present themselves to us all to build up and reconstruct Pakistan in a manner which will command the respect of sister nations and find a place of honor along with great nations of the world as an equal.

It should be our aim not only to remove want and fear of all types, but also to secure liberty, fraternity and equality as enjoined upon us by Islam.

I thank you again, Mayor and Councillor for your address of welcome. Pakistan Zindabad”

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Tagged as: Bohra and Khoja, Jam Sadiq Ali, Jinnahpur, karachi, Karachi Demography, Karachi Target Killing, Memon, Urdu Desh

Focus on Next General Elections

2011-07-31T21:59:00.000+05:00

Focus on Next General Elections

By amicus • Jul 18th, 2011 • Category: Politics, Worth A Second Look • 11 Comments

Even if early polls are not held, the present assemblies will stand dissolved near the end of March 2013.
The political parties have started waking up to the reality and begun bracing for the polls.
It would be a good exercise to indulge in guesswork about the options available to different political parties and their likely strategy for the next general elections:
Pakistan People’s Party
In the general elections of 2008, the Pakistan People’s Party had won 124 out of 342 National Assembly seats, 107 out of 371 Punjab Assembly seats, 93 out of 168 Sindh Assembly seats, 30 out of 124 Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Assembly seats and 12 out of 65 Balochistan Assembly seats. In the Senate its number increased to 27 out of 100 seats when the partial elections of the Senate were held in 2008.
After the elections, the PPP formed the coalition governments at the center and in Sindh and shared power in Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. However, it had to leave the coalition in Punjab a few months ago due to differences with the PML (N).
On the negative side, rampant corruption, favoritism and nepotism have been the hallmark of the Pakistan People’s Party’s governments at the center and in Sindh. The PPP-led coalitions have failed to control inflation, overcome energy crisis or improve law and order.
On the positive side, it has secured consensus on the National Finance Commission Award and on provincial autonomy under the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution. It has initiated Benazir Income Support Program to assist the poor households and regularly increased the pay of government servants and the armed forces personnel in annual budgets.
In the next general elections, the PPP would strive to maintain its present position in the assemblies.
During the 2008 general elections, it had benefited from the sympathy wave caused by the martyrdom of Benazir Bhutto. The division of Muslim League votes between the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) had also helped the PPP in Punjab.
For the next elections, it seems that the PPP would have seat-adjustment with the PML (Q). Perhaps the constituencies where the PPP was successful would be retained by the PPP for its candidates and where the PML (Q) was successful by the PML (Q).
On the seats where both had lost, the strongest amongst the prospective candidates are likely to be fielded. Overall the PPP is likely to capture less number of seats from Punjab than at present for National and Punjab Assemblies due to its poor performance at the Center.
In Sindh, the PPP would not face much difficulty. The rural Sindh is traditionally the PPP’s stronghold. Barring a few seats where the Pakistan Muslim League (F) and the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) have strong candidates to field, the interior Sindh is likely to be retained by the PPP. The PPP would also focus on selected seats in urban Sindh. It would love to deprive the MQM of a couple of its National and Sindh Assembly seats, but is not likely to succeed. The PPP is likely to retain most of its National Assembly seats from Sindh and to secure majority in the Sindh Assembly.
In Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, things are likely to be somewhat difficult for the PPP if there is resurgence of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (F) due to growing anti-Americanism.
Pakistan Muslim League (N)
In the general elections of 2008, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) entered the arena at the last moment and without proper preparation. It secured 91 seats of the National Assembly, 171 of the Punjab Assembly and 9 seats of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Assembly. It remained unrepresentative in the Sindh and Balochistan Assemblies. After the 2008 elections of the Senate, it had 7 seats in the body.
Hitherto, the PML (N) has performed the role of a friendly or moderate opposition. It has refrained from doing anything that might have derailed the democratic process. It has aimed at the next general elections to emerge as the largest party and form the government at the center and in Punjab.
Over-confident about the future prospects, Nawaz Sharif was initially reluctant to take those members of the PML (N) back into the party’s fold who had deserted the party to join the PML (Q) after Sharif’s exile to Saudi Arabia.
It seems now he has realized that politics is the art of impossible and Asif Ali Zardari is master at it. The joining of hands by Zardari and Chaudhry Shujaat has made Sharif sober to the reality that the success of the PML (N) cannot be taken for granted.
The PML (N) also needs to define its policy towards the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Tehrik-e-Insaf Pakistan. These two parties have the potential to cause a dent in the PML (N) support in Punjab.
Given the current situation, the PML (N) is likely to form alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami. Barring the Chaudhries of Gujrat and a few others, it may also open its doors for those who had joined the PML (Q) but are prepared to return to the fold of the PML (N). There are some winning candidates in the PML (Q) with their traditional constituencies who cannot be ignored if the PML (N) aspires to emerge as the largest party in the next National Assembly.
As far as the Punjab Assembly is concerned, the PML (N) is almost certain to secure simple majority even if the PPP and the PML (Q) remain united. Only it needs to take at least the JI along to ensure that some of its voters are not swayed away.
In Sindh and Balochistan, the PML (N) can win a few seats if some PML (Q) members switch over to it. In Khyber-PakhtunKhwa, it is likely to face some set back in Hazara Division because of its support for the change of the name of NWFP to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.
Pakistan Muslim League (Q)
Despite the support of the establishment, it faced a backlash in the general elections of 2008 due to its pro-Musharraf posture.
Still it managed to win 54 seats of the National Assembly, 84 seats of the Punjab Assembly, 9 seats of the Sindh Assembly, 6 seats of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Assembly and 19 seats of the Balochistan Assembly. After the elections of 2008, its strength in the Senate was 21.
The PML (Q) would have willingly joined hands with the PML (N), but the latter enlisted the support of the PPP to form government in Punjab and then managed to create defections within the PML (Q).
In Balochistan, the PML (Q) has shared power with the independents, JUI (F) and the PPP.
Plagued by factionalism and defections, its strength has got divided or dwindled in all assemblies. In desperation, lately its leadership responded positively to the overtures of the PPP and joined the federal government.
After the withdrawal of the MQM from the Sindh government, the PML (Q) has become a partner of the PPP in Sindh too.
Several members of the PML (Q) have their traditional constituencies. The task before the Chaudhries of Gujrat is to retain whatever of the PML (Q) is under their command intact. By joining hands with the PPP, the PML (Q) leadership has ensured that its members are able to enter the corridor of power and avoid looking elsewhere.
During the next general elections, the PPP and the PML (Q) are likely to make seat adjustments to confront the PML (N). If this happens, the PML (Q) may retain considerable ground in Punjab and Sindh. In Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, the JUI (F) seems set to perform relatively better due to anti-Americanism at the cost of other parties.
Muttahida Quami Movement
During last twenty-two years, the MQM has joined the PPP, the PML (N) and the PML (Q)-led coalitions. Except the coalition led by PML (Q), none completed its term in office. In all other instances, the MQM left the coalition midway or was expelled and faced operation against its cadres.
In the general elections of 2008, the MQM secured 25 seats of the National Assembly and 51 seats of the Sindh Assembly. In Senate, its representation is 6. In none of the other provinces it has any representation.
The MQM has successfully created hostage mentality in its mohajir constituencies. The performance of City District Government of Karachi under the MQM was remarkable. It has a sound base in urban Sindh, in particular Karachi and Hyderabad, from where it is not likely to be displaced. Recent Mohajir-Pakhtun clashes and the PPP-MQM tension have strengthened the position of the MQM.
The MQM is struggling to have a foothold in other provinces also. However, at present its prospect of capturing seats in any other province is quite remote.
Awami National Party
The ANP is essentially a Pakhtun Party. In the general elections of 2008, it won 13 seats of the National Assembly, 48 seats of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Assembly, 4 seats of the Balochistan Assembly and 2 seats of the Sindh Assembly. In the Senate it has 6 members.
After the 2008 elections, it joined the PPP-led coalition at the centre and in Sindh. It led the coalition in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and shared power in Balochistan.
With the swing in the pendulum, it is likely to lose some ground to other parties, particularly JUI (F), in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. It is desperate to retain its 2 seats in the Sindh Assembly and increase this tally by at least one more in the next general elections. This is not likely to happen. The MQM is adamant not to lose ground in urban Sindh.
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (F)
The Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (F) faced great set back in the general elections of 2008 due to various reasons: first, after much bickering between its components the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal fell apart. Secondly the JUI (F) facilitated the election of Musharraf as president in September 2007. Thirdly the MMA had remained in power in NWFP (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) without delivering much.
In the general elections of2008, JUI (F) captured 7 seats of the National Assembly, 14 seats of the Pakhtunkhwa Assembly, 10 seats of Balochistan Assembly and 2 seats of Punjab Assembly.
In Senate, its strength was 10 largely thanks to the success of the MMA in 2002 general elections.
It became a coalition partner of the PPP at the center but withdrew a few months back claiming that the Hajj scam had been mishandled. However, the real reasons for it’s leaving the coalition are not very clear. It is believed that the idea was to topple the Gilani government but the PML (N) was not prepared to seize the opportunity when the JUI (F) and MQM left the coalition at the center in a surprise move.
In the next general elections, the JUI (F) is likely to perform better due to anti-Americanism. There is also a move to revive the MMA or form some other alliance of religious parties, which may strengthen it.
Pakistan Muslim League (F)
The PML (F) is mainly a party of feudal lords and gaddi nasheens who have their traditional seats. In the general elections of 2008, it won 5 seats of the National Assembly, 8 seats of the Sindh Assembly and 3 seats of the Punjab Assembly. It has just 1 member in the Senate. There is not likely to be any considerable change in its status.
Jamaat-e-Islami
JI has a number of supporters spread throughout Pakistan. It had boycotted the general elections of 2008. Individually it can hardly capture 3 or 4 seats. But it can give considerable boost to the alliance which it may join.
It seems the JI would prefer to form some grand anti-PPP alliance comprising PML (N), JI, JUI (F), PML (Q) or its faction and some minor groups to contest the next elections.
Tehrik-e-Insaf Pakistan
The TIP led by Imran Khan has great appeal for the youth. It had boycotted the elections of 2008 and does not have any representation in any assembly or the Senate.
The TIP does not have any feudal lords having traditional constituencies within its fold. It is not a well-organized party. Imran Khan has been very critical of the PPP, the PML (N) and the PML (Q). He wants his party to emerge as a third force that seems to be a distant dream.
The TIP may prefer to opt for solo flight. It may not win more than a couple of seats at the most but has the potential to attract voters at the cost of mainly the PML (N) in Punjab.
Conclusion
As of today it appears that the PPP is likely to emerge as the single largest party in the National and Sindh Assemblies, provided it is able to sustain its alliance with the PML (Q) and arrive at some sort of seat adjustment with it. Its tally may be 5 to 10 seat less than the number of seats it captured in 2008.
In that case the present scenario may continue and even the MQM may rejoin the PPP-led coalition after fresh negotiations on power sharing. The MQM would strive to get CDGK restored but may accept the Local Bodies Act of 1979 with some amendments.
The scenario may change if the PML (N) forms a grand alliance comprising the PML (N), the PML (Q) or a major chunk of it, the JI and the JUI (F). The PML (N)-led alliance may secure more seats than the PPP and its allies.
The above-mentioned scenarios have been conceived on the assumption that the next general elections would be held within the framework of the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the above permutations for next general elections, the most important elections right now are Senate elections of March 2012. Let’s take a look and try to under stand why there is so much churning in the ranks of opposition parties and why PPP and its allies are comfortable, with the exception of MQM spanner in the works.
If the next Senate election due in March 2012 is held under the present elected dispensation, the Pakistan Peoples Party will continue to dominate as the leading political party in the Senate. The PPP is expected to secure an unprecedented 43 seats in the upper house of Parliament.
Representation of minorities
The Senate itself has also expanded by four seats to represent the religious minorities in each of the four provinces, a change that took place as a result of the 18th Amendment to the constitution. After March 2012, there were 104 Senators.
Senate retirements:
After the Senate elections on March 11, 2012, several political parties will see a dramatic reduction in their representation. The most significant of these is the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid (PML-Q), which will see 19 of its Senators retiring, With a much smaller presence in the national and provincial legislatures, the party will not be able to replace or re-elect most of them.
Four of the ruling PPP’s senators will retire, but it will have 22 left in addition to a substantially expanded presence in the National, Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan Assemblies to be able to not just replace the outgoing four but to actually expand its presence to a plurality of between 43 and 45, according to some political observers.
The Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) will see its Senator Ishaq Dar complete his term, but the party has more than enough support to ensure his re-election and add to the remaining six senators whose terms expire in 2015.
The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) is likely to maintain its six seats after three of its senators retire while the Awami National Party (ANP) is likely to add to its current tally of six.
Senators from the Jamaat-e-Isami (JI), Pakistan Peoples Party-Sherpao, Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party and Jamhuri Watan Party will complete their tenure next year. Some of these had not participated in the 2008 general election to protest against former president Pervez Musharraf’s policies.
The decision to boycott the 2008 general election is likely to prove costly for five political parties, which will have to forfeit their representation in Parliament once their senators retire before the elections in March 2012.
The top leadership of these parties admit that the decision to boycott parliamentary elections has had far-reaching consequences.
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, Pakhtunkhawa Milli Awami Party, Jamhuri Watan Party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan and Jamiat Ahle Hadith will not be able to participate in the Senate elections because they have no representation in the assemblies.
Political parties which boycotted the 2008 general election will not be able to have their members elected to the Senate next year when half of its members will retire. Elections are conducted on a hundred seats in the Senate every three years. Members of the provincial and national assemblies elect senators for a six-year term.
Hence only the looser and those boycotted will be out and hence the hue and cry in the opposition ranks, particularly the PMl(N) is self serving and geared to deprive the Zardari led PPP from further consolidating its position in the senate, to deprive PML (Q) from benefiting out of its newly formed coalition with the former.
Despite, corruption, nepotism, lack or absence of governance, the the tense and conflict amongst the state organs, it seems the incumbent political dispensation in place is lurching to run its appointed term and complete its natural course and we will see the senate elections in March 2012 and the next general elections in 2013. Barring off course mass resignation by elected representatives of PML(N), MQM, Hum Khayal and some fence sitters in National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies, that could force derailment of the present dispensation and lead to dilute the electoral college for the senate elections in march 2012 and may be early elections.

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Tagged as: ANP, Asif Ali Zardari, CIA, Election Result 2013, ISI, mqm, nawaz sharif, PML-F, pml-n, PML-Q

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2011-07-31T21:56:00.000+05:00

The Deradicalization Initiative

By amicus • Jul 18th, 2011 • Category: Features • 5 Comments

Two newspaper reports:

1. The US Embassy in Islamabad hosted an event on July 3, 2011 in support of gay rights. Speaking on the occasion, US Deputy Ambassador Richard Hoagland stated that the US would support gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender rights in Pakistan. “I want to be clear: the US Embassy is here to support you and stand by your side every step of the way,” he told the audience.

2. In his key-note address at a seminar on ‘de-radicalisation’ held in Mingora on July 6, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani said: “We have taken the first step here in Swat by initiating a de-radicalisation programme. It needs support and initiative of the society, intellectuals and policy-makers to take the lead and put into effect a counter-radicalisation construct, not only to sustain the de-radicalisation effort, but also to assure a free and progressive future for Pakistan.”

Could it be that these two apparently separate events had a single purpose: to change the hue and colour of the Pakistani society, which the two gentlemen think has got too ‘radicalised’. In the case of Mr. Hoagland, the motive also seems to be to provoke and then identify the pockets of resistance in the process of de-radicalisation.

According to Oxford Dictionary & Thesaurus (Second Edition, 2007), the word ‘radical’ (as adjective) means:

1. Having to do with the basic nature of something; fundamental

2. Supporting complete political or social reform

3. Departing from tradition; new

Obviously, radicalisation of a society in the meanings 2 and 3 is something very positive. In fact, “to assure a free and progressive future for Pakistan”, as desired by General Kayani, it is imperative that there should be drastic and grassroots political and social reforms and a break from tradition i.e., tribal and feudal value-system and structure which is hallmark of Pakistan’s predominantly rural society.

This leaves us with the meaning 1 i.e., “having to do with the basic nature of something; fundamental”.

Since last many years, there has been a marked trend in some segments of Pakistan Armed Forces and Pakistani society to take inspiration from the fundamentals of Islam by way of response to multiple challenges that beset the country. Only a biased, stupid, ignorant or naive person would conclude that reverting to the fundamentals of Islam i.e., its purity and essence, amounts to leading a life of backwardness or cultivating terrorist mentality.

In case of ‘de-radicalisation’, or whatever euphemism is applied to the process, the idea seems to be to change the mind-set of the ‘radicalised’ (read Islamised) rank and file of Pakistan’s Armed Forces in particular and of the Pakistani society in general.

Perhaps, different instances of attacks on Pakistan’s military installations, including the General Headquarters, Rawalpindi, and the Mehran Naval Base, Karachi, have revealed that the militants who attacked these installations had sympathisers within the Pakistan Armed Forces. These sympathisers collaborated with the assailants in facilitating the execution of their missions. This led to the novel idea of ‘de-radicalising’ the ‘Islamist elements’ within the armed forces.

Before undertaking any exercise of ‘de-radicalisation’, those at the helm of affairs should answer some relevant questions:

1. How did Pakistan Armed Forces get what they call ‘radicalised’?

2. Why do elements within them cooperate with the outside ‘Islamic militants’?

3. Is it really bad that they have been ‘Islamised’?

To find the answers we have to explore the past.

The British had introduced the concept of ‘martial race’ in India. The Punjabis and the Pathans were included in the martial races that would defend India and serve British interests elsewhere. As a colonial power the British required highly professional mercenary armed forces that could kill and maim their own countrymen and co-religionists without any qualms. The British were successful to a considerable extent in their endeavour. The British Indian forces helped their colonial masters in subjugating the natives and fought for them during the Afghan Wars and the First and Second World Wars.

In what was a parallel development, conscientious Muslims resisted this trend. In early nineteenth century, Hazrat Shah Abdul Aziz, the eldest son of Hazrat Shah Wali-ullah, issued a religious decree (fatwa) that to cooperate with the British in destructing Muslim lives was a mortal sin amounting to apostasy. Shah Abdul Aziz was the moving spirit behind the jihad launched by Syed Ahmed Shaheed against the Sikhs of Punjab and North-West Frontier region.

Although there had been an accumulation of grievances, the immediate cause of the War of Independence of 1857 was religious in nature: the Muslim and Hindu troops refused to use cartridges smeared with the fat of pig and cow. Even these mercenaries declined to cross certain limits.

The issue of service in the British armed forces came to the forefront during the Khilafah Movement, 1919-1924. The institution of Khilafah had a religious significance for Muslims. The British were at war with the Ottomans and had deployed Muslim Indian troops against the Turks. The situation was unacceptable to the religious-minded Muslim.

During the Khilafat Movement several ulema, including Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Maulana Mohammad Ali, categorically stated that it was religiously unlawful (haram) for Indian Muslims to serve the British in war against their Turk co-religionists. The same view was expressed in the form of a resolution adopted by the Khilafah Conference session held at Karachi in 1921.

The reason why Maulana Mohammad Ali is so much admired and respected in Pakistan is that as a true Muslim he vehemently supported the fatwa that it was unlawful for Indian Muslims to serve in the British army against the Turks. The British considered it sedition. His bold advocacy of the said fatwa led to his trial and imprisonment for two years.

During 1940-47 communal feelings were at its height in India. The British Indian troops could not remain unaffected from this ‘great divide’ (although credit goes to Subhash Chandra Bose that his Indian National Army comprising deserters was multi-communal in character).

At the time of partition of India, the British Indian troops were offered choice to join Pakistan or Indian Armed Forces, irrespective of their place of residence. This was an admission that Pakistan was not going to be a ‘nation-state’ as the concept is understood in the West.

Pakistan was born with Islamic moorings. The Indian Muslims had given sacrifices not for ‘democracy’, ‘separate electorates’, ‘reservation of seats’, ‘quota in government jobs’ or ‘provincial autonomy’ but because they had been mesmerised by the lofty idealism and romanticism of creating an ‘Islamic State’, or the fortress of Islam, Pakistan.

After independence, Pakistan Armed Forces adopted Islamic nomenclatures, symbols, insignia and anthems. Victoria Cross was the thing of the past. The most cherished award now was the Nishan-e-Hyder. War ships and submarines were named Babur and Ghazi. Time came when missiles became Ghuaris and Abdalis. Pakistan’s nuclear device was informally referred to as ‘Islamic bomb’.

No doubt it was the Islamic spirit that helped the Pakistan Armed Forces and the nation unite against all odds in the India-Pakistan War of 1965. Just a single sentence of President Ayub Khan’s address that appealed to Islamic character of Pakistan electrified the nation. Blood started running fast in the veins of Pakistani Muslims. The middle level army officers and the rank and file fought the war as a jihad. A mercenary army of British Indian type could never have withstood the Indian onslaught on the fateful day of September 6, 1965.

The same armed forces faced great humiliation in 1971 because their war was illegitimate like the present so-called ‘war on terrorism’. The troops, misguided and confused, fought a losing war against their oppressed Bengali co-religionists who were duly assisted by the Indians. They lost because Islamic bond and fervour were lacking.

In the midst of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (December 1979-February 1989), President and Chief of the Army Staff General Mohammad Zia-ul Haq initiated a programme of ‘Islamization’ of the armed forces.

Alcohol was prohibited. Sporting beard, offering five-time prayers, fasting and performing Hajj was appreciated and rewarded. Those who embraced the concept of jihad and had ‘Islamic mind-set’ got easy promotions. Whatever might have been General Zia’s other failings, he imparted an Islamic colour to the Pakistan Armed Forces. In other words, he completed the process of ‘radicalisation’ of the troops and converted them into a highly motivated and formidable force.

Pakistan’s sponsored and supported militant groups, first in Afghanistan and subsequently in Kashmir. Pakistan Armed Forces forged close ties with these militant outfits and cooperated with them. They came into contact with the Taliban as allies and friends. They also came into contact with Arab, Chechen, Uzbek and Uighar militants and learned about the ideas of international Islamic movements.

The jihadi culture was at its height when 9/11 happened and all of a sudden the United States built–up pressure to reverse the trend and to ‘de-radicalise’ the Pakistan Armed Forces. The United States needed mercenaries. Pakistan Armed Forces were to be pitched against their co-religionists and erstwhile allies.

For the rank and file of the Pakistan Armed Forces who perceived India as the arch enemy, who sincerely believed that the Christians and Jews could never be the true friends of Muslims, who subscribed to the view that the Al-Qaeda was waging jihad against the crusaders and who regarded the Taliban as their brothers in religion, this was psychologically disastrous.

Thus the answer to our second question is to be found in the policy shift that was made by the Musharraf government in the aftermath of 9/11 and continues to this day.

Taking lessons from the past, including the British period and the India-Pakistan War of 1971, the military establishment should and the Government should shun seeking refuge with the Americans.

In matters of religious convictions, no ‘de-radicalisation’ can work. By siding with the United States, Pakistan’s military establishment has tarnished its own image. It has emerged as hypocrite. It has, in the process, created a hype and offered the propagandists an excuse, that that there is un ease within the Pakistan Armed Forces and some cases it is even alleged that some collaborate with the Al-Qaeda, Taliban and others against the infidels and their stooges. Pakistan’s enemies are taking undue advantage of this situation.

Can those who hold gay events in Islamabad be Pakistan’s friends? Never. They do not even comprehend the catharsis of Pakistan, its value system and the culture, where we have all the vices prevalent in the society, but owing to our faith and belief system, no attempt at legitimising or legalizing those could be acceptable or implemented. Besides, for taking Pakistan forward as a progressive democratic and tolerant nation state, Pakistan does not need to legitimise such fringe groups.

Pakistan needs is a sustained and lion’s share of development funds in the areas of education and health. There in lies the remedy for the disease called illiteracy, we in Pakistan suffer.

Once Pakistan jumps down from the American bandwagon, concedes legitimate demands of the militants and offers olive branch to them, the ball will be in their court. If any faction/s of the militants continues to mount attack against Pakistan Armed Forces after peace offer is made, it will be at fault and Pakistani troops will fight against misguided militants with religious zeal and fervour. There will be no hesitation. No fear of committing any mortal sin. No apprehension of becoming apostate. Such enemies would find no collaborators within Pakistan Armed Forces.

Any forced ‘de-radicalisation’ is bound to be counter-productive. It would be perceived as ‘de-Islamization’. It would create more fissures. It would weaken the armed forces and the society. It would be suicidal. It would unleash centrifugal forces. It would prove beyond any shadow of doubt that Pakistan’s military establishment is just a puppet whose strings are in the hands of Americans.

Pakistan needs armed forces that are imbibed with Islamic ideas and imbued with Islamic spirit. Mercenaries cannot defend it. Pakistan is not a ‘nation-state’ in traditional sense. Its ethos is different. Only Islam can cement the Pakistan Armed Forces, the society and the nation and ensure Pakistan’s security and territorial integrity.

Our Military Leaders need to revert to their fundamental moorings before it’s too late. Otherwise we will meet a fate far more terrible than what happened on December 16, 1971.

Has existing temperament, conviction, motivation and commitment to their MOTHER LAND PAKISTAN, impeded the Pakistan Armed Forces from being professionally the best army in the world. Have they not received laurels from the world community in its international missions under the UN, besides, all time love affection of the Nation. Before diving in to “de-radicalise” and reform, consider the notion of introspection and try to find out what went wrong? When and Why?

The tinkering with the ideology, belief system, and attitudes, constructed over a period of decades, particularly for the last three, is extremely sensitive, delicate and dangerous.

The situation in India in the late 1980s and 90s is very similar to most of the rest of the world today where we see, on the one hand, a militant Islamic revival, which has caused the deaths of thousands of people in different parts of the world.

Moderate Muslims have seen themselves sidelined in many countries and countries that have moderate Islamic beliefs like Egypt and Jordan find themselves fighting bloody battles to keep groups like the Islamic Brotherhood at bay even while other countries that have secular constitutions but Muslim majorities like Algeria and Turkey find their very existence threatened by religious fundamentalism.

It is believed by many in India that Indira Gandhi allowed the Sikh fundamentalists to become powerful because she was worried that in the Punjab the communists were working to organise the farm labourers since she believed that a religious fundamentalist would be the best force to fight an anti-religion communist government.

The west supported mujaheddin groups to fight the former USSR who would later join the Taliban and Al Qaeda and the world saw the horrors of 9/11.

The rise in Islamic fundamentalism has been paralleled in a rise in Christian fundamentalism in the USA, the country that suffered from the attack of 9/11 and previous attacks on it’s embassies, ships and citizens in different parts of the world, albeit owing to its own self serving policies of world domination and occupation of Muslim and other nations’ lands. There are as open calls in the USA to make the system more “Christian” as there have been in India by the BJP and it’s VHP, Bajrang Dal and RSS allies to make it more “Hindu.”

On the one side, India leaves no stone unturned in tarnishing the image of Pakistan by indicating the subversive acts of terrorists, which occur in the country intermittently, while Pakistan’s security forces have broken the backbone of the militants through successful military operations.

On the other side, New Delhi is quite silent about Hindutva (Hindu nationalism) terror, which has obtained a new face as Indian secret agency RAW, Indian high officials, and fundamentalist parties of the country have co-relationship.

It is of particular attention that historical background and religious beliefs, which have formed the habits and national character of Hindus, are quite different from the other ethnic and religious communities. Indians still have a strong belief in the superiority of their race.

Indian Hindus are followers of Chanakya (Say some thing and do some thing else). This fact has been verified by the misdeeds of Hindu fundamentalist parties like BJP, RSS, VHP, Shiv Sina and Bajrang Dal, which have missed no opportunity to communalise national politics of India even under the Congress rule. With the support of Indian officials and RAW agents, these parties have intensified anti-Christian and anti-Muslim bloodshed in the last decade coupled with the dissemination of Hindutva.

Israel, a major flashpoint, has seen a militant Jewish government fighting militant Palestinians who have chosen to abandon their more moderate leaders and embrace violently fundamentalist groups like Hamas and Islamic Jehad.

The danger of an intolerant world where the major religionists fight each other after being hijacked by fundamentalists looms large before us like an India magnified several times and made infinitely more dangerous. For, in the various militancy and mini wars that have been fought in India since the 1980s about 200,000 people have been killed.

Hence announcing such intention is doomed. Announcing or cutting a ribbon cannot deconstruct the constructed mindset. Look at Saudi Society they are still struggling with digesting women drivers. At the same time look again they have addressed the required deconstruction of their radicals.

Take a leaf. Being religious is not the problem its militant manifestation in any Society is. Look at Malaysian Model for inspiration.

Pakistan and its armed forces needs to be saved from becoming Afghanistan and moved to become Malaysia like Modern Muslim state, instead de-radicalisation and de-Islamization, we need to opt for reconstruction. No need to look for a phoenix rising from the ashes, it already did rise in 1947.

WHOM THE GODS WOULD DESTROY THEY FIRST MAKE MAD

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THE CHALLENGE OF TALIBANIZATION AND NEW GREAT GAME

2011-07-31T21:07:00.000+05:00

PAKISTAN:

THE CHALLENGE OF TALIBANIZATION AND NEW GREAT GAME

Amicus

Central Asian Oil and Gas Pipelines:

After the traumatic events of 1971, Pakistan is faced with the most serious crisis in its political history. The Taliban are not knocking at the door, they are now a part and parcel of Pakistani state and society. The process of Talibanization in Pakistan’s north-western region has given rise to new tensions in the body-politic of the country. Pakistan’s national security and social harmony depend upon its government’s response to the multi-dimensional challenges posed by the rise of the Taliban.

Ideologically the Taliban:

· Subscribe to a belief system that is based on the teachings of Deobandi school of Sunni sect in Islam. Wahabi influence is also visible due to the Taliban’s Saudi connection.

· Reject modernism and adhere to a social and legal code that combines Pashtun tribal traditions or Pashtunwali with one of the most orthodox versions of Islamic fiqah.

· Regard Islamic ummah as a single entity and disapprove of geographical barriers as representing artificial divisions imposed by the colonial masters on the Muslim world.

· Recognize the identity of purpose of the various Islamic movements across the globe.

· Consider jihad or holy war as the sixth obligatory pillar of Islam.

In the short-term the objectives of the Taliban are:

· To liberate Afghanistan from American-led occupational forces through jihad.

· To enforce a social, political and economic order __ based on their ideology or interpretation of Islam __ in Afghanistan and Pashtun-majority areas of Pakistan.

· In the long-term their objectives appear to be:

· To drive out, in conjunction with other Islamic groups, including Al-Qaeda, the infidel forces from all Muslim lands.

· To export the ideology of radical and fundamentalist Islam to other Muslim countries.

To achieve these objectives, the Taliban consider jihad as the main weapon in their armory. In line with the opinion of Ibn-e-Taimiya, they are prepared to use force against those Muslims who hinder or obstruct them in the waging of jihad or who are perceived as siding with the infidels. In their zeal they resort to suicide bombings in which, along with the target, innocent Muslims also get killed.

The challenges that Pakistani state and society face from the Taliban are multi-dimensional.

The Taliban have established their virtual writ in FATA and some areas of the NWFP. They use Pakistani tribal belt as a base to launch cross-border incursions into Afghanistan to attack American-led occupational forces. Their armed struggle against the occupational forces in Afghanistan is a combination of jihad and Pashtun war of national liberation.

However, since Pakistan is an ally of the United States in its so-called ‘war on terror’ and international law does not allow cross-border incursions into other countries except

in self-defense, Pakistan comes under pressure to act against the Taliban.

Wherever the Taliban get power they impose rules that create resentment in various segments of the society that do not subscribe to their extremist ideology. The Taliban compel women to wear burqa and restrict their employment opportunities to only a few fields. They consider imparting of western education to girls harmful to social values. They ban cinemas, television, videos, music and dancing. They force men to sport beards and do not permit modern hairstyles and dresses. They use armed religious police to implement their edicts concerning ‘social morality’ and establish a parallel judicial system to deliver ‘swift justice’. They are ruthless in punishing the ‘delinquents’.

The opponents of the Taliban argue that there is a considerable room for ijtihad in Islam, and fiqah can not remain static as society progresses. They contend that the interpretation of Islam by the Taliban is faulty and inconsistent with the viewpoint of the majority of Muslims.

They think that the laws and rules framed by the Taliban do not conform to the needs of the changing times and are retrogressive in nature.

According to the detractors of the Taliban, there is no compulsion in Islam to observe its rites, but only persuasion.

The Taliban represent Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam. Their emergence in certain tribal areas, particularly in Hangu, has led to Shia-Sunni conflicts that have claimed many lives. Their domination is likely to promote conflicts between the Deobandies and Bareilvies.

In fact the ongoing clashes between the Lashkar-e-Islam and Lashkar-e-Ansar in the tribal belt represent sectarian divide. The pirs and sajada nasheens of Sindh and Punjab disapprove of the Taliban beliefs.

In Pakistan, where there is a sizable Shia community and probably a majority of Sunnis belonging to Bareilvi maslak, the rise of the Taliban pose a serious threat to social harmony.

The Talibanization is also a threat to traditional power-structure in the tribal areas. The political ascendancy and economic interests of the tribal maliks and feudal lords are at stake. They know that the radicalization of the society under the Taliban would eliminate their leadership role and privileges.

The Taliban include the local people and they are also well-trained, well-equipped and totally devoted to their ideology.

The use of military force against them has always proved very costly. Several hundreds of Pakistani troops have already lost their lives.

The Pakistan armed forces do not have moral resolution and fighting capability to eliminate the Taliban from the frontier region. A large number of Pakistani troops have defected due to religious and ethnic considerations. Others are fighting under great psychological stress.

The Taliban have the human and material resources to respond by attacking targets in Sindh and Punjab. With suicide bombers at their disposal they are capable of targeting military personnel and installations in high security zones.

Having no qualms in killing innocent Muslims as ‘collateral damage’, they have the means to target sensitive civil installations and create havoc in big cities.

The past military actions by the Pakistan armed forces against the Taliban have resulted in creation of a sympathy wave for their cause and soaring of their ranks. The process of Talibanization in the settled areas of NWFP has got impetus and they have succeeded in enforcing their version of Shari’ah in parts of the province.

Pakistan government’s dilemma is that if it resorts to military means as a solution, the process of Talibanization would only intensify, if it does not do so then it may have to concede establishment of a state within state, to make it palatable, call it conceding state writ, which in any case has always been the case.

Any concerted military action against the Taliban may lead to their movement to Karachi and other non-Pashtun areas. The MQM is already crying wolf, has repeatedly warned against the settlement of the Taliban in Karachi, as if that already is not the case. Karachi has the largest Pushtoon popultion, out side their home, one shudders to think the number may translate into thousands even percentge point is assumed.

The recent bomb blasts in the Pashtun-majority localities of the city are indicative of the potential dangers. The city may witness new rounds of Pashtun-Mohajir riots.

The non-Pashtun Islamists may join hands with the Taliban to settle their scores with the MQM activists.

On a different note, there have been reports that Deobandi ulema from India are involved in prompting the Taliban to fight against Pakistani troops on the ground that the later are ‘hypocrites’ and American paid ‘mercenaries’.

There can be no denying the fact that Pakistan armed forces are receiving approximately $ 1 billion annually as payment for guarding the country’s border with Afghanistan and to check Taliban infiltration into that country.

If the idea that Pakistan is nothing more than a client state of the United States gains acceptance, the Taliban may direct their efforts at the creation of an independent ‘Islamic Emirate’ comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan’s FATA, NWFP and northern Balochistan with a land corridor to the Arabian Sea.

Indian Consulates on the Afghan side of the border are also actively involved in fomenting trouble in the NWFP and Balochistan. There are confirmed reports of Indian material support to insurgents in Balochistan which has given renewed impetus to the nationalist-separatist movement in the province.

The number of attacks on gas installations and pipelines has increased. According to some accounts India has established training camps on Afghanistan’s territory to train Baloch and Sindhi nationalists, MQM activists and the Taliban. All this is happening in the presence of American-led coalition forces in Afghanistan.

The question is: Is there any tacit approval of the United States for these anti-Pakistan activities?

The cross-border incursions of the Taliban into Afghanistan have led to infringement of Pakistan’s sovereignty by the American-led coalition forces. There have been air-raids and missile attacks on suspected targets inside Pakistani territory sometime resulting in casualties of Pakistani troops also.

There is likelihood that the American-led coalition forces would resort more frequently to missile attacks, aerial bombings and hot-pursuits deep inside Pakistani territory to target the Taliban.

It is surprising that well equipped NATO forces are unable to guard the Pak-Afghan border and blame is placed on Pakistan.

Pakistan has lost more than one thousand troops fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants and has set up nearly one thousand check-posts on the border. The question is: Where is ISAF? War on Terror was supposed to be Global Effort.

The United States is applying carrot and stick policy to Pakistan. The frequent statements of the US President, Secretary of State and high officials that Pakistan’s tribal belt has become a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and that Pakistan should do more to eliminate the ‘terrorist’ threat to America are meant to brow beat Pakistan.

Simultaneously there are offers of military and economic assistance to Pakistan if it is prepared to ‘do more’. On 30 July a panel of the US Senate proposed a $ 15 billion package for Pakistan under certain conditions.

If Pakistan recants, the United States, could twist Pakistan’s arm through economic means. Since fuel and food prices are sky-rocketing internationally, and Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves are fast depleting, the United States can give tough time to people and Pakistan to extract submission.

Pakistan is caught between devil and deep sea. Opinions differ as to what should be the policy of Pakistan government. Risks abound whatever course of action is adopted.

Opinion in favor of policy of defiance of the United States

There is a strong opinion that before making any policy choice Pakistan’s decision makers should keep the larger context in mind and remember that the ultimate objectives of the United States and India are:

· To prevent China from acquiring a foothold at Gwadar whereby it can project power at the mouth of the Gulf region in the Arabian Sea. China plans to build oil terminals at Gwadar and to obtain transit facilities across Balochistan, the NWFP and the Northern Areas of Pakistan, which goes against the interests of the United States and India.

GWADAR PORT

2.To deprive Pakistan of its nuclear assets on one or other pretext and, if they could, to reduce it to an innocuous buffer state between India and the oil producing Gulf region. India can then have access to the Central Asia and the Gulf region via Pakistan territory to meet its energy requirement and block China from reaching the Arabian Sea.

It would be the height of naiveté, according to this opinion, not to read this United States and Indian Strategic objectives and still indulege in collective self deception, as preached, that its objective is limited to elimination of so-called terrorist threat from the Pakistani tribal belt.

The United States has made it clear that it has come to Afghanistan to stay. So has Nato.

It is a new phase of the erstwhile ‘Great Game’ for control over energy resources and vital transit routes. The core areas in this ‘Great Game’ are Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan and principal players the United States, Russia, China and India.

The protagonists of this opinion ask: If the United States has limited objectives and is serious in a peaceful resolution of Afghanistan crisis then why is it not opening serious dialogue with the Taliban. After all it was and so was, the UN, had Taliban acted as required post 911. If it was kosher then it ought to be now.

Without taking the true representatives of the Pashtuns on board, how can the United States achieve a permanent peace in that country?

If Pakistan does not change its China policy, according to this opinion, the United States is likely to achieve its objectives by redrawing of regional map. This redrawing may be in the form of creation of an independent Balochistan by design and emergence of an ‘Islamic Emirate’ in the Pashtun majority areas, by defult.

In either case, China will be blocked and Pakistan reduced to a shadow of its past.silent struggle between America and China to set Pakistan's future course has bee under way for a while. The symbiotic economic relationship between the US and China is so deep that economic disaster in one could cripple the other. Simultneously, one could not ignore the security interests of both nations are coming in conflict.

Both nations are attempting to resolve conflicting security interests without upsetting the economic applecart. The battlefield of this carefully calibrated struggle is Pakistan. A silent proxy war between the US and China is under way there.

That struggle was out in the open the day President Musharraf assaulted the Lal Masjid and got off his neutral perch.

The Lal Masjid clerics were loyal to Baitullah Mehsud. The latter's brother masterminded the attacks against Chinese workers in Baluchistan and Islamabad. After Chinese workers were killed, Beijing cracked the whip. Musharraf who had resisted similar pressure by the US to counter the Taliban in Afghanistan reacted with alacrity. He ordered the Lal Masjid assault.

Assassination of Benazir Bhutto is also attributed to her declared agenda--to create a European style South Asian Union that would include India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

That is why Mehsud dismissed Pakistan's allegation that he was behind her murder. Mehsud had denied the allegation and there was no reason to disbelieve him.

Instead the pro-Al Qaeda elements including those in the Pakistan army and ISI were alleged to be the likely suspects because they had a motive.

In recent days the CIA charged the ISI with aiding the Taliban militants and organising the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Prime Minister Gilani made a ritualistic denial of this charge. Clearly he is not equipped to take on the ISI. His attempt to place the agency under civilian control was farcically reversed withinhours.

But Musharraf has leapt to the defence of the ISI and in good measure accused India of fomenting the unrest in Baluchistan. For both China and Pakistan, it is much easier targeting India than America.

However, it transpires that within closed doors, Musharraf, general Kayani and ISI chief General Nadeem Taj did accuse the US of aiding terrorism in Pakistan.

According to The News of Pakistan, impeccable sources had informed the paper that the Pakistani leaders had unburdened themselves to two senior US officials in meetings held on July 12th.

The paper reported that the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff admiral Michael Mullen and CIA deputy director Stephen R Kappes carried "what were seen as India-influenced intelligence inputs".

That "hardened the resolve of Pakistan's security establishment to keep supreme Pakistan's national security interest even if it meant straining ties with the US and NATO".

The report added: "The Americans were not interested in disrupting the Kabul-based fountainhead of terrorism in Baluchistan nor do they want to allocate the marvellous Predator (unmanned armed aerial combat vehicle) resource to neutralise the kingpin of suicide bombings against the Pakistani military establishment now hiding near the Pakistan-Afghan border."

The US officials were asked why the CIA-run Predators were not deployed after the exact location of tribal leader Baitullah Mehsud had been provided to them.

It is in this context that Musharraf has accused India of fomenting unrest in Baluchistan while ceasefire violations by the Pakistani army have increased. Impeachment of Musharraf is being discussed by Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, leaders of two Pakistan parties. Musharraf has cancelled his visit to the Beijing Olympics.

Musharraf has seized the moment to strongly defend the army and ISI in order to counter his political opponents. After his recent visit to China he is probably confident of full support from Beijing. Rubbishing US allegations against the ISI seems to indicate that.

According to this opinion, a careful study of the situation would suggest that it is relatively far better to have truce and negotiated settlement with the Taliban than waging war against them.

The understanding with them can broadly be on the following lines:

· Pakistan government should withdraw its troops from the tribal belt and let the local people, including the Taliban, the ulema and the tribal chiefs decide about the fate of the region.

· Pakistan armed forces should not obstruct cross-border incursions into Afghanistan by the Taliban. It is far better to divert the Taliban towards Afghanistan with tacit assurance to them that their rear is safe, if not for its strategic interest then as “tit for tat” for harbouring, training and launching terrorists in connivance with India.

· The Taliban may be allowed to implement shari’ah laws and to establish Islamic judicial system in the Pashtun areas where they enjoy considerable popular support, with negotiation and lagislation. A leaf may be drawn from Malaysia, and many other brotherly Muslim Countries. Even UK and else where in the world, where there is a rich debate going if Muslim Minorities in their midst ought to have their own judicial system.

· The Taliban should be persuaded not to interfere with the sectarian beliefs of other people and not to forcefully penetrate into non-Pashtun areas.

· If India continues with its policy of mischief, it should be paid in the same coin. Even if the peace process is jeopardized let it be so. The dormant jihadi outfits should no more be supressed for Freedom of occupied Kashmir.

· If Pakistan still remains under pressure to act against the Taliban, the Line of Control in Kashmir may be heated up. The world would not be able to ignore nuclear flash-point and issue of ‘war on terror’ would recede into background.

The protagonists of this opinion maintain that even if the concessions to the Taliban mean creation of a quoasi- autonomous region within Pakistani state it is far better than spilling Muslim blood for other peoples war and ultimately witnessing the break-up of the country and surrender of its nuclear assets.

In the most critical times the tribesmen have stood like a rock to defend Pakistan’s interests. The Taliban can still serve as the most dependable line of Pakistan’s defense only they need to be won over and prevented from falling into the lap of India.

The examples of Iraq and Iran have demonstrated that the United States acts only against weak countries. Pakistan should rise from prostration, become assertive and tell United States, as it is, no more at the cost of state.

Opinion in favor of policy of compliance of the United States

The other opinion is that the United States is primarily concerned with the removal of terrorist threat emanating from Pakistani territory and that if another 9 /11 takes place it is likely to be from Pakistani tribal belt. That, un-wittingly, was articulated by Head of our Government.)

The protagonists of this opinion think that Pakistan is in no position to rise from prostration. Either genuinely or in order to ingratiate the United States they are prepared to declare the so-called American ‘war on terror’ as Pakistan’s war.

They project the Taliban as a threat to Pakistani state and society and justify use of force to destroy them.

Since 9 /11 Pakistan government has generally pursued this policy, although at times there was hunting with the hound and running with the hare. Towards the end of 2003, General Musharraf conceded that cross-border incursions into Afghanistan were taking place from Pakistani side and agreed to resort to military action. The use of force proved extremely costly, it destabilized Pakistan and intensified the process of Talibanization. At times the Pakistan government relented and entered into negotiations with the Taliban but peace agreements concluded between the two sides did not last long due to American pressure.

The protagonists of the policy of compliance believe that Pakistan’s hands are tied and it very desperately needs economic and military assistance which can only be secured if it carries out American directives.

Conclusion and Suggestions

Any policy based on outright defiance of the United States is fraught with great dangers. Similarly, the continuation of present policy may bring economic windfall but it is very likely to result in a protracted warfare in FATA and the NWFP that may lead to a virtual north-south division of the country or its formal break-up.

In the opinion of this scrib, the best course for Pakistan government would be to take the sensitivities of principal actors of the ‘Great Game’ into account.

If it is unmistakably proved that giving China access to Gwadar port, with millitary objectives, is beyond the limit of tolerance of the United States and India, Pakistan may need to allay their apprehensions.(1)

India is investing heavy on development of land route between Central Asia and Iranian Port of Chah Bahar via Afghanistan but the United States, despite its hostility with Iran, is has never shown any concerns to create any obstructions perhaps because the project does not involve China.

CHAHBAHAR ENERGY PORT IRAN

The Chinese also need to be made to realize that they have equal stakes in this situation. It can’t happen that Pakistan does all the dirty work while they sit there, grow their economy and reap all the benefits. That said, the point is, we should never be comfortable with the US sitting so close to us. We should only accept them as friends at an arms length.

Simultaneously, Pakistan should persuade the United States to take Taliban on board in Afghanistan and advise the Taliban to dilute their ideology as a tactical readjustment. However, if both remain adamant to pursue the present course of action Pakistan should withdraw its troops from FATA and let the locals decide their future. There should be no use of force against the Taliban, provided they remain confined to Pastrun-majority areas and eschew sectarian violence.

To India, Pakistan should offer olive branch. There are no permanent friends and foes in international politics. As has been the case untill now, in greater national interest, continue to let the Kashmir issue remain on back burner, that’s not burning.

Provided India behaves and call it day by putting an end to it’s subversion of Pakistan via Kabul. India ought to know that it could be otherway around too.

When elephants fight grass is crushed. Why should Pakistan become battle field of great powers?

(1)(NewsCentralAsia.com

Pakistan's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Date: Saturday, April 23 @ 01:36:04 PDT Topic: Central Asia Speaks)

http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=863

About the author: Amicus is the pseudonym of Advocate Mohammed Yousuf. Has written extensively on Islam and Islamist Militancy. Advocate Yousuf can be reached at:

mohmmedyousuf@hotmail.com

advocateyousuf@blogspot.com

CIA Chief Breaks Silence: Pakistan Would Have Jeopardized bin Laden Raid, ‘Impressive’ Intel Captured

2011-05-04T01:44:00.000+05:00

CIA Chief Breaks Silence: Pakistan Would Have Jeopardized bin Laden Raid, ‘Impressive’ Intel Captured

Pakistan: State of Federation & New Provinces

2011-04-30T13:08:00.000+05:00

Pakistan: State of Federation & New Provinces

By amicus • Apr 30th, 2011 • Category: Lead Story • No Responses Although in the past one did come across various suggestions to redefine Pakistan’s politico-administrative structure by creating new provinces, lately the issue has come in the forefront of political debate with unprecedented vigour.

Division	Typ	HASC	FIPS	Population	Area(km.²)	Area(mi.²)	Capital
Azad Kashmir	a	`PK.JK`	`PK06`	2,800,000	11,639	4,494	Muzaffarabad
Balochistan	p	`PK.BA`	`PK02`	6,565,885	347,190	134,051	Quetta
Federally Administered Tribal Areas	t	`PK.TA`	`PK01`	3,176,331	27,220	10,510	Islamabad
Gilgit-Baltistan	a	`PK.NA`	`PK07`	910,000	72,520	28,000	Gilgit
Islamabad	c	`PK.IS`	`PK08`	805,235	906	350	Islamabad
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa	p	`PK.NW`	`PK03`	17,743,645	74,521	28,773	Peshawar
Punjab	p	`PK.PB`	`PK04`	73,621,290	205,344	79,284	Lahore
Sindh	p	`PK.SD`	`PK05`	30,439,893	140,914	54,407	Karachi

Presently Pakistan is divided into four provinces, two centrally administered areas, one territory, and one capital territory.
1.     The Republic and its territories
(1)     Pakistan shall be a Federal Republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as Pakistan.
[1](2)     The territories of Pakistan shall comprise: -
(a)     the Provinces of [1A]Balochistan, [1B]Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Punjab and [1C]Sindh;
(b)     the Islamabad Capital Territory, hereinafter referred to as the Federal Capital;
(c)     Federally Administered Tribal Areas; and
(d)     such States and territories as are or may be included in Pakistan, whether by accession or otherwise.
(3)     [2] [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] may by law admit into the Federation new States or areas on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. Republic & Territory
238.Amendment of Constitution
Subject to this Part, the Constitution may be amended by Act of [255][Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)].
[239.Constitution Amendment Bill
(4) A Bill to amend the Constitution which would have the effect of altering the limits of a Province shall not be presented to the President for assent unless it has been passed by the Provincial Assembly of that Province by the votes of not less than two-thirds of its total membership. Changing Limits of Province
Creation of any new provinces, in view of the above scheme of the Constitution require a constitutional amendment, with passage of a resolution by 2/3rd majority of the affected federating unit.
After the partition of India in 1947, the king of Jammu and Kashmir (Modern Day Indian Jammu and Kashmir + Azad Kashmir + Northern Areas + Aksai Chin) decided to let Jammu-Kashmir be an independent state. This was soon followed by a tribal invasion of Kashmir backed by regular Pakistani troops. Fearing the might of Pakistani Forces, Kashmir sought military help from India and in-turn decided to accede with India.
India accepted this and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 was fought to send Pakistani forces back. However, the war was not decisively complete and a cease-fire was called in 1948.The end of the war saw India (occupying) gaining most of Kashmir, including the fertile parts of it.
Part of Kashmir to the west of the ceasefire line or the Line of Control, known as Northern Areas (72,496 km²) in the north and Azad Kashmir (13,300 km²) in the south, was liberated by Pakistan.
A small part, the Trans-Karakoram Tract, of the Northern Areas was ceded to the People's Republic of China by Pakistan in 1963.
Similarly the incumbent government re-named Northern Areas as Gilgit-Baltistan, with the status of a province, on 29th August 2009, Whether or not the elevation of the Federally Administered Northern Areas to provincial status, and renaming as Gilgit-Baltistan, has met the demands of the local population, it has certainly provided India a new battlefield on which it can fight Pakistan, with the added advantage that it also involves India taking on an anti-Chinese posture. Besides, in the event of a plebiscite on Kashmir, under UN resolution, the creation of this entity within Pakistan may pose serious problems for the people of Kashmir.
This further involves the USA, which sees India as its future regional counterweight against China, in a position where it works against Pakistani interests. According to a report in this newspaper, Indian attention is already moving in this direction, intercepted messages have shown that the so-called Balwaristan National Front, or BNF, will attempt to disrupt the Pakistan-China trade, which is an important part of the economy of the area, through demonstrations.
Expatriates from the area in the USA are to play their role by supporting a certain Imtiaz who is playing a role for the independence of the area. This is evidence that the USA is involved in the Indian machinations, and wants to foment trouble in the area, where it fears the growth of Chinese influence. Apart from its opposition to China, India is also only too happy to involve the USA in a covert operation that puts it in opposition to Pakistan in the disputed territory of Kashmir, of which Gilgit-Baltistan is a part, the former Gilgit Wizarat of the old state, which broke away from Indian control in 1947. Danger in Gilgit-Baltistan
That said, the agitation for Hazara province had hardly subsided that the Pakistan People’s Party announced its support for the creation of a Seraiki province without defining its boundaries. The movement for Seraiki / Bahawalpur province is quite old but it got fresh impetus as a result of the PPP’s support, particularly because Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani hails from the Seraiki region.
Perhaps the PPP, ostensibly, aims at undermining the strength of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and weakening the hold of Punjab on the federation and it seeks to revive its dwindling popularity before the next general elections and is in no mood to leave the field open to the PML (N) in Punjab. However, in reality it runs contrary to Mr. Zardairi’s claim of “Pakistan Khappay”.
The proponents of the creation of more provinces contend that such a step would increase the efficiency of administrative machinery, redress the people’s long-term grievances, promote the development of backward areas, impart to the people a sense of participation in governance and break the monopoly of a single province in the affairs of the federation.
Notwithstanding the benefits that are likely to ensue, the creation of new provinces is not an easy task. One must look into the history of Pakistan’s federation to understand the complexities of the situation.
•    Under the Indian Independence Act 1947, which also amended the Government of India Act 1935, Pakistan emerged as a dominion on 15 August 1947 comprising Sindh, NWFP, (West) Punjab, (East) Bengal, Sylhet (Assam) and a part of Balochistan region that was under the Chief Commissioner. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas enjoyed special status.
•    On 16 August 1947, the Princely State of Bahawalpur applied for accession to Pakistan and on 17 October the same year it became a part of Pakistan.
•    On 11 October 1947, the Princely State of Khairpur announced its accession to Pakistan and was duly incorporated.
•    However, the Princely States of Kalat, Kharan, Lasbela and Makran in Balochistan region were reluctant to join Pakistan.
•    In fact, on 15 August 1947 the State of Kalat announced its independence. In September the same year both houses of its newly formed parliament rejected the proposal to accede to Pakistan.
•    On 17 March 1948, Pakistan Government declared that Kharan, Lasbela and Makran were identities separate from Kalat and annexed them.
•    Simultaneously Kalat was given an ultimatum to decide about its accession latest by 1 April 1948. With other options virtually closed, the Khan of Kalat announced on 27 March, four days before the due date, that his State was acceding to Pakistan.
•    The Princely States that acceded to Pakistan were granted special status and representation in the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan individually or in the form of groups.
•    The First Constituent Assembly failed to frame a constitution, inter alia, largely due to conflict between Punjab and Bengal over the size of representation in the parliament. The Constituent Assembly was dissolved in October 1954.
•    On 23 September 1955, the Second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan passed a resolution for creating ‘One Unit’ i.e., a single province of West Pakistan comprising Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan and the Princely States of Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Kalat, Kharan, Lasbela and Makran.
•    This was done to frame the Constitution of Pakistan on the principle of parity i.e., equality of representation between East and West Pakistan in federal legislative assembly. The province of West Pakistan came into existence on 14 October 1955 with Lahore as its capital.
•    The Constitutions of 1956 and 1962 were based on the principle of parity between the eastern and western wings of the country.
•    On 28 July 1969, the Princely States of Chitral, Dir and Swat, which hitherto enjoyed special status, were annexed to the province of West Pakistan on what was called popular demand.
•    There was resentment everywhere except in Punjab against ‘One Unit’. One of the popular demands during the agitation against Ayub Khan was to restore the former provinces. Effective 1 July 1970, Yahya Khan Administration abolished ‘One Unit’ without fully reverting to status quo ante.
•    Bahawalpur was merged into Punjab, Khairpur and the former capital city of Karachi into Sindh, the States of Swat, Dir and Chitral into NWFP (now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) and the States of Kalat, Kharan, Lasbela and Makran into newly formed full-fledged province of Balochistan.
•    Seen in this background, the creation of the province of Bahawalpur would amount to recognizing that Bahawalpur’s merger into Punjab was unjustified. It may tempt other such entities to demand provincial status; especially Kalat’s case would become very strong because it was forced to accede to Pakistan despite the fact that both houses of its parliament had rejected the proposal of accession to Pakistan.
•    Although the population of what was formerly the Princely State of Bahawalpur is predominantly Seraiki-speaking, the Seraiki people in sizable numbers live in provinces other than Punjab also.
Hence, it would be unjust to create a Seraiki province in the areas of Punjab only just to break Punjab’s hegemony in the federation.
If a Seraiki province is ever to be created, it should comprise the areas of southern Punjab, northern Sindh, eastern Balochistan and southeastern Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa where Seraiki language is spoken as mother tongue. Multan deserves to be its capital.
In case the demands for creation of Seraiki and Hazara provinces are conceded, this may over time encourage the Potoharies in Punjab to claim a separate province. Trickier would become the issue of Balochistan where there is a large population of Pakhtuns in the north and northwest and they may call for bifurcation of Balochistan. The Makranies in the south of the province may also aspire for separate status.
Potentially the most dangerous situation is in Sindh. The Urdu-speaking people of Karachi have ethos those are quite different from the natives. For present the Muttahida Qaumi Movement wants to have city governments in urban Sindh but this posture is tactical and may not last long. In the past it had not ruled out demand for Karachi province.
Any redrawing of provinces on the basis of language and ethnicity is fraught with risk of accompanying violence. There may be displacement and transfer of population on a large scale if the situation turns nasty.
The creation of new provinces may strengthen centrifugal forces. It may enhance the role of regional or separatist groups at the cost of national parties. If the process of unravelling of the federation started, it may not be controlled.
We have before us the example of Yugoslavia where ethnic diversities led to internal wars culminating in the break up of the country. It is advisable to be cautious and discreet to avert disaster.
One suggestion often made is that instead of creating provinces that conform to ethno-lingual lines, the country should have a number of smaller provinces that disintegrate nationalities.
For example, one blogger on the website of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf has proposed division of Punjab into Cholistan, Ravi, Gandhara and Panjnad provinces; of Sindh into Sindh Uttar [northern] and Sindh Dakshin [southern] provinces; of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa into Khyber and Abaseen provinces and of Balochistan into Bolan and Makran provinces. He has further suggested that FATA should be renamed as Khorasan province and Gilgit-Baltistan as Karakoram province.
But the questions are: first, what would be the administrative cost of having twelve provinces and a federal capital with respective executives, legislatures and judiciaries? Secondly, how much autonomy should these provinces enjoy? Lastly, are the Council of Common Interests and National Finance Commission capable of resolving inter-provincial and province-centre differences / disputes if the number of provinces increases?
The concurrent list having been abolished under the Eighteenth Amendment, the constituent units of the federation have already become considerably autonomous and if twelve provinces are created, the federation may not remain manageable.
Finally, the question is; ‘is the present parliament constitutionally authorized and morally justified to take the vital decision of creating new provinces?’
The Second Constituent Assembly, a body duly authorized to frame the constitution, although it is doubtful it had the right to amalgamate the Princely States into the province of West Pakistan, created the ‘One Unit’.
A military ruler who was afterwards declared usurper by the Supreme Court undid the province of West Pakistan; however, for various reasons the actions of Martial Law Administration were validated.
Subsequently, the Constituent-cum-Legislative Assembly elected in 1970 under Martial Law Administration’s Legal Framework Order when it framed the Constitution of 1973, legitimated the break up of the ‘One Unit’.
Interestingly, the same Assembly, which had completed its task of framing the Constitution, considered itself authorized to recognize Bangladesh after amending the Constitution (First Amendment).
If the then parliament could amend the Constitution to recognize secession of a territory designated as a part of Pakistan in the Constitution, the present parliament cannot be barred from creating new provinces through amendment to the Constitution.
However, morally it would not be appropriate for the existing parliament to do so because no such promise was made at the time of elections held in 2008. Either the political parties supporting the creation of new provinces should make the proposal a part of their manifesto for the next general elections or the federal government should hold a referendum on the issue to ascertain the people’s opinion.
All said one must realize that presently Pakistan is passing through an extremely critical phase of its history. It is advised that no Pandora’s box should be opened at present juncture that might endanger the country’s security and territorial integrity.
The purpose of this paper is to generate an informed. If that was to happen the author may be vindicated.
Be Content with what you have; rejoice in the way things are. When you realize there is nothing lacking, the whole world belongs to you.Lao Tzu
Governing a great nation is like cooking a small fish – too much handling will spoil it. Lao Tzu

Amn Ka Chakka, a Loose Ball or a Bouncer?

2011-03-26T14:11:00.002+05:00

Amn Ka Chakka, a Loose Ball or a Bouncer?

By amicus • Mar 26th, 2011 • Category: Features • No Responses In 1996, India and Pakistan sent joint cricket “friendship” teams to Sri Lanka during the World Cup the three nations were then jointly hosting, after Australia and the West Indies refused to tour Sri Lanka after a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) bomb attack in Colombo. Top Indian and Pakistani cricket stars played together in Sri Lanka to express solidarity with the island nation.
Following the November 26 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, it was Sri Lankan solidarity for Pakistan that brought its ill-fated team to Lahore, after India meanly canceled its tour as apparent payback for the Mumbai attacks.
“Match abandoned due to terror attacks,” announced the Google News India home page of the second five-day match in Lahore between Sri Lanka and Pakistan, in the live updates of matches that Google provides for cricket-crazy Indian fans. Such a match-ending line has never been seen in the 120-year recorded history of the game.
Cricket was already a strong component in sub-continental diplomacy, both to express coldness and as an ice-breaker in relations. An Indian cricket team toured Pakistan in 1977, to mark the resumption of warmer diplomatic ties between the two countries after the 1971 war that led to the creation of Bangladesh.
Former Pakistan president and late military dictator Zia ul-Haq was an ardent cricket fan, as have been his successor chiefs of the Pakistan army, some of whom have headed the Pakistan cricket board, recently former Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf.
In 1987, Zia ul-Haq, whose term marked the resumption of India-Pakistan tensions over disputed Kashmir, went to India almost uninvited to see a cricket match in Jaipur, in what he hoped would be an attempt to cool rising tempers in India over Pakistan’s alleged involvement in terrorist violence in the restive region.
In 1996, India and Pakistan sent joint cricket “friendship” teams to Sri Lanka during the World Cup the three nations were then jointly hosting, after Australia and the West Indies refused to tour Sri Lanka after a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) bomb attack in Colombo. Top Indian and Pakistani cricket stars played together in Sri Lanka to express solidarity with the island nation.
The 1999 war between India and Pakistan, the worst military confrontation between the two countries since 1971, happened during the cricket World Cup in England in which both nations were participating.
A 2003 Indian tour of Pakistan led to unprecedented warmth between the two neighboring nations, a people-to-people contact.
In 2004, the Indian cricket team went to Pakistan for the first full tour after more than a decade. It was termed as the Friendship series.
In 2005, Musharraf came to see a cricket match in New Delhi, the city of his birth, to again thaw relations between the two nations.
In identical letters to President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani, Singh said he proposed to watch the Indo-Pak World Cup semi-final and “it gives me a great pleasure” to invite them to watch the match.
“India has always been desirous of friendly relations with Pakistan. Yet, we have been very firm and realistic about what we expect in return. The latest overture is yet another expression of this holistic approach,” Congress spokesperson Manish Tiwary said.
In his editorial in party’s mouthpiece, Saamna, Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray, then wrote that Shahrukh deserves Pakistan’s highest civilian award “Nishaan-e-Pakistan” for supporting Pakistani cricketers’ inclusion in IPL. Sena activists demonstrated outside Shahrukh’s bungalow “Mannat” at Bandra. Suggesting that Shahrukh should go to Pakistan, they displayed a travel ticket for him from Mumbai to Karachi. They also tore down posters of Shahrukh’s new film, “My Name is Khan” and wrote to theater owners asking them not to screen this move. (January 31 2010).
Shiv Sena has a history of trying to disrupt visits by Pakistan’s cricket team to India. Pakistan has not visited India since 2007, the last tour being canceled after a November 2008 terror attack at Mumbai.
A right-wing political party with roots in Mumbai was reported in the domestic media Friday as saying it would decide to see who wins the India vs. Pakistan semifinal at Mohali on wednesday before deciding whether or not to disrupt the marquee match.
India-Pakistan semi-final in Mohali now looks set to be the highpoint of the current cricket World Cup but the possibility of Pakistan going on to play the finals in Mumbai is giving nightmares to the Indian security apparatus.
“Pakistan’s successful run in the ongoing Cricket World Cup has given fresh jitters to India that now anticipates a deluge of visa applications, over and above the 5,000 already processed,” Says Indian Express.
The danger of the fanatical Shiv Sena creating ugly scenes and bringing the city to a halt, also could not be taken lightly, it quoted sources as saying.
“But what bothers the Indian Home Ministry and security agencies is Mumbai as venue, where memories of 26/11 terror attacks are still fresh and the terror threat from the Lashkar-e-Taiba looms large,” the Indian Express said.
“While the Home Ministry is not worried about the semi-finals in Mohali which is close to Attari-Wagah border, and arrangements can be made for fans to come through the border point at Wagah via special buses, Mumbai has posed a real challenge,” according to the Express.
“The Home Ministry in consultation with the Ministry of External Affairs has decided that the 45-day application period required would be waived off, but has dismissed the suggestion from Islamabad that fans be allowed to reach Mumbai by Samjhauta Express train via Atari border.”
A government source told the Express that there were “other easier ways of reaching Mumbai, say by flight or by the sea”.
As enough flights cannot be arranged and possibility of getting a special trainload from Attari has been ruled out, a short ship voyage from Karachi to Mumbai is being seen as a possibility, the report said.
According to Foreign Office, the invitation from Indian Prime Minister to the President and the Prime Minister was received on Friday evening. Pakistan government’s response to Indian PM’s invitation to Mohali is yet to come. However, Indians are optimistic that in all likelihood, one of the Pakistani leaders will agree to watch the match with Mr. Singh. Besides watching an exciting contest, leaders of the two nations will have a unique opportunity to iron out their differences.
(Bharat Chronicle)
Next couple of days will tell Manmohanji’s Cricket offensive is Amn Ka Chakka, a loose ball or a Bouncer.
In the meanwhile let’s enjoy cricket, leaving the Cricket diplomacy to politicians. Best wishes for Pakistan team in Mohali and Mumbai.

Libya's Terrorism Option

2011-03-24T23:29:00.000+05:00

Libya's Terrorism Option

Judge Not!!

2011-01-28T15:24:00.000+05:00

JUDGE NOT!!

I was shocked, confused, bewildered

As I entered Heaven's door,

Not by the beauty of it all,

Nor the lights or its decor.

But it was the folks in Heaven

Who made me sputter and gasp--

The thieves, the liars, the sinners,

The alcoholics and the trash.

There stood the kid from seventh grade

Who swiped my lunch money twice.

Next to him was my old neighbor

Who never said anything nice.

Herb, who I always thought

Was rotting away in hell,

Was sitting pretty on cloud nine,

Looking incredibly well.

I nudged the Angel, 'What's the deal?

I would love to hear Your take.

How'd all these sinners get up here?

God must've made a mistake.

'And why is everyone so quiet,

So somber - give me a clue.'

'Hush, child,' He said, 'they're all in shock.

No one thought they'd be seeing you here..'

JUDGE NOT!!

Every saint has a PAST... Every sinner has a FUTURE!

Our Lagislators

2011-01-27T22:22:00.000+05:00

Our Lagislators

Our lagislators are not computer buffs,well most of them. They all claim to be at least Graduate.

When they are in the Parliament House, they sleep.

If awake they indulge in bickering. Sleep again.

Justify more privillages.

Move privillege motions.

Offer Fateha for the victims of terrorism, militancy, national catestrophy.

Ask for funds for the victims.

Indulge in blame game.

Change positions from treassury benches or vice versa.

Give time frames to the government, with solutions found by them,

in their dvine wisdom,

after three years stooper (stuper) and;

go to sleep for 45 days,

might as well for remainder of the tenure of the Assemblies and governments.

They have all ganged up for what?

No they want to strengthen

Democracy

N0.

Complete their tenure.

Life continues, or

better continues to suffer.

from

Rising Cost of Living, insecurity of life, property and Honor

Food shoratges, High cost of Living

absence of

water, power, fuel

militancy

terrorism

target killings

but

Good thing is we have democracy.

People

this what you wanted.

So be it.

Here is democracy.

Pakistan Zindabad

See you

at the

end

of the tenure

Assemblies

may be

Life

mine

your

our

Nation

we are not them

we will do

some thing

We will

See something is happenning in

Tunis

Algeria

Egypt

Pakistan

Open the Dyke-Say no to Status Quo

2011-01-11T23:07:00.000+05:00

Open the Dyke-Say no to Status Quo

amicus

"The Parable of Falcon and the Tree Trunk!

In olden days, a king who was fond of hunting birds received a gift of two magnificent falcons from another king. They were peregrine falcons, the most beautiful birds he had ever seen. He gave the precious birds to his head falconer to be trained.

Months passed and one day the head falconer informed the king that though one of the falcons was flying majestically, soaring high in the sky. But, the other bird had not moved from the single branch of a dried up tree since the day it had arrived.

The king summoned experts from all the land to tend to the falcon, but no one could make the bird fly from its perch. Having tried everything else, the king thought to himself, "May be I need someone more familiar with the countryside to understand the nature of this problem." So he cried out to his court, "Go and get a farmer."

In the morning, the king was thrilled to see the falcon soaring high above the palace gardens.

The king asked the farmer "How did you make the falcon fly?"

With a bow, he replied “ I cut the branch which this falcon had come to like and preferred sitting on it, rather than fly. Moreso, as he was getting good food to eat and fresh water to drink through courtesy of the royal attendants.”

We are all made to fly -- to realize our incredible potential as human beings. But instead of doing that, we sit on our branches, clinging to the things that are easier or become familiar to us. The possibilities are endless, but for most of us, they remain undiscovered. We conform to the familiar, the comfortable, the mundane. So for the most part, our lives are mediocre instead of exciting, thrilling and fulfilling.

So let us learn to destroy the branch of fear we cling to and free ourselves to the glory of flight."

Aadil Adalat Ka Aadil Faisla

2011-01-02T22:25:00.000+05:00

Dear All,

A must read leaf from glorious Islamic Justice System. I wish this should be read by all those who undertake indiscreet renovations of public buildings under their use involving huge funds and by those who claim immunity of their actions.Regards. Mufti

بسم اللہ الرحمٰن الرحیم

السلامُ علیکم و رحمۃ اللہ و برکاتہ

عادل عدالت کا عادل فیصلہ

عرب سالار قتیبۃ بن مسلم نے اسلامی لشکر کشی کے اصولوں سے انحراف کرتے ہوئے سمرقند کو فتح کر لیا تھا، اصول یہ تھا کہ حملہ کرنے سے پہلے تین دن کی مہلت دی جائے۔ اور یہ بے اصولی ہوئی بھی تو ایسے دور میں جب زمانہ بھی عمر بن عبدالعزیز کا چل رہا تھا۔

سمرقند کے پادری نے مسلمانوں کی اس غاصبانہ فتح پر قتیبۃ کے خلاف شکایت دمشق میں بیٹھے مسلمانوں کے حاکم کو ایک پیغامبر کے ذریعہ خط لکھ کر بھجوائی۔

پیغامبر نے دمشق پہنچ کر ایک عالیشان عمارت دیکھی جس میں لوگ رکوع و سجود کر رہے تھے۔ اُس نے لوگوں سے پوچھا: کیا یہ حاکمِ شہر کی رہائش ہے؟ لوگوں نے کہا یہ تو مسجد ہے، تو نماز نہیں پڑھتا کیا؟ پیغامبر نے کہا نہیں، میں اھلِ سمرقند کے دین کا پیروکارہوں۔ لوگوں نے اُسے حاکم کے گھر کا راستہ دکھا دیا۔

پیغامبر لوگوں کے بتائے ہوئے راستہ پر چلتے حاکم کے گھر جا پہنچا، کیا دیکھتا ہے کہ ایک شخص دیوار سے لگی سیڑھی پر چڑھ کر چھت کی لپائی کر رہا ہے اور نیچے کھڑی ایک عورت گارا اُٹھا کر اُسے دے رہی ہے۔ پیغامبر جس راستے سے آیا تھا واپس اُسی راستے سے اُن لوگوں کے پاس جا پہنچا جنہوں نے اُسے راستہ بتایا تھا۔ اُس نے لوگوں سے کہا میں نے تم سے حاکم کے گھر کا پتہ پوچھا تھا نہ کہ اِس مفلوک الحال شخص کا جس کے گھر کی چھت بھی ٹوٹی ہوئی ہے۔ لوگوں نے کہا، ہم نے تجھے پتہ ٹھیک ہی بتایا تھا، وہی حاکم کا گھر ہے۔ پیغامبر نے بے دلی سے دوبارہ اُسی گھرپر جا کر دستک دی،

جو شخص کچھ دیر پہلے تک لپائی کر رہا تھا وہی اند ر سے نمودار ہوا۔ میں سمرقند کے پادری کی طرف سے بھیجا گیا پیغامبر ہوں کہہ کر اُس نے اپنا تعارف کرایا اور خط حاکم کو دیدیا۔ اُس شخص نے خط پڑھ کر اُسی خط کی پشت پر ہی لکھا: عمر بن عبدالعزیز کی طرف سے سمرقند میں تعینات اپنے عامل کے نام؛ ایک قاضی کا تقرر کرو جو پادری کی شکایت سنے۔ مہر لگا کر خط واپس پیغامبر کو دیدیا۔

پیغامبر وہاں سے چل تو دیا مگر اپنے آپ سے باتیں کرتے ہوئے، کیا یہ وہ خط ہے جو مسلمانوں کے اُس عظیم لشکر کو ہمارے شہر سے نکالے گا؟ سمرقند لوٹ کر پیغامبر نے خط پادری کو تھمایا، جسے پڑھ کر پادری کو بھی اپنی دنیا اندھیر ہوتی دکھائی دی، خط تو اُسی کے نام لکھا ہوا تھا جس سے اُنہیں شکایت تھی، اُنہیں یقین تھا کاغذ کا یہ ٹکڑا اُنہیں کوئی فائدہ نہیں پہنچا سکے گا۔ مگر پھر بھی خط لیکر مجبورا اُس حاکمِ سمرقند کے پاس پہنچے جس کے فریب کا وہ پہلے ہی شکار ہو چکے تھے۔ حاکم نے خط پڑھتے ہی فورا ایک قاضی (جمیع نام کا ایک شخص) کا تعین کردیا جو سمرقندیوں کی شکایت سن سکے۔

موقع پر ہی عدالت لگ گئی، ایک چوبدار نے قتیبہ کا نام بغیر کسی لقب و منصب کے پکارا، قتیبہ اپنی جگہ سے اُٹھ کر قاضی کے رو برو اور پادری کے ساتھ ہو کر بیٹھ گیا۔

قاضی نے سمرقندی سے پوچھا، کیا دعویٰ ہے تمہارا؟

پادری نے کہا: قتیبہ نے بغیر کسی پیشگی اطلاع کے ہم پر حملہ کیا، نہ تو اِس نے ہمیں اسلام قبول کرنے کی دعوت دی تھی اور نہ ہی ہمیں کسی سوچ و بچار کا موقع دیا تھا۔

(ایک تاریخی نکتہ ملحوظہ فرما لیجیئے کہ قتیبہ بن مسلم رحمۃ اللہ علیہ کا اُس وقت تک انتقال ہو چکا تھا، یہاں پر قتیبہ سے مراد اُنکا نائب ہے)

قاضی نے قتیبہ (کے نائب) کو دیکھ کر پوچھا، کیا کہتے ہو تم اس دعویٰ کے جواب میں؟

قتیبہ (کے نائب)نے کہا: قاضی صاحب، جنگ تو ہوتی ہی فریب اور دھوکہ ہے، سمرقند ایک عظیم ملک تھا، اس کے قرب و جوار کے کمتر ملکوں نے نہ تو ہماری کسی دعوت کو مان کر اسلام قبول کیا تھا اور نہ ہی جزیہ دینے پر تیار ہوئے تھے، بلکہ ہمارے مقابلے میں جنگ کو ترجیح دی تھی۔ سمرقند کی زمینیں تو اور بھی سر سبز و شاداب اور زور آور تھیں، ہمیں پورا یقین تھا کہ یہ لوگ بھی لڑنے کو ہی ترجیح دیں گے، ہم نے موقع سے فائدہ اُٹھایا اور سمرقند پر قبضہ کر لیا۔

قاضی نے قتیبہ (کے نائب) کی بات کو نظر انداز کرتے ہوئے دوبارہ پوچھا: قتیبہ میری بات کا جواب دو، تم نے ان لوگوں کو اسلام قبول کرنے کی دعوت، جزیہ یا پھر جنگ کی خبر دی تھی؟

قتیبہ (کے نائب) نے کہا: نہیں قاضی صاحب، میں نے جس طرح پہلے ہی عرض کر دیا ہے کہ ہم نے موقع سے فائدہ اُٹھایا تھا۔

قاضی نے کہا: میں دیکھ رہا ہوں کہ تم اپنی غلطی کا اقرار کر رہے ہو، اس کے بعد تو عدالت کا کوئی اور کام رہ ہی نہیں جاتا۔

قتیبہ: اللہ نے اس دین کو فتح اور عظمت تو دی ہی عدل و انصاف کی وجہ سے ہے نہ کہ دھوکہ دہی اور موقع پرستی سے۔

میری عدالت یہ فیصلہ سناتی ہے کہ تمام مسلمان فوجی اور انکے عہدہ داران بمع اپنے بیوی بچوں کے، اپنی ہر قسم کی املاک، گھر اور دکانیں چھوڑ کر سمرقند کی حدوں سے باہر نکل جائیں اور سمر قند میں کوئی مسلمان باقی نہ رہنے پائے۔ اگر ادھر دوبارہ آنا بھی ہو تو بغیر کسی پیشگی اطلاع و دعوت کے اور تین دن کی سوچ و بچار کی مہلت دیئے بغیر نہ آیا جائے۔

پادری جو کچھ دیکھ اور سن رہا تھا وہ ناقابل یقین بلکہ ایک مذاق اور تمثیل نظر آ رہا تھا۔ چند لمحوں کی یہ عدالت، نہ کوئی گواہ اور نہ ہی دلیلوں کی ضرورت۔ اور تو اور قاضی بھی اپنی عدالت کو برخاست کرکے قتیبہ کے ساتھ ہی اُٹھ کر جا رہا تھا۔

اور چند گھنٹوں کے بعد ہی سمرقندیوں نے اپنے پیچھے گرد و غبار کے بادل چھوڑتے لوگوں کے قافلے دیکھے جو شہر ویران کر کے جا رہے تھے۔ لوگ حیرت سے ایک دوسرے سے سبب پوچھ رہے تھے اور جاننے والے بتا رہے تھے کہ عدالت کے فیصلے کی تعمیل ہو رہی تھی۔

اور اُس دن جب سورج ڈوبا تو سمرقند کی ویران اور خالی گلیوں میں صرف آوارہ کتے گھوم رہے تھے اور سمرقندیوں کے گھروں سے آہ و پکار اور رونے دھونے کی آوازیں سنائی دے رہی تھیں، اُن کو ایسے لوگ چھوڑ کر جا رہے تھے جن کے اخلاق ، معاشرت، برتاؤ، معاملات اور پیار و محبت نے اُن کو اور اُن کے رہن سہن کو مہذب بنا دیا تھا۔

تاریخ گواہ ہے کہ سمرقندی یہ فراق چند گھنٹے بھی برداشت نہ کر پائے، اپنے پادری کی قیادت میں لا الٰہ الاّ اللہ محمّد الرّسول اللہ کا اقرار کرتے مسلمانوں کے لشکر کے پیچھے روانہ ہوگئے اور اُن کو واپس لے آئے۔

اور یہ سب کیوں نہ ہوتا، کہیں بھی تو ایسا نہیں ہوا تھا کہ فاتح لشکر اپنے ہی قاضی کی کہی دو باتوں پر عمل کرے اور شہر کو خالی کردے۔ دینِ رحمت نے وہاں ایسے نقوش چھوڑے کہ سمرقند ایک عرصہ تک مسلمانوں کا دارالخلافہ بنا رہا۔

«جی ہاں، ایسے ہوا کرتے تھے مسلمان حکمران، اور ایسا ہوا کرتا تھا سیدنا عمر فاروق بن خطاب کے نواسوں میں سے ایک نواسہ یعنی عمر بن عبدالعزيز بن مروان بن الحكم بن أبي العاص بن أميۃ رضی اللہ عنہ و ارضاہ ، اُموی دور کا آٹھواں اور خلفائے راشدين کے سلسلہ کا پانچویں خلیفہ ، جس کے عدل و انصاف سے مشرق و مغرب کے ممالک دینِ اسلام سے بہرہ ور ہو کر دائرہ اسلام میں شامل ہوئے».

مندرجہ بالا واقعہ شیخ علی طنطاوی رحمۃ اللہ علیہ کی کتاب (قصص من التاریخ) کے صفحہ نمبر 411 (مصر میں 1932 میں چھپی ہوئی) سے لے کر اردو میں ترجمہ کیا گیا ہے۔

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حسبِ سابق یہ مضمون بھی عربی سے اردو میں ترجمہ کرکے آپکی خدمت میں پیش کیا ہے، آپکی دعاؤں کا طالب ہوں۔ محمد سلیم/شانتو-چائنا

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Text of Steve Jobs' Commencement address (2005)

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Your time is limited, so don't waste it living someone else's life.

"Your time is limited, so don't waste it living someone else's life. Don't be trapped by dogma — which is living with the results of other people's thinking. Don't let the noise of others' opinions drown out your own inner voice. And most important, have the courage to follow your heart and intuition. They somehow already know what you truly want to become. Everything else is secondary."

A Quotation from his third story. Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple Computer and of Pixar Animation Studios, delivered this commencement address, on June 12, 2005 at Stanford University.

Text of Steve Jobs' Commencement address (2005)