Mohammed Yousuf
Saturday, January 14, 2012 at 9:49pm
The Supreme Court has made it clear that it would not bestow legitimacy to any extra-constitutional act of taking over the government and the military establishment has given assurance that it does not intend to derail the democratic process.Pakistan Muslim League (N) has shown great maturity by declaring that it will oppose any military intervention. Almost all important political parties have supported the democratic process. Same is the stand taken by the media in general and representatives of the civil society in particular.But then this leads us to the question: what next?
For the PPP leadership it is the time for introspection and soul-searching. It needs to reform itself and become more responsive to people’s demands and aspirations. No one can challenge the authority of the government if it is able to command popular trust and respect.
Obviously the best course for the ruling coalition is to address the grievances of the people and focus on improving the quality of governance. It should address the complaints of corruption, favouritism, nepotism, breakdown in law and order, energy crisis, mismanagement in state corporations, inflation, economic meltdown and other issues. It also has to show that it respects the other institutions of the state as “as it desires to be respected.
If the present slide continues, the people may get completely tired and ultimately become fed up of the civilian rule. The fatigue is already visible. To be frank, it is largely due to the Imran Khan factor that a considerable segment of masses has retained some hope in democratic process.
The PPP should understand that, despite all proclamations in the favour of democracy, there is a thresh hold of tolerance and the army or the Supreme Court may perforce decide to wind up the system in national interests if there is a further deterioration in governance and if the government continues on the collision course.
The possibility of such an eventuality is highly pronounced, despite the clear and forth right announcement by both the institutions, given the propensity of the incumbent Zardari-Gilani dispensation to provoke confrontation with these state institutions.
Such an eventuality will be a reality if they were to indulge in any ill-conceived adventurism against the Army and Judiciary. They ought to take a leaf from the contemporary instances of such adventurism by Nawaz Sharif in 1993 and again by Nawaz Sharif in October 1999.
For the government the best course would be to resign and go to the people for a fresh mandate, but it is a tall order for the incumbent government, although the entire dispensation is crying hoarse thatit believes in the power of ballot.
Hence, given the prevailing environment, for the opposition, the best course available is to resign from the assemblies and force the government to go for the fresh polls.
After the resignations the opposition should simultaneously press for having an independent Election Commission, preparation of fool proof voters’ list as directed by the Supreme Court and peaceful conduct of polling on the day of elections.
It should not insist on resignation or removal of President Zardari as a prerequisite for transparent and fair general elections. Any such demand would be unconstitutional and would set a bad example. As for the President, let the cases before the Supreme Court run its course and the President should honour, abide and bow before the outcome of those cases.
Asfar as the controversial memo is concerned, let there be an inquiry commission by the Supreme Court and let it submit its report to the Supreme Court and let the Supreme Court decide the future line of action and if anyone is found responsible, the laws should take its own course, may it be Haqqani or even the President.
The army has already got over stretched. Its primary responsibility is to defend the country against foreign aggression and internal insurgencies. It should not offer an opportunity to the PPP leaders to go down as martyrs. Any reckless adventurism will bring bad name to the army and it would be thoroughly discredited in a short span.
It is not in the interest of the country to upset the applecart when elections are possible constitutionally and that is the only democratic way to go forward.
There’s certainly a lot of legitimate debate about what exactly government is supposed to be expected to do, and what is the best way to go about doing it. Perhaps you in fact think it appropriate to take some people’s money at gunpoint to give to poor folks (like YOU, no doubt). But recognize this is what you are doing, and don’t kid yourself that it’s something truly different than if you just walked into the bank with a gun — other than you’re getting someone else to do your dirty work. The stick-up artist is just cutting out the middleman. As HL Mencken memorably put it, “Every election is a sort of advance auction sale of stolen goods.”
That said, Mr President and Mr Prime Minister, seize the moment and go to the people, your government has run out of steam. Live up to what you preach and let the change come through the ballot, the power of the ballot is what we need in sheer defence; else what shall save us from a second slavery?
However, do not misunderstand and think that ballots are the opposite of bullets. They are not. They are just a substitute for muting direct violence, not the elimination of violence.
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Saturday, January 14, 2012
Tuesday, December 27, 2011
The Politics of Uncertainty
The Politics of Uncertainty
By amicus • Dec 27th, 2011 • Category: Lead Story •
On 25th December, the nation celebrates the 135th Birth anniversary of Quid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan was, “There is no doubt that the future of our state will and must greatly depend upon the type of education and way in which we bring up our children as the future servants of Pakistan…What we have to do is mobilise our people and build up the character of our future generations…”.
President Zardari said today in his message, “it will not allow any change through “force and intimidation and respect the power of ballot as an instrument of change.” He goes on to say; “The Quaid believed that any change must be brought about by ballot and reject change by bullet”.
Very true Mr President; let us bring change through ballot before it is too late.
Let us first take a look at the State of Affairs in Jinnah’s Pakistan.
Early October 2011, the Pakistan People’s Party-led coalition government appeared set to complete its term and there were indications that, if no spanner was thrown, the PPP might secure majority in the Senate as a result of elections in March 2012 and, if the coalition partners made seat adjustments, even emerge as the largest party in the National Assembly in the general elections likely to be held in March 2013.
All of a sudden the situation changed after Mansoor Ijaz, an influential American citizen of Pakistani ancestry, disclosed in an article published in The Financial Times on October10, 2011 that about a week after the Abbottabad Operation of May 2, 2011, in which Osama Bin Laden was hunted down, “a senior Pakistani diplomat” contacted him in the name of President Asif Ali Zardari, to send a message to the White House national security officials, seeking US assistance to prevent military takeover in Pakistan and offering to appoint a new national security team that would eliminate Section ‘S’ of the ISI, which maintained relations with the Taliban, Haqqani network and other militants.
According to Ijaz, a memo to the effect was duly drafted and sent to Admiral Mullen on May 10, 2011. Later on, former US National Security Advisor James L. Jones disclosed that the memo was sent through him.
After Foreign Policy magazine published the full text of the alleged memo, it became known that the memo contained provisions of far serious implications for Pakistan’s defence establishment and national security interests, including its nuclear programme, than what had been initially stated by Ijaz.
In quick developments subsequent to the publication of Ijaz’s Financial Times article, DG ISI General Ahmed Shuja Pasha met Ijaz in London to seek more details and then briefed Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani about the memo; General Kayani conveyed his concern to Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani about the alleged role of Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani in the memo affair; Gilani summoned Haqqani to Islamabad to clarify his position; Haqqani denied the charges that he had anything to do with the memo; Ijaz publicly maintained that Haqqani was the senior diplomat who had approached him for sending the memo and produced some ‘evidences’ in the form of Blackberry data and messages which he had exchanged with Haqqani; after initial rejection, Mullen’s spokesman confirmed that he had received the memo but had ignored it; Gilani obtained resignation from Haqqani and announced to hold inquiry into the whole affair. The inquiry was to be conducted by a parliamentary committee.
However, not satisfied with Gilani’s announcement, on November 23, 2011 Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the principal opposition party, Pakistan Muslim League (N) and many others, took the matter to the Supreme Court, praying that the “dreadful conspiracy to demonise, ridicule, malign and consequently demoralise and terrorise and resultantly to destroy the invaluable and valiant Armed Forces of Pakistan; to trade away the sovereignty of Pakistan and to barter away the very existence and the future of Pakistan which also amounts to waging a war against Pakistan, should be unearthed.”
Lead Petitioner Sharif arrayed Zardari, Haqqani, Ijaz, General Kayani, and General Pasha, Foreign Secretary and Interior Secretary and others as respondents to explain the “detestable, despicable and treacherous memorandum.”
The proceedings in the Supreme Court, where more petitions were filed, exposed many things, including some intriguing aspects of relationship between the civilian and military leadership, although, in the meantime, the attention was partly diverted to the dastardly blatant ISAF / NATO attack on Pakistani posts in the tribal area near Afghanistan’s border in which 24 soldiers were killed and many more seriously wounded.
December 1, 2011 the Supreme Court ordered the formation of a one-man inquiry commission, directed Haqqani not to leave the country and asked Zardari, General Pasha and General Kayani to explain their position.
The same day the PPP reacted with much venom.
In a hurriedly called press conference addressed by the PPP leaders, Babar Awan lashed out: “This time the PML (N) leaders have chosen strong shoulders to play their game, which I call the first act of the Bangladesh model.”
He referred to Sharif’s petition as a conspiracy to pitch state institutions against each other to come to power through back door. He contended that under the Constitution only the executive had the authority to set up a commission and wrongly complained that the Supreme Court did not allow the federation to present its argument on the subject. He also criticised restrictions imposed on Haqqani without hearing him.
The PPP leaders’ tone in the press conference was very harsh and sarcastic. Awan played the old game: “The judicial history of the country is witness to the fact that PPP was never given justice, but at the same it has also become a known reality now that rulers of the Punjab have always got relief from the courts.” Awan’s outburst indicated that the PPP intended to use Sindh card and pose as an innocent victim of highhandedness if collision between institutions could not be averted.
On December 3, 2011 Newsweek published another article by Ijaz on a website in which Ijaz claimed that Haqqani had prior knowledge of the US “stealth mission to eliminate bin Laden that would violate Pakistan’s sovereignty.” Haqqani denied having any prior information of the Abbottabad Operation.
In another development, on December 4, 2011 President Zardari’s spokesman Farhatullah Babar announced that the president would address the joint session of the parliament after Ashura, which was falling on December 6.
It was understood that Zardari intended to speak about the proceedings subjudice before the Supreme Court on the controversial memo and the ISAF / NATO attack on Pakistani border posts, which had strained relations with the United States. Significantly the announcement of President Zardari’s address referred to him also as the Co-Chairman of the PPP and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This was unusual.
In a surprising development that created breath-taking suspense, on the day of Ashura (December 6) President Zardari suddenly left for Dubai. The statements of the PPP leaders about his departure compounded the confusion and confounded the nation.
The presidential spokesman stated that Zardari had gone to Dubai to visit his children and also to undergo some tests. Another PPP source stated the president needed “some time off from this madness.”
Late night reports said that Zardari had been admitted to hospital after he had a heart attack. A blog story claimed that the president was incoherent while speaking with President Barrack Obama on Sunday (December 4) because he felt that the noose was tightening around his neck.
In this back drop, the speculation became rife that he had left under some kind of deal offering safe passage and would submit his resignation soon. However, when asked about a possibility of soft coup in Pakistan, the US State Department said: “We have no concerns; we think it is health-related.”
In an emergency meeting of the PPP leaders in Islamabad on December 8 jointly chaired by Prime Minister Gilani and chairman of the party Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the PPP leaders decided to close their ranks in the face of growing challenges for the party. It seemed something critical was in the offing.
The next day, Zardari called Gilani and some journalists from hospital in Dubai. Reportedly he was his usual self. He stated that he left for Dubai because he did not trust hospitals in Pakistan and would be back soon. He dispelled the idea that he would resign. Now the questions that bothered the people were: Why did Zardari not trust hospitals in Pakistan? Was there any threat to his life and from whom? Was the military establishment or any of its agencies after him?
The same day (December 9) in his reply to the Supreme Court Haqqani, inter alia, submitted that Nawaz Sharif’s petition was not maintainable because it failed to highlight any violation of (his) fundamental rights and was based on allegations made by a dubious individual.
He also challenged the Supreme Court’s Order dated December 1. His petition challenging the Supreme Court Order was returned by the Registrar Supreme Court’s Office with some objections. Haqqani challenged the Registrar Supreme Court’s decision the following day.
In an interview with BBC on December 10, Gilani denied that Zardari had suffered from any stroke or that he had written a letter of resignation. He also dismissed speculation about any quiet coup.
Within 72 hours, things again appeared uncertain. This time it was a meeting on December 13 between Prime Minister Gilani and Chairman Senate Farooq H. Naek who was serving as acting president. The official press release said that they discussed the memo scandal.
On December 14 Gilani told the Senate that there had been a threat to President’s life if he had gone to Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences when his father was admitted there and, therefore, the president was persuaded to go to Dubai [instead of PIMS].
In the same speech Prime Minister stated: “Parliament, and not the government and the prime minister, should complete the term. It does not make any difference if I sit on opposition benches.”
Glani claimed that he had two-third majority in the National Assembly and if he resigned the opposition would not be in a position to form the government. He added: “In that case both of us will have to go and there will be no elections in our life time.” Gilani further said that there was a procedure in the Constitution to impeach the president and that the Constitution should be followed to keep the country intact.
Gilani again called the memo controversy a conspiracy against the parliament. He stated: “What is the purpose of taking to the court an incredible document authored by a person having a history of writing articles against Pakistan, its government and establishment.”
On December 14, Independent, a British newspaper published an article titled “Pakistan’s memo gate: was there ever going to be a coup?” by Omar Warriach based on Mansoor Ijaz’s, alleged, claim that General Pasha had visited Arab countries for discussion on a possible coup in Pakistan.
In the blog posted on Independent newspaper’s website Ijaz was quoted as having explained the following Blackberry message which he claimed to have sent to Haqqani: “I was just informed by senior US Intel that GD – SII [DG ISI] Mr. P asked for, and received permission, from senior Arab leaders a few days ago to sack Z.”
In the message, Intel stood for Intelligence Officer, P for Pasha and Z for Zardari. Reportedly Pasha had gone on a secret foreign trip on May 6, 2011.
December 15, 2011 was the last date for submission of reply to the Supreme Court in the memo case. The Supreme Court received the replies of all respondents except President Zardari.
In its reply the federal government requested the Supreme Court to dismiss Nawaz Sharif’s petition. It said that it was essential that the Parliamentary Committee on National Security should proceed with the probe to determine the issue and give its recommendations.
The reply stated: “It is the stance of the federation that the federal government (including the constitutional head of the state, the constitutional chief executive of the country or any other component of the federal government) has neither conceptualised nor initiated or, in manner, has anything to do with the alleged memo or the allegations or views expressed therein.”
Intriguingly, the federation’s reply attached a downloaded copy of Omar Warraich’s article published in Independent of December 14. This was an indication that the PPP government was prepared to counter attack the military establishment.
In his somewhat circumspect reply General Kayani stated: “There may be a need to fully examine the facts and circumstances leading to conception and issuance of the memo.” He also said that the matter had an impact on national security and the morale of Pakistan Army.
General Pasha in his reply called for a thorough investigation and stated that “access to unadulterated truth and justice” was the right of the people of Pakistan, “the real sovereign masters of this country.”
Both, the Army Chief and DG ISI, initially, held Haqqani responsible for the controversial memo.
In his submission spread over 81 pages, Mansoor Ijaz gave his version of the events since he was first time allegedly contacted by Haqqani for the drafting and communication of the memo.
On December 16, Jones came in support of Haqqani stating that he had no reason to believe that Haqqani had any role in the preparation of the memo. He did not elaborate what was the basis of his belief vindicating HH, and did not spell out the reasons for such vindication, when the matter is subjudice before the apex Court in Pakistan.
The same day Gilani and Kayani met and, according to the statement issued by the prime minister’s office, agreed that their replies to the Supreme Court should not be misconstrued as “a standoff between the army and the government.”
It was reported that during the meeting Gilani received a phone call of Zardari and Kayani also talked to the president. Next day prime minister was upbeat and told the media that both army and judiciary were with democracy and they would not derail the system.
In the early hours of December 19 President Zardari landed in Karachi.
It appeared that the tense moments were over.
But the optimism was quite short-lived. The Supreme Court took up the memo issue in the morning and at the outset of the hearing the Chief Justice, after referring to the press conference of the PPP leaders held on December 1, observed: “If the prime minister is of the opinion (that whatever uttered was not the stand of the government) he should tell what action he has taken knowing well that the matter is pending before the court.”
The Supreme Court noted that Zardari had not submitted his reply and told the attorney general that when allegations were not rebutted, these were normally considered to be true. The Supreme Court also sought para-wise comments from the respondents on petitions and replies.
The same day (December 19) Inter Services Public Relations issued a statement to dispel the impression that there had been any deal between Zardari and Kayani. The statement clarified that the President and the Army Chief talked for about a minute. “Hence, attributing anything more to this conversation is unfounded and unnecessary.”
Temperature in Islamabad rose again.
On December 20, the Ministry of Defence submitted to the Supreme Court that it exercised only administrative control and no operational control over the armed forces of Pakistan as well as the ISI.
The sign of friction between the civilian set-up and the military establishment became more evident.
In an important development on December 21, the ISPR denied that the DG ISI had met any Arab leader between May 1 and 9 and that stated that visits to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates prior and after these dates were of routine nature. This had become imperative because a petition had been filed in the Supreme Court seeking removal of Pasha as ISI Chief.
When others were complying with the directive of the Supreme Court, the PPP leaders held a meeting on December 21 to deliberate if Zardari should submit his reply or not. The PPP appeared to be on collision path.
December 22 was the worst day of the crisis.
While addressing at a function to commemorate the birth anniversary of the Quaid-i-Azam, Prime Minister Gilani stated that a conspiracy against his government was being hatched. He said that “a state within state” would not be tolerated and added: “all institutions, including the ministry of defence, should be answerable to parliament and the chief executive, who is the prime minister.” Obviously he was upset with the reply submitted by the Secretary of Defence to the Supreme Court and wanted to assert the authority of the civilian arm of the government over the military.
Later in the day he spoke in the National Assembly and pointedly said that he had set up a commission to know about those who were responsible for allowing Osama bin Laden to live in Abbottabad for six years. He repeated: “All institutions of the country are answerable to parliament and nobody is above law.”
It was a full-blown crisis. It seemed the point of no-return had been reached and the military may act any moment to wind up the civilian set-up.
At this juncture some western diplomats became active to defuse the crisis.
Next day the things settled down to a considerable extent.
Quite unusually, Chief of the Army Staff during his visit to forward posts in Mohmand and Kurram agencies stated: “Pakistan Army has and will continue to support democratic process in the country.” But he accused the government of diverting attention from the memo affair by raising alarm of coup. “Irrespective of all other considerations, there can be no compromise on national security,” he clarified.
During a hearing in the Supreme Court, Chief justice Chaudhry also made it clear that unlike in the past, there would be no validation of military takeover. “The (amended) code of conduct demands the judges to preserve and protect the Constitution at all cost. The system will run according to what the Constitution commands,” he stated.
This was not the first time that uncertainty gripped the country.
On a number of occasions since the PPP came to power it appeared that the civilian and military leaderships were on a collision course or the executive and the judiciary were on a war path. Every time the PPP played on the front foot, directly or indirectly, accusing the army and judiciary of hatching conspiracy against democracy and the civilian set-up.
The truth is that all these three institutions have failed to fulfil their responsibilities within the parameters of the Constitution in varying degrees. The executive has not fully complied with the orders and directives of the Supreme Court issued in different cases. Although on several occasions the prime minister has assured the nation that the orders of the Supreme Court would be implemented in letter and spirit, the facts do not substantiate his claim. Often it appeared that the executive was dodging the Supreme Court or playing hide and seek with it.
On its part, the superior judiciary has also given the impression that it has been a bit selective in taking up cases. There is the petition of Asghar Khan concerning the distribution of money by secret agencies to political rivals of the PPP.
There is the case questioning the legitimacy of Shabaz Sharif as Chief Minister of Punjab. There are a large number of cases against the leaders and workers of the MQM for committing violence, including murders, which should have been reopened or restored after the NRO was declared null and void.
There is the case against the MQM for creating mayhem in Karachi on May 12, 2007 in which at least 40 people were killed. When Sindh High Court tried to take up the matter of May 12 the MQM workers threateningly surrounded the Sindh High Court. The High Court was brow-beaten by the MQM thugs but the Supreme Court did nothing.
It is also a truth that the military establishment and its agencies – Military Intelligence or Inter-Services Intelligence – have to live with lot of past baggage. In every general election, the military establishment historically resorts to pre-poll, polling day and post-poll manipulations.
It jealously and exclusively controls the defence and foreign policies of the country. At time people get the impression that the armed forces have monopolised patriotism and do not consider the civilians trustworthy.
Having said all this, one should take it as a good omen that the Supreme Court has made it clear that it would not bestow legitimacy to any extra-constitutional act of taking over the government and the military establishment has given assurance that it does not intend to derail the democratic process.
Pakistan Muslim League (N) has shown great maturity by declaring that it will oppose any military intervention. Almost all important political parties have supported the democratic process. Same is the stand taken by the media in general and representatives of the civil society in particular.
But then this leads us to the question: what next?
For the PPP leadership it is the time for introspection and soul-searching. It needs to reform itself and become more responsive to people’s demands and aspirations. No one can challenge the authority of the government if it is able to command popular trust and respect.
Obviously the best course for the ruling coalition is to address the grievances of the people and focus on improving the quality of governance. It should address the complaints of corruption, favouritism, nepotism, breakdown in law and order, energy crisis, mismanagement in state corporations, inflation, economic meltdown and other issues. It also has to show that it respects the other institutions of the state as “as it desires to be respected.
If the present slide continues, the people may get completely tired and ultimately become fed up of the civilian rule. The fatigue is already visible. To be frank, it is largely due to the Imran Khan factor that a considerable segment of masses has retained some hope in democratic process.
The PPP should understand that, despite all proclamations in the favour of democracy, there is a thresh hold of tolerance and the army or the Supreme Court may perforce decide to wind up the system in national interests if there is a further deterioration in governance and if the government continues on the collision course.
The possibility of such an eventuality is highly pronounced, despite the clear and forth right announcement by both the institutions, given the propensity of the incumbent Zardari-Gilani dispensation to provoke confrontation with these state institutions.
Such an eventuality will be a reality if they were to indulge in any ill-conceived adventurism against the Army and Judiciary. They ought to take a leaf from the contemporary instances of such adventurism by Nawaz Sharif in 1993 and again by Nawaz Sharif in October 1999.
For the government the best course would be to resign and go to the people for a fresh mandate, but it is a tall order for the incumbent government, although the entire dispensation is crying hoarse thatit believes in the power of ballot.
Hence, given the prevailing environment, for the opposition, the best course available is to resign from the assemblies and force the government to go for the fresh polls.
After the resignations the opposition should simultaneously press for having an independent Election Commission, preparation of fool proof voters’ list as directed by the Supreme Court and peaceful conduct of polling on the day of elections.
It should not insist on resignation or removal of President Zardari as a prerequisite for transparent and fair general elections. Any such demand would be unconstitutional and would set a bad example. As for the President, let the cases before the Supreme Court run its course and the President should honour, abide and bow before the outcome of those cases.
As far as the controversial memo is concerned, let there be an inquiry commission by the Supreme Court and let it submit its report to the Supreme Court and let the Supreme Court decide the future line of action and if anyone is found responsible, the laws should take its own course, may it be Haqqani or even the President.
The army has already got over stretched. Its primary responsibility is to defend the country against foreign aggression and internal insurgencies. It should not offer an opportunity to the PPP leaders to go down as martyrs. Any reckless adventurism will bring bad name to the army and it would be thoroughly discredited in a short span.
It is not in the interest of the country to upset the applecart when elections are possible constitutionally and that is the only democratic way to go forward.
There’s certainly a lot of legitimate debate about what exactly government is supposed to be expected to do, and what is the best way to go about doing it. Perhaps you in fact think it appropriate to take some people’s money at gunpoint to give to poor folks (like YOU, no doubt). But recognize this is what you are doing, and don’t kid yourself that it’s something truly different than if you just walked into the bank with a gun — other than you’re getting someone else to do your dirty work. The stick-up artist is just cutting out the middleman. As HL Mencken memorably put it, “Every election is a sort of advance auction sale of stolen goods.”
That said, Mr President and Mr Prime Minister, seize the moment and go to the people, your government has run out of steam. Live up to what you preach and let the change come through the ballot, the power of the ballot is what we need in sheer defence; else what shall save us from a second slavery?
However, do not misunderstand and think that ballots are the opposite of bullets. They are not. They are just a substitute for muting direct violence, not the elimination of violence.
By amicus • Dec 27th, 2011 • Category: Lead Story •
On 25th December, the nation celebrates the 135th Birth anniversary of Quid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan was, “There is no doubt that the future of our state will and must greatly depend upon the type of education and way in which we bring up our children as the future servants of Pakistan…What we have to do is mobilise our people and build up the character of our future generations…”.
President Zardari said today in his message, “it will not allow any change through “force and intimidation and respect the power of ballot as an instrument of change.” He goes on to say; “The Quaid believed that any change must be brought about by ballot and reject change by bullet”.
Very true Mr President; let us bring change through ballot before it is too late.
Let us first take a look at the State of Affairs in Jinnah’s Pakistan.
Early October 2011, the Pakistan People’s Party-led coalition government appeared set to complete its term and there were indications that, if no spanner was thrown, the PPP might secure majority in the Senate as a result of elections in March 2012 and, if the coalition partners made seat adjustments, even emerge as the largest party in the National Assembly in the general elections likely to be held in March 2013.
All of a sudden the situation changed after Mansoor Ijaz, an influential American citizen of Pakistani ancestry, disclosed in an article published in The Financial Times on October10, 2011 that about a week after the Abbottabad Operation of May 2, 2011, in which Osama Bin Laden was hunted down, “a senior Pakistani diplomat” contacted him in the name of President Asif Ali Zardari, to send a message to the White House national security officials, seeking US assistance to prevent military takeover in Pakistan and offering to appoint a new national security team that would eliminate Section ‘S’ of the ISI, which maintained relations with the Taliban, Haqqani network and other militants.
According to Ijaz, a memo to the effect was duly drafted and sent to Admiral Mullen on May 10, 2011. Later on, former US National Security Advisor James L. Jones disclosed that the memo was sent through him.
After Foreign Policy magazine published the full text of the alleged memo, it became known that the memo contained provisions of far serious implications for Pakistan’s defence establishment and national security interests, including its nuclear programme, than what had been initially stated by Ijaz.
In quick developments subsequent to the publication of Ijaz’s Financial Times article, DG ISI General Ahmed Shuja Pasha met Ijaz in London to seek more details and then briefed Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani about the memo; General Kayani conveyed his concern to Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani about the alleged role of Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani in the memo affair; Gilani summoned Haqqani to Islamabad to clarify his position; Haqqani denied the charges that he had anything to do with the memo; Ijaz publicly maintained that Haqqani was the senior diplomat who had approached him for sending the memo and produced some ‘evidences’ in the form of Blackberry data and messages which he had exchanged with Haqqani; after initial rejection, Mullen’s spokesman confirmed that he had received the memo but had ignored it; Gilani obtained resignation from Haqqani and announced to hold inquiry into the whole affair. The inquiry was to be conducted by a parliamentary committee.
However, not satisfied with Gilani’s announcement, on November 23, 2011 Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the principal opposition party, Pakistan Muslim League (N) and many others, took the matter to the Supreme Court, praying that the “dreadful conspiracy to demonise, ridicule, malign and consequently demoralise and terrorise and resultantly to destroy the invaluable and valiant Armed Forces of Pakistan; to trade away the sovereignty of Pakistan and to barter away the very existence and the future of Pakistan which also amounts to waging a war against Pakistan, should be unearthed.”
Lead Petitioner Sharif arrayed Zardari, Haqqani, Ijaz, General Kayani, and General Pasha, Foreign Secretary and Interior Secretary and others as respondents to explain the “detestable, despicable and treacherous memorandum.”
The proceedings in the Supreme Court, where more petitions were filed, exposed many things, including some intriguing aspects of relationship between the civilian and military leadership, although, in the meantime, the attention was partly diverted to the dastardly blatant ISAF / NATO attack on Pakistani posts in the tribal area near Afghanistan’s border in which 24 soldiers were killed and many more seriously wounded.
December 1, 2011 the Supreme Court ordered the formation of a one-man inquiry commission, directed Haqqani not to leave the country and asked Zardari, General Pasha and General Kayani to explain their position.
The same day the PPP reacted with much venom.
In a hurriedly called press conference addressed by the PPP leaders, Babar Awan lashed out: “This time the PML (N) leaders have chosen strong shoulders to play their game, which I call the first act of the Bangladesh model.”
He referred to Sharif’s petition as a conspiracy to pitch state institutions against each other to come to power through back door. He contended that under the Constitution only the executive had the authority to set up a commission and wrongly complained that the Supreme Court did not allow the federation to present its argument on the subject. He also criticised restrictions imposed on Haqqani without hearing him.
The PPP leaders’ tone in the press conference was very harsh and sarcastic. Awan played the old game: “The judicial history of the country is witness to the fact that PPP was never given justice, but at the same it has also become a known reality now that rulers of the Punjab have always got relief from the courts.” Awan’s outburst indicated that the PPP intended to use Sindh card and pose as an innocent victim of highhandedness if collision between institutions could not be averted.
On December 3, 2011 Newsweek published another article by Ijaz on a website in which Ijaz claimed that Haqqani had prior knowledge of the US “stealth mission to eliminate bin Laden that would violate Pakistan’s sovereignty.” Haqqani denied having any prior information of the Abbottabad Operation.
In another development, on December 4, 2011 President Zardari’s spokesman Farhatullah Babar announced that the president would address the joint session of the parliament after Ashura, which was falling on December 6.
It was understood that Zardari intended to speak about the proceedings subjudice before the Supreme Court on the controversial memo and the ISAF / NATO attack on Pakistani border posts, which had strained relations with the United States. Significantly the announcement of President Zardari’s address referred to him also as the Co-Chairman of the PPP and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This was unusual.
In a surprising development that created breath-taking suspense, on the day of Ashura (December 6) President Zardari suddenly left for Dubai. The statements of the PPP leaders about his departure compounded the confusion and confounded the nation.
The presidential spokesman stated that Zardari had gone to Dubai to visit his children and also to undergo some tests. Another PPP source stated the president needed “some time off from this madness.”
Late night reports said that Zardari had been admitted to hospital after he had a heart attack. A blog story claimed that the president was incoherent while speaking with President Barrack Obama on Sunday (December 4) because he felt that the noose was tightening around his neck.
In this back drop, the speculation became rife that he had left under some kind of deal offering safe passage and would submit his resignation soon. However, when asked about a possibility of soft coup in Pakistan, the US State Department said: “We have no concerns; we think it is health-related.”
In an emergency meeting of the PPP leaders in Islamabad on December 8 jointly chaired by Prime Minister Gilani and chairman of the party Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the PPP leaders decided to close their ranks in the face of growing challenges for the party. It seemed something critical was in the offing.
The next day, Zardari called Gilani and some journalists from hospital in Dubai. Reportedly he was his usual self. He stated that he left for Dubai because he did not trust hospitals in Pakistan and would be back soon. He dispelled the idea that he would resign. Now the questions that bothered the people were: Why did Zardari not trust hospitals in Pakistan? Was there any threat to his life and from whom? Was the military establishment or any of its agencies after him?
The same day (December 9) in his reply to the Supreme Court Haqqani, inter alia, submitted that Nawaz Sharif’s petition was not maintainable because it failed to highlight any violation of (his) fundamental rights and was based on allegations made by a dubious individual.
He also challenged the Supreme Court’s Order dated December 1. His petition challenging the Supreme Court Order was returned by the Registrar Supreme Court’s Office with some objections. Haqqani challenged the Registrar Supreme Court’s decision the following day.
In an interview with BBC on December 10, Gilani denied that Zardari had suffered from any stroke or that he had written a letter of resignation. He also dismissed speculation about any quiet coup.
Within 72 hours, things again appeared uncertain. This time it was a meeting on December 13 between Prime Minister Gilani and Chairman Senate Farooq H. Naek who was serving as acting president. The official press release said that they discussed the memo scandal.
On December 14 Gilani told the Senate that there had been a threat to President’s life if he had gone to Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences when his father was admitted there and, therefore, the president was persuaded to go to Dubai [instead of PIMS].
In the same speech Prime Minister stated: “Parliament, and not the government and the prime minister, should complete the term. It does not make any difference if I sit on opposition benches.”
Glani claimed that he had two-third majority in the National Assembly and if he resigned the opposition would not be in a position to form the government. He added: “In that case both of us will have to go and there will be no elections in our life time.” Gilani further said that there was a procedure in the Constitution to impeach the president and that the Constitution should be followed to keep the country intact.
Gilani again called the memo controversy a conspiracy against the parliament. He stated: “What is the purpose of taking to the court an incredible document authored by a person having a history of writing articles against Pakistan, its government and establishment.”
On December 14, Independent, a British newspaper published an article titled “Pakistan’s memo gate: was there ever going to be a coup?” by Omar Warriach based on Mansoor Ijaz’s, alleged, claim that General Pasha had visited Arab countries for discussion on a possible coup in Pakistan.
In the blog posted on Independent newspaper’s website Ijaz was quoted as having explained the following Blackberry message which he claimed to have sent to Haqqani: “I was just informed by senior US Intel that GD – SII [DG ISI] Mr. P asked for, and received permission, from senior Arab leaders a few days ago to sack Z.”
In the message, Intel stood for Intelligence Officer, P for Pasha and Z for Zardari. Reportedly Pasha had gone on a secret foreign trip on May 6, 2011.
December 15, 2011 was the last date for submission of reply to the Supreme Court in the memo case. The Supreme Court received the replies of all respondents except President Zardari.
In its reply the federal government requested the Supreme Court to dismiss Nawaz Sharif’s petition. It said that it was essential that the Parliamentary Committee on National Security should proceed with the probe to determine the issue and give its recommendations.
The reply stated: “It is the stance of the federation that the federal government (including the constitutional head of the state, the constitutional chief executive of the country or any other component of the federal government) has neither conceptualised nor initiated or, in manner, has anything to do with the alleged memo or the allegations or views expressed therein.”
Intriguingly, the federation’s reply attached a downloaded copy of Omar Warraich’s article published in Independent of December 14. This was an indication that the PPP government was prepared to counter attack the military establishment.
In his somewhat circumspect reply General Kayani stated: “There may be a need to fully examine the facts and circumstances leading to conception and issuance of the memo.” He also said that the matter had an impact on national security and the morale of Pakistan Army.
General Pasha in his reply called for a thorough investigation and stated that “access to unadulterated truth and justice” was the right of the people of Pakistan, “the real sovereign masters of this country.”
Both, the Army Chief and DG ISI, initially, held Haqqani responsible for the controversial memo.
In his submission spread over 81 pages, Mansoor Ijaz gave his version of the events since he was first time allegedly contacted by Haqqani for the drafting and communication of the memo.
On December 16, Jones came in support of Haqqani stating that he had no reason to believe that Haqqani had any role in the preparation of the memo. He did not elaborate what was the basis of his belief vindicating HH, and did not spell out the reasons for such vindication, when the matter is subjudice before the apex Court in Pakistan.
The same day Gilani and Kayani met and, according to the statement issued by the prime minister’s office, agreed that their replies to the Supreme Court should not be misconstrued as “a standoff between the army and the government.”
It was reported that during the meeting Gilani received a phone call of Zardari and Kayani also talked to the president. Next day prime minister was upbeat and told the media that both army and judiciary were with democracy and they would not derail the system.
In the early hours of December 19 President Zardari landed in Karachi.
It appeared that the tense moments were over.
But the optimism was quite short-lived. The Supreme Court took up the memo issue in the morning and at the outset of the hearing the Chief Justice, after referring to the press conference of the PPP leaders held on December 1, observed: “If the prime minister is of the opinion (that whatever uttered was not the stand of the government) he should tell what action he has taken knowing well that the matter is pending before the court.”
The Supreme Court noted that Zardari had not submitted his reply and told the attorney general that when allegations were not rebutted, these were normally considered to be true. The Supreme Court also sought para-wise comments from the respondents on petitions and replies.
The same day (December 19) Inter Services Public Relations issued a statement to dispel the impression that there had been any deal between Zardari and Kayani. The statement clarified that the President and the Army Chief talked for about a minute. “Hence, attributing anything more to this conversation is unfounded and unnecessary.”
Temperature in Islamabad rose again.
On December 20, the Ministry of Defence submitted to the Supreme Court that it exercised only administrative control and no operational control over the armed forces of Pakistan as well as the ISI.
The sign of friction between the civilian set-up and the military establishment became more evident.
In an important development on December 21, the ISPR denied that the DG ISI had met any Arab leader between May 1 and 9 and that stated that visits to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates prior and after these dates were of routine nature. This had become imperative because a petition had been filed in the Supreme Court seeking removal of Pasha as ISI Chief.
When others were complying with the directive of the Supreme Court, the PPP leaders held a meeting on December 21 to deliberate if Zardari should submit his reply or not. The PPP appeared to be on collision path.
December 22 was the worst day of the crisis.
While addressing at a function to commemorate the birth anniversary of the Quaid-i-Azam, Prime Minister Gilani stated that a conspiracy against his government was being hatched. He said that “a state within state” would not be tolerated and added: “all institutions, including the ministry of defence, should be answerable to parliament and the chief executive, who is the prime minister.” Obviously he was upset with the reply submitted by the Secretary of Defence to the Supreme Court and wanted to assert the authority of the civilian arm of the government over the military.
Later in the day he spoke in the National Assembly and pointedly said that he had set up a commission to know about those who were responsible for allowing Osama bin Laden to live in Abbottabad for six years. He repeated: “All institutions of the country are answerable to parliament and nobody is above law.”
It was a full-blown crisis. It seemed the point of no-return had been reached and the military may act any moment to wind up the civilian set-up.
At this juncture some western diplomats became active to defuse the crisis.
Next day the things settled down to a considerable extent.
Quite unusually, Chief of the Army Staff during his visit to forward posts in Mohmand and Kurram agencies stated: “Pakistan Army has and will continue to support democratic process in the country.” But he accused the government of diverting attention from the memo affair by raising alarm of coup. “Irrespective of all other considerations, there can be no compromise on national security,” he clarified.
During a hearing in the Supreme Court, Chief justice Chaudhry also made it clear that unlike in the past, there would be no validation of military takeover. “The (amended) code of conduct demands the judges to preserve and protect the Constitution at all cost. The system will run according to what the Constitution commands,” he stated.
This was not the first time that uncertainty gripped the country.
On a number of occasions since the PPP came to power it appeared that the civilian and military leaderships were on a collision course or the executive and the judiciary were on a war path. Every time the PPP played on the front foot, directly or indirectly, accusing the army and judiciary of hatching conspiracy against democracy and the civilian set-up.
The truth is that all these three institutions have failed to fulfil their responsibilities within the parameters of the Constitution in varying degrees. The executive has not fully complied with the orders and directives of the Supreme Court issued in different cases. Although on several occasions the prime minister has assured the nation that the orders of the Supreme Court would be implemented in letter and spirit, the facts do not substantiate his claim. Often it appeared that the executive was dodging the Supreme Court or playing hide and seek with it.
On its part, the superior judiciary has also given the impression that it has been a bit selective in taking up cases. There is the petition of Asghar Khan concerning the distribution of money by secret agencies to political rivals of the PPP.
There is the case questioning the legitimacy of Shabaz Sharif as Chief Minister of Punjab. There are a large number of cases against the leaders and workers of the MQM for committing violence, including murders, which should have been reopened or restored after the NRO was declared null and void.
There is the case against the MQM for creating mayhem in Karachi on May 12, 2007 in which at least 40 people were killed. When Sindh High Court tried to take up the matter of May 12 the MQM workers threateningly surrounded the Sindh High Court. The High Court was brow-beaten by the MQM thugs but the Supreme Court did nothing.
It is also a truth that the military establishment and its agencies – Military Intelligence or Inter-Services Intelligence – have to live with lot of past baggage. In every general election, the military establishment historically resorts to pre-poll, polling day and post-poll manipulations.
It jealously and exclusively controls the defence and foreign policies of the country. At time people get the impression that the armed forces have monopolised patriotism and do not consider the civilians trustworthy.
Having said all this, one should take it as a good omen that the Supreme Court has made it clear that it would not bestow legitimacy to any extra-constitutional act of taking over the government and the military establishment has given assurance that it does not intend to derail the democratic process.
Pakistan Muslim League (N) has shown great maturity by declaring that it will oppose any military intervention. Almost all important political parties have supported the democratic process. Same is the stand taken by the media in general and representatives of the civil society in particular.
But then this leads us to the question: what next?
For the PPP leadership it is the time for introspection and soul-searching. It needs to reform itself and become more responsive to people’s demands and aspirations. No one can challenge the authority of the government if it is able to command popular trust and respect.
Obviously the best course for the ruling coalition is to address the grievances of the people and focus on improving the quality of governance. It should address the complaints of corruption, favouritism, nepotism, breakdown in law and order, energy crisis, mismanagement in state corporations, inflation, economic meltdown and other issues. It also has to show that it respects the other institutions of the state as “as it desires to be respected.
If the present slide continues, the people may get completely tired and ultimately become fed up of the civilian rule. The fatigue is already visible. To be frank, it is largely due to the Imran Khan factor that a considerable segment of masses has retained some hope in democratic process.
The PPP should understand that, despite all proclamations in the favour of democracy, there is a thresh hold of tolerance and the army or the Supreme Court may perforce decide to wind up the system in national interests if there is a further deterioration in governance and if the government continues on the collision course.
The possibility of such an eventuality is highly pronounced, despite the clear and forth right announcement by both the institutions, given the propensity of the incumbent Zardari-Gilani dispensation to provoke confrontation with these state institutions.
Such an eventuality will be a reality if they were to indulge in any ill-conceived adventurism against the Army and Judiciary. They ought to take a leaf from the contemporary instances of such adventurism by Nawaz Sharif in 1993 and again by Nawaz Sharif in October 1999.
For the government the best course would be to resign and go to the people for a fresh mandate, but it is a tall order for the incumbent government, although the entire dispensation is crying hoarse thatit believes in the power of ballot.
Hence, given the prevailing environment, for the opposition, the best course available is to resign from the assemblies and force the government to go for the fresh polls.
After the resignations the opposition should simultaneously press for having an independent Election Commission, preparation of fool proof voters’ list as directed by the Supreme Court and peaceful conduct of polling on the day of elections.
It should not insist on resignation or removal of President Zardari as a prerequisite for transparent and fair general elections. Any such demand would be unconstitutional and would set a bad example. As for the President, let the cases before the Supreme Court run its course and the President should honour, abide and bow before the outcome of those cases.
As far as the controversial memo is concerned, let there be an inquiry commission by the Supreme Court and let it submit its report to the Supreme Court and let the Supreme Court decide the future line of action and if anyone is found responsible, the laws should take its own course, may it be Haqqani or even the President.
The army has already got over stretched. Its primary responsibility is to defend the country against foreign aggression and internal insurgencies. It should not offer an opportunity to the PPP leaders to go down as martyrs. Any reckless adventurism will bring bad name to the army and it would be thoroughly discredited in a short span.
It is not in the interest of the country to upset the applecart when elections are possible constitutionally and that is the only democratic way to go forward.
There’s certainly a lot of legitimate debate about what exactly government is supposed to be expected to do, and what is the best way to go about doing it. Perhaps you in fact think it appropriate to take some people’s money at gunpoint to give to poor folks (like YOU, no doubt). But recognize this is what you are doing, and don’t kid yourself that it’s something truly different than if you just walked into the bank with a gun — other than you’re getting someone else to do your dirty work. The stick-up artist is just cutting out the middleman. As HL Mencken memorably put it, “Every election is a sort of advance auction sale of stolen goods.”
That said, Mr President and Mr Prime Minister, seize the moment and go to the people, your government has run out of steam. Live up to what you preach and let the change come through the ballot, the power of the ballot is what we need in sheer defence; else what shall save us from a second slavery?
However, do not misunderstand and think that ballots are the opposite of bullets. They are not. They are just a substitute for muting direct violence, not the elimination of violence.
Wednesday, November 9, 2011
Pakistan and the Endgame in Afghanistan
Pakistan and the Endgame in Afghanistan
By amicus • Nov 9th, 2011 • Category: Lead Story • 3 Comments
After completing the review of America’s ongoing ‘war on terror’ and related situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Barack Obama addressed the nation from West Point, New York, on December 1, 2009, to announce: “.. as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined to send an additional 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.”
In order to comply with the timetable set for starting the withdrawal of American troops, the US Administration stepped up military operations against the Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan and built pressure on Pakistan to do the same in different parts of Federally Administered Tribal Areas where allegedly there were safe havens of the militants.
Although Pakistan opened new fronts against the Taliban in the tribal region, it was selective in choosing its targets. In particular, Pakistan was not prepared to act against the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan and denied the existence of the so-called Quetta Shura. Pakistan’s military establishment regards them as strategic assets to be used to safeguard Pakistan’s interests in post-American Afghanistan. There is divergence of goals in Afghanistan between Pakistan and USA.
The US-Pakistan cooperation received a setback in January 2011 when Raymond Davis, a CIA operative, killed two Pakistanis in Lahore and was caught. The incident exposed some clandestine CIA activities that were in conflict with Pakistan’s national security interests and the Pakistan security establishment decided to impose certain restrictions on the CIA operatives and private contractors hired by the agency.
As if the Raymond Davis Case was not enough, on May 2, 2011, the US Navy Seals conducted an operation in Abbottabad hunting Osama bin Laden. The Abbottabad Operation was highly secret and the Pakistan military establishment was not taken into confidence even at the highest level. At least two US helicopters and a C-130 plane blatantly violated Pakistani airspace to conduct the operation deep inside Pakistani territory.
The Abbottabad Operation led to breakdown of trust between the United States and Pakistan. The US Administration suspected the ISI or some of its officers of harboring Osama bin Laden and other high value targets. On the other side, the Pakistani military establishment was jolted out of its slumber to realize the nature of threats that existed to Pakistan’s status as a sovereign state.
On 22 May terrorists played havoc in the Mehran Base of Pakistan Navy in Karachi, further heightening the sense of insecurity and vulnerability of the armed forces.
All these incidents cast aspersions on the preparedness and ability of Pakistan Armed Forces to defend the country and their own installations. They also raised questions about the costs and benefits of Pakistan’s role in what was essentially an American war.
Pakistan had been cooperating with the United States to the utmost limit commensurate with its security interests. It had allowed the US to use drones at will to attack targets in FATA, which had enabled the US forces to eliminate a number of Al-Qaeda operatives. More than 30,000 Pakistani civilians and 3,500 armed forces personnel had lost their lives in ‘war on terror’. Pakistan’s economy had suffered a loss of nearly $60 billion since 9/11 and here was the United States that did not trust it or adequately compensate it and only demanded that Pakistan should ‘do more’.
Inside Afghanistan, there was a resurgence of the Taliban and, although the US Administration was reluctant to admit, the things were not working as planned. The incompetent and corrupt Karzai regime was not able to expand its writ effectively or strengthen its national security apparatus to the requisite extent. Counter-insurgency (COIN) needed popular support which was not forthcoming.
Notwithstanding the grim scenario, President Obama was determined to go ahead with what he had promised to the American people in his West Point speech of December 1, 2009.
Addressing the nation from White House on June 22, 2011, Obama referred to his West Point speech and recalled that there were clear objectives of the surge: to refocus on Al Qaeda; reverse the Taliban’s momentum; and train Afghan Security Forces to defend their own country, and that American commitment in Afghanistan was not to be open-ended.
Obama also declared that starting next month i.e., July, the American troops would start withdrawing from Afghanistan and by the summer of 2012 a total of 33,000 troops would have returned home. He said that after this initial reduction American troops would continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces moved into the lead. He added that American mission would change from combat to support. By 2014, the process of transition would be complete and the Afghan people would be responsible for their security.
Obama claimed that the United States was starting the drawdown from a position of strength. He said that Al Qaeda was under more pressure than at any other time since 9/11 and, working, together with the Pakistan, the Americans had taken out more than half of Al Qaeda’s leadership.
Emphasizing upon the need for a political settlement in Afghanistan, Obama stated that as the United States strengthened the Afghanistan government and security forces, it would join initiatives to reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban. “Our position on these talks is clear: they must be led by the Afghan government, and those who want to be a part of peaceful Afghanistan must break from Al Qaeda, abandon violence, and abide by the Afghan Constitution”, he added.
Obama made it clear that the American goal was to ensure there were no safe havens from which Al Qaeda or its affiliates could launch attacks against American homeland or American allies. He said that the United States would build an enduring partnership with the Afghan people to ensure that it was able to continue targeting terrorists and supporting a sovereign Afghan government. This implied that some American forces would continue to stay in Afghanistan for an indefinite period.
Alleging the presence of terrorist safe-havens in Pakistan, Obama stated: “. . . we will continue to press Pakistan to expand its participation in securing a more peaceful future for this war-torn region. We will work with the Pakistan government to root out the cancer of violent extremism, and we will insist that it keeps its commitment.”
While defining these broad features of American plan for endgame in Afghanistan, Obama said that as there would be dark days ahead in Afghanistan, the light of secure peace could be seen in the distance.
Soon after Obama’s speech, there was a marked surge in the Taliban activities in Afghanistan.
On June 28, 2011, there was an attack on Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul in which at least ten people were killed. On August 19, at least sixteen people lost their lives and twenty-two were injured in a suicide attack on the British Council in Kabul. On September 10, there was a truck bombing at a NATO outpost in Wardak province that killed four civilians and wounded seventy-seven American troops. On September 13, the militants targeted US Embassy, NATO headquarters and some other high profile installations with rocket-propelled grenades, gunfire and suicide bombings. In the assault which continued for 20 hours sixteen people lost their lives and six NATO troops were wounded.
This was too much for the Americans. The US officials blamed the Haqqani network for these attacks and started brow-beating Pakistan.
On September 15, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told the Senate Committee on Armed Services that the US could take “operational steps” to eliminate the threat emanating from terrorist sanctuaries which he alleged were situated in the Pakistani tribal belt. “I think the message they [Pakistanis] need to know is we’re going to do everything we can to defend our forces.”
US Military Chief Admiral Mike Mullen hurled the accusation during the Congressional hearing: “The Haqqani network, for one, acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Internal Services Intelligence agency. With ISI support, the Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy.” He claimed: “We also have credible intelligence that they were behind the June 28 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller, but effective operations.” He warned: “In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the government of Pakistan – and most especially the Pakistan Army and ISI – jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership, but also Pakistan’s opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence.”
In an interview to Radio Pakistan, Ambassador Cameron Munter also blamed the Haqqani network for Kabul attack and said: “There is evidence linking the Haqqani network to the Pakistan government. This is something that must stop.”
Subsequently US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton gave a long lecture to Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar on the possible consequences of Pakistan’s failure to rein in the Haqqanis.
Perhaps the US objective was to make Pakistan a scapegoat for its failure in Afghanistan. The Americans were conveniently forgetting that if the militants had their bases on Pakistani soil, they must have travelled a long distance inside Afghanistan to reach Kabul to carry out the assault without any check on the part of NATO/ISAF.
The US officials were also ignoring the fact that there had been attacks inside Pakistan from across the border with Afghanistan which the NATO/ISAF or the Afghan security forces had failed to prevent.
Implicit in the US posturing was the threat that it could retaliate against Pakistan for its failure to act against the Haqqani network. It could resort to air-raids against alleged targets inside Pakistan or the NATO/ISAF could cross the Durand Line in hot-pursuit of the militants. This obviously created a sense of emergency in Pakistan.
On September 16, Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, while addressing the meeting of NATO Chiefs of Defense in Seville, Spain, stated that Pakistan was committed to struggle against terrorism but it was Pakistan’s sovereign right to formulate its policy “in accordance with its national interests and the wishes of the Pakistani people.”
The situation took yet another nasty turn.
On September 20, a Taliban suicide bomber killed Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik and a former President of Afghanistan, who was the head of the High Peace Council formed by the Afghanistan Government to work for a political settlement in the country. Reportedly Burhanuddin was working on a plan that included offering amnesty and jobs to Taliban fighters and asylum to Taliban leaders in third countries.
Some quarters in Afghanistan pointed fingers towards Pakistan claiming that the assassin had come from FATA.
In this backdrop, Pakistan Government and the military establishment felt the need to demonstrate national unity and consensus on the Afghanistan policy and a firm resolution to face American threats and challenges to Pakistan’s sovereignty and security.
On September 29, 2011, an All Parties Conference was convened in Islamabad in which the Chief of Army Staff General Kayani and ISI Chief Shuja Pasha were also present.
Among other things the APC recognized that there had to be “a new direction and policy with focus on peace and reconciliation.” It called for initiation of dialogue with a view to negotiate peace with “our own people” in the tribal area.
The APC made it clear that defense of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity was a sacred duty which should never be compromised. It said that national interests were supreme and should guide Pakistan’s policy and response to all challenges at all times.
The APC rejected the assertions and baseless allegations made [by the United States] against Pakistan. It called them of no substance and derogatory to a partnership approach. The APC declared: “The Pakistani nation affirms its full solidarity and support for the armed forces of Pakistan in defeating any threat to national security.”
The message was loud and clear to the United States: This time Pakistan had decided to show spine.
The Haqqanis were not Pakistan’s headache; they had done no harm to Pakistan; if they were involved in attacks against the occupational forces in Afghanistan, it was their problem.
If the United States opted for any military adventurism inside FATA or stopped aid, Pakistan could withdraw from the so-called American war on terror; it could bring to a halt nearly 75% of supplies to the NATO/ISAF that passed through its territory. If the United States sought Pakistan’s continued cooperation, it had to take Pakistan’s legitimate interests and security concerns into consideration.
Perhaps the United States had not expected Pakistan to take a tough stand. It understood that if Pakistan withdrew its cooperation, the Afghan tangle would become far more difficult to resolve. It was essential to have Pakistan on board for the timely endgame in Pakistan. As a result the US officials changed their tone.
On September 30, Obama stated that Mullen was expressing “frustration” over alleged safe havens when he referred to the Haqqani network as an arm of Pakistan’s ISI. “The intelligence is not as clear as we might like in terms of what exactly that relationship is”, he added.
In order to sort out Pakistan-United States differences, Clinton visited Pakistan on October 20-21. Although the mantra of terrorist safe havens on Pakistani territory and Pakistan’s responsibility to eliminate them continued, her mission included cooling down of the temperature and improving the US image in the Pakistani media.
Significantly Clinton urged Pakistan to play the role of a peacemaker in Afghanistan. She stated: “We think that Pakistan for a variety of reasons has the capacity to encourage, push, to squeeze . . . terrorists, including the Haqqanis and Afghan Taliban, to be willing to engage in the peace process.”
She declared that the United States respected Pakistan’s sovereignty and would not take any unilateral action against the terrorists on Pakistani soil.
On her return home, Clinton clarified that the United States had asked Pakistanis to squeeze the Taliban and the Haqqani network but that did not necessarily mean “overt military action” against them. She also admitted that there were safe havens of the Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan.
As of today certain dimensions of the Afghanistan tangle are clear.
The United States is prepared to negotiate with the Taliban, including the Haqqani network and Mulla Umar-led so-called Quetta Shura, for the formation of a broad-based government in Afghanistan but insists that these negotiations should be (apparently) led by the Afghanistan Government.
In fact, according to US State Department the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to hold a trilogue with the Taliban and operational details are being worked out.
The United States intends to withdraw the bulk of its forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Its NATO allies are even in greater hurry to wind up their operations. However, the US Administration wants an unspecified number of American troops to stay at selected places, bases and installations in Afghanistan. This is to enable the United States to monitor the situation in Afghanistan and the region as a whole.
Simultaneously, the United States is inclined to give an important role to India in Afghanistan. Due to China factor there is substantial compatibility of the US-India interests in the region.
At present the Taliban are reluctant to negotiate with the American until foreign troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. Pakistan has some clout over the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban. It can serve as bridge and facilitator between the two but cannot guarantee the success of the negotiations.
The United States should also understand that there cannot be pre-conditions. The Taliban cannot be asked to lay down arms, sever ties with the Al Qaeda or declare respect for the Afghan Constitution before the start of negotiations.
The Haqqani network has declared itself a part of the Taliban. It has asked the Americans to establish contact with Mulla Umar, whom the Taliban regard as the commander of the faithful (Amir-ul Momineen). It has rejected previous overtures of the United States for talks on the suspicion that they aimed at creating fissures and divisions among the Taliban.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, it considers Afghanistan, particularly its Pashtun-dominated southern and eastern parts, as of vital interest.
Pakistan believes that India is aspiring to have a foothold and say in Afghanistan which is not commensurate with what it rightly deserves. There are reports that India plans to train Afghan forces and have some military contingents and advisors permanently stationed in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan-India strategic alliance with provision for cooperation in the field of defense is a nightmare for Pakistan.
India can ask for extension of proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline to its territory. It can also aspire to have transit trade facilities across Pakistani territory to Afghanistan and beyond. But a permanent Indian military presence in Afghanistan is an unacceptable security risk for Pakistan.
Pakistan’s claim for a say in Afghanistan’s future is based on solid grounds. No other country has so close ethnic affinity with Afghanistan as Pakistan. Not only is the Afghanistan-Pakistan border long and porous, traditionally there has been free movement of Pashtun tribesmen across it. Since independence, Pakistan has provided transit trade facilities to Afghanistan. There are still nearly three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. India’s interests in Afghanistan do not match Pakistan’s legitimate claims.
There are irrefutable evidences of Indian interference in Pakistan’ Baluchistan province and FATA. The Indian consulates on the Afghanistan side of the Durand Line are responsible for master-minding several terror attacks inside Pakistan. They support Baloch insurgents to destabilize the province. If Pakistan’s security concerns about post-American Afghanistan are not addressed now, it would have no option other to use militant organizations to target Indian interests in Afghanistan and the peace in the region would remain elusive.
It is heartening that Clinton has shown understanding of Pakistan’s position and complexity of the situation.
On October 27, she told the Congress Committee on Foreign Affairs: “There is no solution in the region without Pakistan and no stable future in the region without a partnership.”
She insisted that the US aid to Pakistan should not be made conditional on disbanding of Lashkar-i-Taiba and that the real game-changer in the region would be a stronger relationship between Pakistan and India.
“You can always count on Americans to do the right thing – after they’ve tried everything else.” . . . Winston Churchill.
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Tagged as: FATA, Haqqani Network, Hillary Clinton, Lashkar-i-Taiba, War on Terror
By amicus • Nov 9th, 2011 • Category: Lead Story • 3 Comments
After completing the review of America’s ongoing ‘war on terror’ and related situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Barack Obama addressed the nation from West Point, New York, on December 1, 2009, to announce: “.. as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined to send an additional 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.”
In order to comply with the timetable set for starting the withdrawal of American troops, the US Administration stepped up military operations against the Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan and built pressure on Pakistan to do the same in different parts of Federally Administered Tribal Areas where allegedly there were safe havens of the militants.
Although Pakistan opened new fronts against the Taliban in the tribal region, it was selective in choosing its targets. In particular, Pakistan was not prepared to act against the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan and denied the existence of the so-called Quetta Shura. Pakistan’s military establishment regards them as strategic assets to be used to safeguard Pakistan’s interests in post-American Afghanistan. There is divergence of goals in Afghanistan between Pakistan and USA.
The US-Pakistan cooperation received a setback in January 2011 when Raymond Davis, a CIA operative, killed two Pakistanis in Lahore and was caught. The incident exposed some clandestine CIA activities that were in conflict with Pakistan’s national security interests and the Pakistan security establishment decided to impose certain restrictions on the CIA operatives and private contractors hired by the agency.
As if the Raymond Davis Case was not enough, on May 2, 2011, the US Navy Seals conducted an operation in Abbottabad hunting Osama bin Laden. The Abbottabad Operation was highly secret and the Pakistan military establishment was not taken into confidence even at the highest level. At least two US helicopters and a C-130 plane blatantly violated Pakistani airspace to conduct the operation deep inside Pakistani territory.
The Abbottabad Operation led to breakdown of trust between the United States and Pakistan. The US Administration suspected the ISI or some of its officers of harboring Osama bin Laden and other high value targets. On the other side, the Pakistani military establishment was jolted out of its slumber to realize the nature of threats that existed to Pakistan’s status as a sovereign state.
On 22 May terrorists played havoc in the Mehran Base of Pakistan Navy in Karachi, further heightening the sense of insecurity and vulnerability of the armed forces.
All these incidents cast aspersions on the preparedness and ability of Pakistan Armed Forces to defend the country and their own installations. They also raised questions about the costs and benefits of Pakistan’s role in what was essentially an American war.
Pakistan had been cooperating with the United States to the utmost limit commensurate with its security interests. It had allowed the US to use drones at will to attack targets in FATA, which had enabled the US forces to eliminate a number of Al-Qaeda operatives. More than 30,000 Pakistani civilians and 3,500 armed forces personnel had lost their lives in ‘war on terror’. Pakistan’s economy had suffered a loss of nearly $60 billion since 9/11 and here was the United States that did not trust it or adequately compensate it and only demanded that Pakistan should ‘do more’.
Inside Afghanistan, there was a resurgence of the Taliban and, although the US Administration was reluctant to admit, the things were not working as planned. The incompetent and corrupt Karzai regime was not able to expand its writ effectively or strengthen its national security apparatus to the requisite extent. Counter-insurgency (COIN) needed popular support which was not forthcoming.
Notwithstanding the grim scenario, President Obama was determined to go ahead with what he had promised to the American people in his West Point speech of December 1, 2009.
Addressing the nation from White House on June 22, 2011, Obama referred to his West Point speech and recalled that there were clear objectives of the surge: to refocus on Al Qaeda; reverse the Taliban’s momentum; and train Afghan Security Forces to defend their own country, and that American commitment in Afghanistan was not to be open-ended.
Obama also declared that starting next month i.e., July, the American troops would start withdrawing from Afghanistan and by the summer of 2012 a total of 33,000 troops would have returned home. He said that after this initial reduction American troops would continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces moved into the lead. He added that American mission would change from combat to support. By 2014, the process of transition would be complete and the Afghan people would be responsible for their security.
Obama claimed that the United States was starting the drawdown from a position of strength. He said that Al Qaeda was under more pressure than at any other time since 9/11 and, working, together with the Pakistan, the Americans had taken out more than half of Al Qaeda’s leadership.
Emphasizing upon the need for a political settlement in Afghanistan, Obama stated that as the United States strengthened the Afghanistan government and security forces, it would join initiatives to reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban. “Our position on these talks is clear: they must be led by the Afghan government, and those who want to be a part of peaceful Afghanistan must break from Al Qaeda, abandon violence, and abide by the Afghan Constitution”, he added.
Obama made it clear that the American goal was to ensure there were no safe havens from which Al Qaeda or its affiliates could launch attacks against American homeland or American allies. He said that the United States would build an enduring partnership with the Afghan people to ensure that it was able to continue targeting terrorists and supporting a sovereign Afghan government. This implied that some American forces would continue to stay in Afghanistan for an indefinite period.
Alleging the presence of terrorist safe-havens in Pakistan, Obama stated: “. . . we will continue to press Pakistan to expand its participation in securing a more peaceful future for this war-torn region. We will work with the Pakistan government to root out the cancer of violent extremism, and we will insist that it keeps its commitment.”
While defining these broad features of American plan for endgame in Afghanistan, Obama said that as there would be dark days ahead in Afghanistan, the light of secure peace could be seen in the distance.
Soon after Obama’s speech, there was a marked surge in the Taliban activities in Afghanistan.
On June 28, 2011, there was an attack on Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul in which at least ten people were killed. On August 19, at least sixteen people lost their lives and twenty-two were injured in a suicide attack on the British Council in Kabul. On September 10, there was a truck bombing at a NATO outpost in Wardak province that killed four civilians and wounded seventy-seven American troops. On September 13, the militants targeted US Embassy, NATO headquarters and some other high profile installations with rocket-propelled grenades, gunfire and suicide bombings. In the assault which continued for 20 hours sixteen people lost their lives and six NATO troops were wounded.
This was too much for the Americans. The US officials blamed the Haqqani network for these attacks and started brow-beating Pakistan.
On September 15, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told the Senate Committee on Armed Services that the US could take “operational steps” to eliminate the threat emanating from terrorist sanctuaries which he alleged were situated in the Pakistani tribal belt. “I think the message they [Pakistanis] need to know is we’re going to do everything we can to defend our forces.”
US Military Chief Admiral Mike Mullen hurled the accusation during the Congressional hearing: “The Haqqani network, for one, acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Internal Services Intelligence agency. With ISI support, the Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy.” He claimed: “We also have credible intelligence that they were behind the June 28 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller, but effective operations.” He warned: “In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the government of Pakistan – and most especially the Pakistan Army and ISI – jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership, but also Pakistan’s opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence.”
In an interview to Radio Pakistan, Ambassador Cameron Munter also blamed the Haqqani network for Kabul attack and said: “There is evidence linking the Haqqani network to the Pakistan government. This is something that must stop.”
Subsequently US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton gave a long lecture to Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar on the possible consequences of Pakistan’s failure to rein in the Haqqanis.
Perhaps the US objective was to make Pakistan a scapegoat for its failure in Afghanistan. The Americans were conveniently forgetting that if the militants had their bases on Pakistani soil, they must have travelled a long distance inside Afghanistan to reach Kabul to carry out the assault without any check on the part of NATO/ISAF.
The US officials were also ignoring the fact that there had been attacks inside Pakistan from across the border with Afghanistan which the NATO/ISAF or the Afghan security forces had failed to prevent.
Implicit in the US posturing was the threat that it could retaliate against Pakistan for its failure to act against the Haqqani network. It could resort to air-raids against alleged targets inside Pakistan or the NATO/ISAF could cross the Durand Line in hot-pursuit of the militants. This obviously created a sense of emergency in Pakistan.
On September 16, Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, while addressing the meeting of NATO Chiefs of Defense in Seville, Spain, stated that Pakistan was committed to struggle against terrorism but it was Pakistan’s sovereign right to formulate its policy “in accordance with its national interests and the wishes of the Pakistani people.”
The situation took yet another nasty turn.
On September 20, a Taliban suicide bomber killed Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik and a former President of Afghanistan, who was the head of the High Peace Council formed by the Afghanistan Government to work for a political settlement in the country. Reportedly Burhanuddin was working on a plan that included offering amnesty and jobs to Taliban fighters and asylum to Taliban leaders in third countries.
Some quarters in Afghanistan pointed fingers towards Pakistan claiming that the assassin had come from FATA.
In this backdrop, Pakistan Government and the military establishment felt the need to demonstrate national unity and consensus on the Afghanistan policy and a firm resolution to face American threats and challenges to Pakistan’s sovereignty and security.
On September 29, 2011, an All Parties Conference was convened in Islamabad in which the Chief of Army Staff General Kayani and ISI Chief Shuja Pasha were also present.
Among other things the APC recognized that there had to be “a new direction and policy with focus on peace and reconciliation.” It called for initiation of dialogue with a view to negotiate peace with “our own people” in the tribal area.
The APC made it clear that defense of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity was a sacred duty which should never be compromised. It said that national interests were supreme and should guide Pakistan’s policy and response to all challenges at all times.
The APC rejected the assertions and baseless allegations made [by the United States] against Pakistan. It called them of no substance and derogatory to a partnership approach. The APC declared: “The Pakistani nation affirms its full solidarity and support for the armed forces of Pakistan in defeating any threat to national security.”
The message was loud and clear to the United States: This time Pakistan had decided to show spine.
The Haqqanis were not Pakistan’s headache; they had done no harm to Pakistan; if they were involved in attacks against the occupational forces in Afghanistan, it was their problem.
If the United States opted for any military adventurism inside FATA or stopped aid, Pakistan could withdraw from the so-called American war on terror; it could bring to a halt nearly 75% of supplies to the NATO/ISAF that passed through its territory. If the United States sought Pakistan’s continued cooperation, it had to take Pakistan’s legitimate interests and security concerns into consideration.
Perhaps the United States had not expected Pakistan to take a tough stand. It understood that if Pakistan withdrew its cooperation, the Afghan tangle would become far more difficult to resolve. It was essential to have Pakistan on board for the timely endgame in Pakistan. As a result the US officials changed their tone.
On September 30, Obama stated that Mullen was expressing “frustration” over alleged safe havens when he referred to the Haqqani network as an arm of Pakistan’s ISI. “The intelligence is not as clear as we might like in terms of what exactly that relationship is”, he added.
In order to sort out Pakistan-United States differences, Clinton visited Pakistan on October 20-21. Although the mantra of terrorist safe havens on Pakistani territory and Pakistan’s responsibility to eliminate them continued, her mission included cooling down of the temperature and improving the US image in the Pakistani media.
Significantly Clinton urged Pakistan to play the role of a peacemaker in Afghanistan. She stated: “We think that Pakistan for a variety of reasons has the capacity to encourage, push, to squeeze . . . terrorists, including the Haqqanis and Afghan Taliban, to be willing to engage in the peace process.”
She declared that the United States respected Pakistan’s sovereignty and would not take any unilateral action against the terrorists on Pakistani soil.
On her return home, Clinton clarified that the United States had asked Pakistanis to squeeze the Taliban and the Haqqani network but that did not necessarily mean “overt military action” against them. She also admitted that there were safe havens of the Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan.
As of today certain dimensions of the Afghanistan tangle are clear.
The United States is prepared to negotiate with the Taliban, including the Haqqani network and Mulla Umar-led so-called Quetta Shura, for the formation of a broad-based government in Afghanistan but insists that these negotiations should be (apparently) led by the Afghanistan Government.
In fact, according to US State Department the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to hold a trilogue with the Taliban and operational details are being worked out.
The United States intends to withdraw the bulk of its forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Its NATO allies are even in greater hurry to wind up their operations. However, the US Administration wants an unspecified number of American troops to stay at selected places, bases and installations in Afghanistan. This is to enable the United States to monitor the situation in Afghanistan and the region as a whole.
Simultaneously, the United States is inclined to give an important role to India in Afghanistan. Due to China factor there is substantial compatibility of the US-India interests in the region.
At present the Taliban are reluctant to negotiate with the American until foreign troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. Pakistan has some clout over the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban. It can serve as bridge and facilitator between the two but cannot guarantee the success of the negotiations.
The United States should also understand that there cannot be pre-conditions. The Taliban cannot be asked to lay down arms, sever ties with the Al Qaeda or declare respect for the Afghan Constitution before the start of negotiations.
The Haqqani network has declared itself a part of the Taliban. It has asked the Americans to establish contact with Mulla Umar, whom the Taliban regard as the commander of the faithful (Amir-ul Momineen). It has rejected previous overtures of the United States for talks on the suspicion that they aimed at creating fissures and divisions among the Taliban.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, it considers Afghanistan, particularly its Pashtun-dominated southern and eastern parts, as of vital interest.
Pakistan believes that India is aspiring to have a foothold and say in Afghanistan which is not commensurate with what it rightly deserves. There are reports that India plans to train Afghan forces and have some military contingents and advisors permanently stationed in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan-India strategic alliance with provision for cooperation in the field of defense is a nightmare for Pakistan.
India can ask for extension of proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline to its territory. It can also aspire to have transit trade facilities across Pakistani territory to Afghanistan and beyond. But a permanent Indian military presence in Afghanistan is an unacceptable security risk for Pakistan.
Pakistan’s claim for a say in Afghanistan’s future is based on solid grounds. No other country has so close ethnic affinity with Afghanistan as Pakistan. Not only is the Afghanistan-Pakistan border long and porous, traditionally there has been free movement of Pashtun tribesmen across it. Since independence, Pakistan has provided transit trade facilities to Afghanistan. There are still nearly three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. India’s interests in Afghanistan do not match Pakistan’s legitimate claims.
There are irrefutable evidences of Indian interference in Pakistan’ Baluchistan province and FATA. The Indian consulates on the Afghanistan side of the Durand Line are responsible for master-minding several terror attacks inside Pakistan. They support Baloch insurgents to destabilize the province. If Pakistan’s security concerns about post-American Afghanistan are not addressed now, it would have no option other to use militant organizations to target Indian interests in Afghanistan and the peace in the region would remain elusive.
It is heartening that Clinton has shown understanding of Pakistan’s position and complexity of the situation.
On October 27, she told the Congress Committee on Foreign Affairs: “There is no solution in the region without Pakistan and no stable future in the region without a partnership.”
She insisted that the US aid to Pakistan should not be made conditional on disbanding of Lashkar-i-Taiba and that the real game-changer in the region would be a stronger relationship between Pakistan and India.
“You can always count on Americans to do the right thing – after they’ve tried everything else.” . . . Winston Churchill.
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Tagged as: FATA, Haqqani Network, Hillary Clinton, Lashkar-i-Taiba, War on Terror
Thursday, October 6, 2011
Detailed Judgement Supreme Court of Pakistan-Karachi Situation
A Five Member Bench of Supreme Court of Pakistan, headed by Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, announced detailed Judgment on Suo-Moto Case No. 16 of 2011 and other petitions Regarding Suo-Moto action on Law and Order situation in Karachi.
Thursday, September 29, 2011
The Karachi Crisis
The Karachi Crisis
By amicus • Sep 29th, 2011 • Category: Politics • No Responses As a result of the on-going discourse and proceedings in the Supreme Court on the Karachi crisis, there has emerged a general consensus that the various mafias involved in extortion (bhatta-taking), kidnapping for ransom, drug peddling, arms proliferation, land grabbing and target-killings are either part and parcel of different political, ethnic and sectarian parties or enjoy their patronage, protection and blessings.
It has also been further confirmed that the three principal stake-holders – the PPP, the MQM and the ANP – are largely responsible for the ineffective role of law enforcement agencies in stemming the tide of crimes in the metropolis. They are reluctant to look beyond narrow party interests and their leaders have insatiable lust for material gains.
DG Rangers has informed the Supreme Court that the armed groups belonging to different political and religious parties hide their illicit weapons in their respective party offices where law-enforcement personnel are denied access. According to him, the situation in Karachi is worse than Waziristan. The DG Rangers is not exaggerating.
Extremely alarming is the recent phenomenon of abduction of innocent people on the ground of their ethnic or linguistic identity and their execution through beheading or torturing to death in the most heinous manner. The uploading of gory scenes shot in torture cells on You-tube has terrorized the people in Karachi. The involvement of foreign powers with local political forces cannot be ruled out.
The questions are: Where is the city of Karachi heading to? Is there any solution?
It would be of great worth if the Supreme Court is able to dig out the root causes of the lawlessness in Karachi and set some general guidelines to overcome the crisis. However, judicial process has its limitations and judiciary cannot act politically.
It is time the principal stake-holders and political forces, in particular the PPP, the MQM and the ANP, resolved their differences in the light of ground realities and took necessary steps to restore law and order in Karachi.
A sensible and patriotic course for the civilian government and political forces would be to forge understanding broadly on the following lines:
• Recognition of demographic changes that have taken place in Karachi since 9/11 and power-sharing on its basis.
• Fresh delimitation of National and Provincial Assembly constituencies to make them reflective of Karachi’s current demography.
• Restoration of the City District Government of Karachi (with commensurate changes in Hyderabad) and holding of local bodies elections.
• Making the Election Commission of Pakistan completely independent, preparation of fool proof voters’ lists and taking of appropriate steps to ensure that the general and local bodies’ elections are held freely, fairly and transparently.
• Cleansing of political parties of criminal elements, disbanding of their armed groups/wings and renunciation of violence as an instrument of policy by all political parties.
• Stern across the board and indiscriminate action by law enforcement agencies – police and rangers – against criminal groups and mafias, including those affiliated with the political parties, particularly the PPP, the MQM and the ANP.
• If required, imposition of Governor’s rule or calling of the armed forces to civilian help under Article 245 of the Constitution.
• Strengthening of prosecution process and improvement in collection of evidence, especially forensic evidence.
• Offering adequate protection to judicial officials and witnesses.
• Holding of trials of terrorists without any political interference.
• Necessary and practical steps to check flow of arms and seizure of unlicensed arms. Cancellation of arms licenses given on political consideration.
• Across the board accountability in all government departments to check corruption and mismanagement. Improvement in the quality of governance.
Karachi has turned into a jungle and as a part of long-term solution its civic infrastructure would have to be restored, rebuilt and upgraded.
A people psychologically shattered due to electricity outages, disruption in water and gas supply, poor and inadequate transport, health and education systems, housing problems, under-nourishment etc. become prone to committing violence at the slightest instigation and fall an easy prey to anti-social and anti-state propaganda.
If the civilian authorities and political forces fail to forge understanding on taking effective measures, ultimately the Pakistan Armed Forces may have to act to rescue the situation in Karachi on its own.
In other words, the army would have to take-over the whole country.
But the army intervention is likely to have far-reaching positive and negative consequences for the country.
On the positive side, there would be marked improvement in law and order situation in Karachi and elsewhere, due to military action, at least in the short run. The reason: the criminal elements would find themselves without protection of civilian authorities and political parties.
The armed forces would involve technocrats in the administration of the country. This would improve the quality of governance, including decision-making, planning and execution of projects.
The civic agencies would provide relatively better service to the people and respond to their complaints to the possible extent.
There would be reduction in corruption and wastage of resources.
On the negative side, the first casualty would be the country’s Constitution. The nascent democratic process would be wound up and representative institutions, including the National and Provincial Assemblies, would stand dissolved.
The military administration would have to take on board self-serving politicians to serve as a bridge to the people and, as in the past, a King’s Party would have to be formed.
The army that is deeply involved in Baluchistan and FATA would be further over-stretched at the cost of the defence of Pakistan’s western and eastern frontiers.
The centrifugal forces would get strengthened and find an opportunity to intensify its propaganda against the Pakistan Armed Forces. This would become easier for the centrifugal forces, if some mishap happens or extra-judicial killings take place during the military operation.
The professionalism of the armed forces would be compromised and ultimately there would be search for an exit strategy.
At the end of the day the armed forces would decide to hold general elections and transfer power to the same corrupt politicians, whom they are going to remove, to complete another vicious cycle in Pakistan’s chequered political history.
As such, the army intervention would only be justified if the military establishment is prepared to transform the structure of the society by introducing drastic land and taxation reforms and heavily investing in physical infrastructure and social sectors. In other words, the intervention would be beneficial only if the military establishment is prepared to become the torch-bearer of revolutionary change in Pakistan. It should not leave the country in a worse position.
The two stark options have been mentioned above. If neither the civilian government nor the Pakistan Armed Forces address the Karachi situation with sincerity of purpose, the consequences would be disastrous.
Already a considerable part of Karachi has got divided into areas belonging to different ethnic groups. Some localities belonging to Pashtuns or Sindhis and Balochis have become no go areas for Mohajirs. Similarly some Mohajir dominated localities are considered as dangerous by other ethnic groups. In sensitive areas, people belonging to minority communities are feeling unsafe. They are selling their properties at throw-out prices and moving away. There have been reports of ethnic cleansing taking place. The process may be slow but it is there to be observed.
Karachi is on the precipice. Further aggravation in law and order may cause irreparable loss. In the worst case scenario the city may plunge into civil war leading to massive dislocation and indiscriminate killings in hundreds or even thousands.
Demography of Karachi is such that combined population of Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Sindhis and Balochis is almost equal to that of Mohajirs. The symmetry of power may increase the ferocity of the conflict if it becomes free for all.
There are apparently elements within different political parties who do not seem to be sincere with the country. They are likely to work for disintegration of Pakistan. Killings on massive scale would allow them to solicit support of foreign powers, including India and NATO.
Karachi is strategically located. In the context of ‘war on terror’, it has assumed great importance for the United States. The bulk of supplies to NATO/ISAF stationed in Afghanistan first arrive at the port of Karachi. Karachi is the southern gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, hence very self-serving point of view too, the United States cannot afford Karachi’s destabilization.
As the first option, the United States and Britain are using their clout to resolve the differences between the PPP and the MQM and want the MQM to re-join the federal and provincial governments. If they fail in their task, they may not remain averse to the Pakistan army taking-over the country to ensure that stability is restored in Karachi. However, if Karachi plunges into civil war and situation becomes extremely critical, they may as a last resort ask NATO to intervene in Karachi to protect their vital interests.
Some political analysts have speculated that the United States is interested in acquiring a corridor from Gwadar to Chaman or some other appropriate point in Baluchistan to have access through land route to Afghanistan and beyond for construction of gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia.
In this manner, the United States would also be able to block China from acquiring access to the Gwadar Port which is situated near the mouth of the Gulf in the Arabian Sea and may acquire presence all along the Pakistan-Iran Border, which would entail horrendous consequences for the region.
Even if this, apparently, far-fetched idea gets materialized, the importance of the port city of Karachi would not diminish in foreseeable future and the United States would go to any extent to restore peace and stability in Karachi. It would love to ensure that there is a proper power-sharing and cooperation between stake-holders / political forces through whatever options available, including military intervention by NATO.
It is about time we the people of Pakistan rise to the occasion and bring peace to Karachi by persuasion, prodding and if necessitated, even by force.
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It has also been further confirmed that the three principal stake-holders – the PPP, the MQM and the ANP – are largely responsible for the ineffective role of law enforcement agencies in stemming the tide of crimes in the metropolis. They are reluctant to look beyond narrow party interests and their leaders have insatiable lust for material gains.
DG Rangers has informed the Supreme Court that the armed groups belonging to different political and religious parties hide their illicit weapons in their respective party offices where law-enforcement personnel are denied access. According to him, the situation in Karachi is worse than Waziristan. The DG Rangers is not exaggerating.
Extremely alarming is the recent phenomenon of abduction of innocent people on the ground of their ethnic or linguistic identity and their execution through beheading or torturing to death in the most heinous manner. The uploading of gory scenes shot in torture cells on You-tube has terrorized the people in Karachi. The involvement of foreign powers with local political forces cannot be ruled out.
The questions are: Where is the city of Karachi heading to? Is there any solution?
It would be of great worth if the Supreme Court is able to dig out the root causes of the lawlessness in Karachi and set some general guidelines to overcome the crisis. However, judicial process has its limitations and judiciary cannot act politically.
It is time the principal stake-holders and political forces, in particular the PPP, the MQM and the ANP, resolved their differences in the light of ground realities and took necessary steps to restore law and order in Karachi.
A sensible and patriotic course for the civilian government and political forces would be to forge understanding broadly on the following lines:
• Recognition of demographic changes that have taken place in Karachi since 9/11 and power-sharing on its basis.
• Fresh delimitation of National and Provincial Assembly constituencies to make them reflective of Karachi’s current demography.
• Restoration of the City District Government of Karachi (with commensurate changes in Hyderabad) and holding of local bodies elections.
• Making the Election Commission of Pakistan completely independent, preparation of fool proof voters’ lists and taking of appropriate steps to ensure that the general and local bodies’ elections are held freely, fairly and transparently.
• Cleansing of political parties of criminal elements, disbanding of their armed groups/wings and renunciation of violence as an instrument of policy by all political parties.
• Stern across the board and indiscriminate action by law enforcement agencies – police and rangers – against criminal groups and mafias, including those affiliated with the political parties, particularly the PPP, the MQM and the ANP.
• If required, imposition of Governor’s rule or calling of the armed forces to civilian help under Article 245 of the Constitution.
• Strengthening of prosecution process and improvement in collection of evidence, especially forensic evidence.
• Offering adequate protection to judicial officials and witnesses.
• Holding of trials of terrorists without any political interference.
• Necessary and practical steps to check flow of arms and seizure of unlicensed arms. Cancellation of arms licenses given on political consideration.
• Across the board accountability in all government departments to check corruption and mismanagement. Improvement in the quality of governance.
Karachi has turned into a jungle and as a part of long-term solution its civic infrastructure would have to be restored, rebuilt and upgraded.
A people psychologically shattered due to electricity outages, disruption in water and gas supply, poor and inadequate transport, health and education systems, housing problems, under-nourishment etc. become prone to committing violence at the slightest instigation and fall an easy prey to anti-social and anti-state propaganda.
If the civilian authorities and political forces fail to forge understanding on taking effective measures, ultimately the Pakistan Armed Forces may have to act to rescue the situation in Karachi on its own.
In other words, the army would have to take-over the whole country.
But the army intervention is likely to have far-reaching positive and negative consequences for the country.
On the positive side, there would be marked improvement in law and order situation in Karachi and elsewhere, due to military action, at least in the short run. The reason: the criminal elements would find themselves without protection of civilian authorities and political parties.
The armed forces would involve technocrats in the administration of the country. This would improve the quality of governance, including decision-making, planning and execution of projects.
The civic agencies would provide relatively better service to the people and respond to their complaints to the possible extent.
There would be reduction in corruption and wastage of resources.
On the negative side, the first casualty would be the country’s Constitution. The nascent democratic process would be wound up and representative institutions, including the National and Provincial Assemblies, would stand dissolved.
The military administration would have to take on board self-serving politicians to serve as a bridge to the people and, as in the past, a King’s Party would have to be formed.
The army that is deeply involved in Baluchistan and FATA would be further over-stretched at the cost of the defence of Pakistan’s western and eastern frontiers.
The centrifugal forces would get strengthened and find an opportunity to intensify its propaganda against the Pakistan Armed Forces. This would become easier for the centrifugal forces, if some mishap happens or extra-judicial killings take place during the military operation.
The professionalism of the armed forces would be compromised and ultimately there would be search for an exit strategy.
At the end of the day the armed forces would decide to hold general elections and transfer power to the same corrupt politicians, whom they are going to remove, to complete another vicious cycle in Pakistan’s chequered political history.
As such, the army intervention would only be justified if the military establishment is prepared to transform the structure of the society by introducing drastic land and taxation reforms and heavily investing in physical infrastructure and social sectors. In other words, the intervention would be beneficial only if the military establishment is prepared to become the torch-bearer of revolutionary change in Pakistan. It should not leave the country in a worse position.
The two stark options have been mentioned above. If neither the civilian government nor the Pakistan Armed Forces address the Karachi situation with sincerity of purpose, the consequences would be disastrous.
Already a considerable part of Karachi has got divided into areas belonging to different ethnic groups. Some localities belonging to Pashtuns or Sindhis and Balochis have become no go areas for Mohajirs. Similarly some Mohajir dominated localities are considered as dangerous by other ethnic groups. In sensitive areas, people belonging to minority communities are feeling unsafe. They are selling their properties at throw-out prices and moving away. There have been reports of ethnic cleansing taking place. The process may be slow but it is there to be observed.
Karachi is on the precipice. Further aggravation in law and order may cause irreparable loss. In the worst case scenario the city may plunge into civil war leading to massive dislocation and indiscriminate killings in hundreds or even thousands.
Demography of Karachi is such that combined population of Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Sindhis and Balochis is almost equal to that of Mohajirs. The symmetry of power may increase the ferocity of the conflict if it becomes free for all.
There are apparently elements within different political parties who do not seem to be sincere with the country. They are likely to work for disintegration of Pakistan. Killings on massive scale would allow them to solicit support of foreign powers, including India and NATO.
Karachi is strategically located. In the context of ‘war on terror’, it has assumed great importance for the United States. The bulk of supplies to NATO/ISAF stationed in Afghanistan first arrive at the port of Karachi. Karachi is the southern gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, hence very self-serving point of view too, the United States cannot afford Karachi’s destabilization.
As the first option, the United States and Britain are using their clout to resolve the differences between the PPP and the MQM and want the MQM to re-join the federal and provincial governments. If they fail in their task, they may not remain averse to the Pakistan army taking-over the country to ensure that stability is restored in Karachi. However, if Karachi plunges into civil war and situation becomes extremely critical, they may as a last resort ask NATO to intervene in Karachi to protect their vital interests.
Some political analysts have speculated that the United States is interested in acquiring a corridor from Gwadar to Chaman or some other appropriate point in Baluchistan to have access through land route to Afghanistan and beyond for construction of gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia.
In this manner, the United States would also be able to block China from acquiring access to the Gwadar Port which is situated near the mouth of the Gulf in the Arabian Sea and may acquire presence all along the Pakistan-Iran Border, which would entail horrendous consequences for the region.
Even if this, apparently, far-fetched idea gets materialized, the importance of the port city of Karachi would not diminish in foreseeable future and the United States would go to any extent to restore peace and stability in Karachi. It would love to ensure that there is a proper power-sharing and cooperation between stake-holders / political forces through whatever options available, including military intervention by NATO.
It is about time we the people of Pakistan rise to the occasion and bring peace to Karachi by persuasion, prodding and if necessitated, even by force.
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Wednesday, August 24, 2011
Making of Mohajir Political Entity and City of Karachi
Making of Mohajir Political Entity and City of Karachi
By Guest Blogger • Aug 24th, 2011 • Category: Lead Story • 5 CommentsMohajirs constitute a part of the population, which migrated from India to Pakistan after partition in 1947. A majority of migrants came from East Punjab In West Punjab. They got relatively assimilated with the native population within a generation.
On the other hand, Mohajirs came from areas further east, south and west in India and settled mainly in urban Sindh. They remained largely unassimilated with the local population even after two generations.
Patterns of Migration Number of Share of Ratio in Total Refugees Population
1. Pakistan7.22 million 100 10%
2. East Bengal.7 million9.67%1.7%
3. W. Pakistan6.52 million 90.3%20%
4. Punjab5.3 million73%25.6%
5. Sindh (ex K).55 million7.6%11.7%
6. Karachi.61 million8.53%55%
Source: Census of Pakistan 1951, Vol. I, Table 19-A, Vol. 6, p. 65.Unlike in Punjab, refugees in Sindh deified integration in the local society because of their linguistic, cultural and historical remoteness from Sindhis.
These differences were patterned along sectoral lines. 63.9 percent of refugees in Sindh lived in urban areas, 86.16 percent in Hyderabad district and 71 percent in Sukkur.
In Karachi, there were only 14.28 percent speakers of Sindhi in 1951 as opposed to 58.7 percent who spoke Urdu as their mother tongue. Thus, Karachi overnight became a Mohajir city.
The government of Pakistan carved the city out of Sindh in July 1948. It became a federally administered area as capital of Pakistan. The process of refugee rehabilitation in Karachi and Sindh generally remained far from satisfactory.
Even in 1954, i.e. 7 years after partition, no less than 2,40,000 out of a total of 7,50,000 refugees in Karachi were still to be rehabilitated.
While in Punjab, immigration had virtually stopped in 1948, in Sindh it continued even after the passport and visa system was introduced for travel between India and Pakistan.
About 1,00,000 refugees from India continued to come to Pakistan each year, with a majority belonging to ‘urban classes’ who generally came straight to Karachi. This created an immense problem of settlement, which in turn led to gross frustration among refugees.
Census of Pakistan, Karachi, 1951, Vol. 6, Statement 3-R, p. 36.13Ibid. Vol. 1, Statement 5-C, p. 87.14Debates (CAP), 23 March 1954, p. 405.
Mohajirs constitute a privileged community on the decline. Initially, they dominated the All India Muslim League in British India and later the government in Pakistan.
However, they occupied an inherently insecure position in terms of electoral politics. Prime Minister-designate Liaqat Ali Khan who was a Mohajir was inducted into the Constituent Assembly in place of an elected member from East Bengal.
The Mohajir leadership chose to bypass the Constituent Assembly which had been elected by the Muslim members of the legislative assemblies of Muslim majority provinces comprising Pakistan, and which was therefore dominated by ‘locals.’ It shunned elections, which would lead to its exit from power.
Instead, it operated through the higher bureaucracy that was also dominated by migrants of both Punjabi and Mohajir extraction.
Mohajirs who were only 3 percent of the population had 21 percent jobs. Among senior jobs, Mohajirs had 33.5 percent in federal bureaucracy in 1973 and 20 percent in the Secretariat group in 1974;however, their share came down to 18.3 percent in 1986 and 14.3 percent in 1989 respectively.
Mohajirs not only dominated politics and bureaucracy but also business. The Gujrati-speaking migrants from Bombay in India, especially Memon, Bohra and Khoja communities, were in the vanguard of industrialization in Pakistan. Gujrati-speaking Mohajirs controlled seven of the twelve largest industrial houses.
In 1972, when Bhutto nationalized industry in the ten leading sectors including electrical engineering, petrochemicals, iron and steel as well as rudimentary automotive assembly plants, Mohajirs were dealt a severe blow.
The Mohajir-led political leadership in the immediate post independence period sought to identify Pakistan with the Islamic world. Political loyalties in Pakistan were thus ‘externalized’ in the name of religion.
Mohajirs also continued to be deeply involved in the fate of Indian Muslims across the border. They were acutely sensitive to the latter’s needs to get jobs and tried to help them migrate to Pakistan.
Indeed, Mohajirs interpreted the Two Nation Theory itself in the context of the right of Indian Muslims to migrate to Pakistan. This led to a general deification of the state, accompanied by a cult of unity of the nation in the face of the perceived Indian bellicosity, largely at the cost of provincial autonomy, indigenous cultures.
Both the first Governor general and the first prime minister of Pakistan were Mohajirs. Similarly, Mohajirs also dominated the Central Working Committee of the Muslim League.
Mohajirs’ political attitudes were typically based on a paternalistic vision of the society, enhanced commitment to ideological mobilization and lack of tolerance for provincial and ethnic aspirations.
Three broad areas of change adversely affected Mohajirs: First, One-Unit was conceived to counter the weight of Bengalis in the National Assembly of Pakistan in view of the latter’s share of 55 percent in the country’s population.
However, under One Unit, it was Punjabis not Mohajirs who expanded their job circuit. Secondly, the 1958 coup put Punjabi generals in control of key positions in the corporate sector, opening up jobs for their co-ethnics.
Finally, the shift of capital to Islamabad in the vicinity of the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi pointed to the centrality of Punjab-based army in the new dispensation, largely at the expense of Mohajirs.
Pakistan was a state infused with a dominant migrant ethos, couched in an ideological framework of the Two-Nation Theory as the raison d’etre of Pakistan.
The ruling elite took pride in the achievements of the Indo-Muslim civilization over a thousand years and appropriated its symbols such as Urdu language, Mogul architectural monuments and the Indo-Iranian tradition of art.
The 1970 election was to change all that. The elite was unable to take into account the massive currents of indigenous revival in East Bengal, Punjab and Sindh. In (W) Pakistan, the Indus Valley overtook the Indo-Muslim civilization as a source of cultural symbols. Territorial nationalism pushed aside ideological nationalism as the dominant mode of thinking.
The popular refrain in the 1970s was that Pakistan was the home of four cultures, Sindhi, Punjabi, Baloch and Pakhtuns. This gradually legitimized the thesis that Pakistan consisted of four nationalities. The new populism flourished at the cost of the cherished worldview of the migrant elite rooted in a Unitarian model of politics.
In 1970, the state of Pakistan, which was originally conceived in non-Pakistan areas, finally took roots in the languages and cultures of the country itself. The indigenous revival put a new generation of Sindhi leadership in power.
It represented popular aspirations identified with historical and cultural identity of Sindh and was committed to the goal of cultural preservation against the perceived onslaught of Mohajirs.
It criticized the fact that only one fourth of the material in school text books reflected indigenous Pakistani cultures and their heroes while three fourths represented northern Indian cultural symbols and that making of Pakistan was attributed predominantly to Muslims of minority provinces while the role of majority provinces, especially Sindh which voted for Pakistan before others, was ignored.
The land question was another major source of Sindhi nationalist sentiment. Out of the land brought under cultivation by Ghulam Mohammad, Guddu and Sukkur. For a discussion of the migrant ethos, see Mohammad Waseem, op. cit., pp. 110-11.21Aftab Kazi, ‘Ethnic Nationalities, Education and Problems of National Integration in Pakistan-II’, Sindh Quarterly, 1989, No.1, pp. 21–27.
Barrages, 1.48 million, 0.64 million and 0.28 million acres respectively, ex-military officers and bureaucrats among others—mostly Punjabi but also Mohajirs—were allotted .87 million, 0.32 million and 0.13 million acres in that order.
The standard Mohajir response to Sindhi protest was that Sindhi waderas were too much given to a life of luxury and Sindhi haris were far too condemned to a life of misery to cultivate lands irrigated by Sukkur Barrage and that Mohajir domination in education and services was the product of inability or unwillingness of Sindhis to fill the vacuum created by the departing Hindus.
Mohajirs favored an open system of recruitment to educational institutions, jobs and businesses through competition on the basis of merit. Sindhis wanted protection through a fixed quota for jobs and services.
During the second quarter century after independence, Mohajirs’ social vision was effectively ‘nativised’. They now looked at themselves as belonging to Sindh and, especially, Karachi.
This happened due to arrival of new migrants who challenged their cultural, economic and political interests. During the last half century, Karachi experienced four major waves of migration, comprising Mohajirs (1940s–50s), Punjabis and Pathan (1960s–80s), Sindhis (1970s–90s), and foreigners including from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Thailand and Philippines, among others (1980s–90s).
The Mohajir mass public, which represented the bulk of the first wave migrants, squatted in kachi abadis (Shanty Towns), in conditions of acute residential and income insecurity. This situation reflected their helplessness with the local government for provision of tenure and civic amenities.
During the 1980s, the popular idiom shifted away from the two traditional sources of Mohajir identity formation, Islam and Pakistan to ethno-linguistic.
The second wave of migrants representing Punjabis and Pathan has been defined as ‘circular migration’ as opposed to the ‘permanent migration’ of Mohajirs. The former kept relations with family back home and visited home at varying intervals. It was estimated that out of 350,000 new inhabitants of Karachi every year, 150,000 were migrants from upcountry.
Punjabi migrants entered jobs in the new industrial units. Pathan construction workers, diggers of soil, retail sellers and transport workers, followed them.
At least half of them behaved as working-life migrants tied with home. Unlike the first wave migrants, the second wave migrants tended to keep their upcountry identity and loyalty intact.
As Linguistic Groups Karachi comprised, Urdu, Punjabi Pushtoon, Sindhi, Balochi, Hindko and Others 54.3%13.6%8.7%6.3%4.4%1%11.7%, respectively.
Source: 1981 Census Report of Karachi Division.
In Karachi, ethnicity emerged as the dominant theme in the 1980s as the mass of humanity living off the mainstream ‘planned’ social and political life developed its own rules of game for survival.
Ethnic groups were huddled together into informal security structures woven around vested interests such as jobs, houses, security against eviction or bulldozing of illegal tenements and other psychological support mechanisms.
Mohajirs started developing a sense of nationalism about Karachi and Sindh as a bulwark against Punjabi and Pathan migrants.
Previously, Punjabis had joined hands with Mohajirs and Pathan to form the Mohajir-Punjabi-Pashtun Muttahida Mahaz, which sought to safeguard the rights of the three migrant communities in Sindh.
However, as Mohajirs sought to co-operate with Sindhis against Punjabis, the latter reacted by closing their gap with Sindhis. The third wave of migration brought Sindhis into Karachi and Hyderabad.
Re-integration of Karachi with Sindh in an administrative and ‘political’ sense in 1970 and installation of a PPP government led by nationalist elements under Mumtaz Ali Bhutto as well as acts such as passing of the Language Bill and introduction of the quota system made the presence of Sindhis felt in the city.
The quota system provided jobs for the nascent Sindhi middle class. Moreover, the late arrival of Green Revolution in Sindh in the 1980s displaced many Sindhi tenants and haris from land and pushed them to Karachi.
The fourth wave of migration emerged in the 1980s when nationals of the neighboring countries started coming to Karachi.
A huge market in manpower transport emerged in the east of Arabian Sea extending to India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Indonesia and Philippines up to South Korea. Karachi became an important mid-way stop on the route to the Gulf, often becoming the hub of under ground activity surrounding traffic in workers, drug and women from Bangladesh and Philippines.
The number of political refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq (Kurds), Iran (Bahais), Burma (Muslims), and Sri Lanka (Tamils) and economic 27 Ibid. pp. 25–27.28.
Akbar Zaidi, ‘Sindhi vs Mohajir in Pakistan: Contradiction, Conflict, Compromise’, Economic and Political Weekly. May 16, 1991, p. 1297.
Refugees from Philippines, Bangladesh, Thailand, Somalia and Ethiopia in 1995 rose to 1,626,324.29. The first wave migrants—Mohajirs—resent the second, third and fourth wave migrants, and now considered themselves ‘natives’ of Karachi and Sindh.
They view Punjabis and Pathan as migrants of fortune who earn in Karachi but send back their earnings to their families’ upcountry, and invest money there in property and education of children, involving a net transfer of resources from Karachi. Mohajirs also object to the Sindhis’ practices of earning in Karachi and spending in the interior, (which is erroneous as it is other way around in large measure.
MQM: A POLITICAL PROFILE Squatter settlements provided a fertile ground for the ethnic message of Mohajir student activists. Universities and colleges crystallized Mohajir consciousness. Mohajir students had to contend with student association’s organized on linguistic and regional lines, including the Punjab Students Association, Pashtun Students Association, Baloch Students Organization and Jiye Sindh Students Federation.
This led to formation of the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organization (APMSO) in 1978. APMSO was a product of the perceived Mohajir grievances in terms of non-delivery of promises of the PNA leaders to eliminate the quota system and to secure the lives of Mohajirs against the perceived tyranny and violence. These student leaders later formed the MQM in 1984. In the new party, blind faith in the leader provided a string binding different participants of the movement. The MQM created a strong cult of personality of Altaf Hussain.
The non-elite character of the MQM leadership gave it a certain level of legitimacy to call itself a party of the poor. It claimed that it had broken the spell of traditional drawing room politics of capitalists and feudal and brought the poor and middle class leadership into assemblies.
It observed that masses could not vote according to their own choice because jagirdars, waderas, sardars and nawabs held them down under their cruel and dictatorial system.
It vowed to establish a system in the country under which there would be the rule of not the 2 percent privileged but the 98 percent poor and middle class.
However, despite its progressive rhetoric, the MQM lacked any policy structure, reform program or legislative proposals, observes Mohammad Suleman Sheikh, in ‘The Issue of Migration in Pakistan’, Unpublished paper, Islamabad, 1995.
Imran Farooq, Imperatives of Discipline and Organization, (Urdu), MQM document, Karachi, pp. 10–17.31 Reply Statement of the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Sindh in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, 5 June 1995, Petition No. 46/94, pp. 32-33.
MQM is the Symbol of Being Oppressed, (Urdu), MQM document, Karachi, 1994, pp. 6, 13.33Ibid. p. 14.34The Rule of the Poor, (Urdu), MQM document, Karachi, n.d., p. 7.
Not surprisingly, the MQM’s self-image as a party of the poor lacked credibility in the eyes of non-Mohajirs everywhere. In the public view, the MQM pitted the poor of one community against the poor of the other community across the street, not against the rich from the other side of the city.
The MQM can be considered as a policy-neutral, ideologically agnostic and pro-status quo party despite claims to the contrary. The quota system has been at the heart of the MQM politics.
After the Sindhi-dominated PPP government took power in Karachi in 1971, the issue of the share of Sindhis in education and jobs re-emerged on the political agenda.
The MQM points to a deliberate policy of discrimination against Mohajirs. Similarly, the fate of a quarter of a million Biharis in Bangladesh is a constant reference in the MQM’s literature.
The party has strongly criticized the government of Pakistan for not accepting its own citizens back into the country. A closely related issue is population because it has implications for jobs and elections.
The MQM has claimed that Mohajirs constituted 60 percent of the population in Sindh and that the 1961, 1972and 1981 census figures were manipulated to reduce the population of Mohajirs by more than half.
The MQM defined Mohajirs as those who (i) migrated to Pakistan from Muslim minority provinces of the sub-continent at the time of the partition, (ii) are not considered to belong to any of the nationalities of Pakistan—neither Punjabi, nor Sindhi, nor Balochi, nor Pakhtun, and (iii) migrated from those areas of East Punjab whose language and culture was not Punjabi.
The MQM took exception to the fact that the four provinces of Pakistan were constantly being declared as four brothers, excluding those who did not originally belong to any of these provinces.
Altaf Hussain declared that the slogan of Mohajir nationality was indeed the product of reaction to the slogan of four nationalities.
It was claimed that Mohajirs had now aligned themselves with the destiny of Sindh and become de facto sons of the soil. The MQM demanded rationalization of the prevalent domicile system so that only those locals should be issued domicile that had lived in Sindh along with their whole family for at least 20 years. It defined ‘locals’ as those who lived a family life, earned, spent, died and got buried in, and linked their interests with, the interests of Sindh.
This was essentially a nativity idiom rooted in a part of the territory of Sindh. The MQM leadership’s hobnobbing with the Sindhi nationalist leadership reflected its political stand against the upcountry migrants. Herald, Karachi, February 1988, p. 58.36MQM, Constitutional Petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Part 1.
The Punjabi Pakhtun Ittehad (PPI) came in to being on 7 March 1987. However, the PPI never really took off. In the 1988 elections, MQM and PPP bagged almost all Mohajir and Sindhi seats representing the two ethnic nationalisms respectively. The MQM and PPP formed a coalition and signed the Karachi Accord as a basis for co-operation.
However, soon their distinct party profiles on the issue of implementation of the Accord led them apart.
The downhill march of the coalition culminated in a secret alliance between the IJI opposition and MQM, which was disclosed and signed on 24 October 1989, but negotiated and signed much earlier in July 1989, on the eve of the no-confidence motion against Benazir Bhutto. Violence increased on the street and so did army’s involvement in civil administration.
The MQM’s partnership in the IJI government from 1990–92 represented the high point in its street power whereby it sought to maintain an iron grip on all Mohajir public activity.
The press was a special target of the MQM workers who burnt thousands of copies of the daily Dawn and stopped its distribution, looted the offices of daily Jang, and attacked the houses of journalists.
It demanded full coverage of its activities on prominent places on the papers, condemned critical views about the party and sought to punish those who would not oblige.
As long as some sections of the Mohajir population stayed outside its fold, the MQM felt that its legitimacy as an exclusively Mohajir party remained less than total.
These people were called traitors to the Mohajir cause and were sometimes beaten, abducted and tortured to teach a lesson to others.
Mohajirs were still far from integrated into a community because of their different linguistic, geographic and cultural backgrounds. In order to bind them together and put them immediately at the front of the political stage, unity by command rather than by persuasion was considered to be the way out.
In 1989-90, the MQM played the local bully for a national level political alliance, with a larger political objective of destabilizing the PPP government.
The MQM kept the momentum of its street politics high when it was a partner in Jam Sadiq Ali’s government in Sindh. Its share in state power, combined with its unchallenged street power, produced an inordinately high level of confidence in the party workers. Again in 1994-95, the MQM’s strategy focused on destabilizing the PPP government by exposing its inability to control street violence.
Moving beyond the rival ethnic groups and internal dissidents as targets of their action, the party workers abducted and tortured a serving army officer, Major Kaleem Ahmad. That was the last straw, which brought the army into play with full force. On 19 June 1992, army started Operation-Clean up in Sindh. It claimed that it had got hold of maps of ‘Jinnahpur’ or ‘Urdu Desh’ meant to be carved out of Sindh including Karachi, Hyderabad and some coastal area as an independent country by the MQM. It also unearthed 22 MQM torture cells, including one in Abbasi Shaheed Hospital.
Many of the top leaders of the MQM including Altaf Hussain were declared proclaimed offenders. Many others, including MNAs and MPAs of the MQM went underground.
The latter resigned from membership of the two assemblies. The army allegedly sponsored a rival faction within the MQM, called Haqiqi, comprising opponents of the Altaf group.
The MQM boycotted the 1993 elections for the National Assembly but it participated in the Sindh Assembly elections three days later and won 27 out of 100 seats. The new Benazir Bhutto government started a dialogue with the MQM, especially after the latter voted for the PPP nominee Farooq Leghari as president. However, each round of talks ended in failure. In June 1994, the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Court to a 27-year jail term sentenced Altaf Hussain.
In a series of open letters addressed to armed services chiefs, Altaf Hussain accused the military unit FIT and ‘officials of the armed forces’ in general of perpetrating atrocities on Mohajirs, extracting bribes from people worth millions of rupees and becoming ‘wealthy but devoid of moral fiber and patriotism’.
In end November 1994, the civil armed forces took over from the regular army units in Sindh. In the aftermath of the army withdrawal, the MQM launched its major attack on the institutions of civil administration and sought to create a law and order situation out in the street. In July 1995, a new Operation Clean-up was started in Karachi under the supervision of Interior Minister General Babar.
It was a coordinated effort between elite security and intelligence agencies, which used sophisticated monitoring equipment, network of informers, evaluation and corroboration of information acquired through interrogation and intelligence links within the MQM.
In the process of the operation, the PPP government allegedly carried out extra judicial killings, especially in fake police encounters, torture of the MQM’s workers and persecution of the latter’s families.
The humiliating searches inside households and brutish behavior of the police vis-à-vis the Mohajir youth alienated the community still further. Not surprisingly, Mohajirs continued to look towards the MQM for safeguarding their rights and interests.
By the second quarter of 1996, the MQM’s movement had been largely contained. While the MQM had intensely lobbied human rights organizations in and outside Pakistan, no generalized protest campaign against the government’s strong-arm tactics against it emerged in the country.
The MQM’s failure lay in its inability to challenge the legitimacy of the elected PPP government at any stage from 1993–96 either at Karachi or in Islamabad.
Rise of ethno nationalism, without incorporating the possibility and the nature of decline in its scope and intensity. An absolute majority of such movements have indeed been contained in the postwar era. It is unlikely that this trend will reserve in near future.
In this context, one can point to the Pushtoon, Baloch and Sindhi nationalist movements in Pakistan, which have been relatively contained within the framework of the political system of the country.
One can hope that the Mohajir nationalist movement will be reoriented towards a constitutional form of struggle and a parliamentary way to negotiating an ethnic bargain with other communities living in Sindh. It is significant to note that it is the state at the non-policy level, which created a situation of ethnic explosion in urban Sindh.
Various macro-level issues revolving around conflicts between politicians and army, federalist and provincial forces, Islamist and secularist elements and, externally, India and Pakistan seriously circumscribed the state’s capacity and will to pursue micro-level issues such as urban planning, educational and manpower strategies, as well as rural-urban and inter-provincial migration.
What is immediately required is the expansion of the service-giving network of the state in order to incorporate large sections of the population.
As the state defaulted on various counts such as citizen orientations, legal protection and security of life and property, ethnicity emerged as the new source of definition and categorization of interests and identity formation.
In other words, it was not too much of the (Jacobin) state, as primordial would have us believe, but rather too little of it which produced the Mohajir ethnic movement.
MQM has, since 2002, when General Pervez Musharraf opted for inclusive politics and rehabilitated the, MQM and MQM responded coming in to mainstream politics and since then is in the power corridors.
The PPP government opted for the same policy with MQM, although definitely for altogether different considerations, indispensability of MQM for formation and since then sustainability of Federal Government.
Hence in the Sindh Province MQM is a necessary evil for PPP, it is indispensable in keeping Zardari led PPP Government in Islamabad.
In this backdrop it is Karachi, which has become Achilles’ Heel-the vulnerable spot for the Mr. Zardari and Gilani. In the case of Karachi read MQM, the Peoples Party Sindh clearly appears to be at odds with its own Federal Government. The state is bearing the cost for the indecisiveness of incumbent dispensation in Islamabad.
One may seek guidance from Jinnah to address the contemporary issues of Karachi.
KARACHI–A CITY WITH BRIGHT FUTURE
Reply to the Civic Address presented by the Karachi Corporation on 25th August, 1947:
“I thank you Mayor and Councilors of the Corporation of the City of Karachi for your cordial address of welcome and all the kind thoughts and personal references you have been good enough to make with regard to myself and my sister. I appreciate the noble sentiments and ideals, which you have referred to and I assure you that it is my desire and hope that they will be cherished and lived up to. I am very glad that I have had this opportunity of meeting you all and the citizens of Karachi.
Undoubtedly, I have great love and regard for this beautiful town not only because of my old associations with it, or because it is my birthplace, as you have said, but because it has now become the birthplace of the free, sovereign and independent state of Pakistan. For all freedom - loving people, Karachi will on that account not only be symbol of special significance but will occupy a place in history for which there is no parallel, and I feel it my good fortune that I have the honor to be the first to receive this Civic Address.
Karachi is no ordinary town. Nature has given it exceptional advantages, which particularly suit modern needs and conditions.
That is why starting from humble beginnings it has come to be what it is, and one could say with confidence that the day is not far hence when it will be ranked amongst the first cities of the world. Not only its airports, but also the naval port and also the main town will be amongst the finest. There is one especially pleasing feature about Karachi –while most of the big cities are crowded and cramped with over towering structures, Karachi has large open spaces and hill station style roofs which give to the visitor a feeling of space and ease.
It has also got the advantage of a salubrious climate and is always blessed with healthy and cool breezes throughout the year. I visualize a great future for Karachi –it always had immense potentialities. Now with the establishment of Pakistan’s Capital here and the arrival of Pakistan Government and its personnel and the consequent influx of trade, industry and business, immense opportunities have opened out for it. So let us all strive together to make this beautiful town a great metropolis, a center of trade, industry and commerce, and a seat of learning and culture.
As you have said, the responsibilities of Karachi and its Corporation have increased along with its importance. I hope that the Corporation will prove equal to the task. There would be an extra strain on all phases of Corporation activities, but under the wise and able guidance of the City fathers, and with the co-operation of all the citizens, this would be, I trust, borne with alacrity and willingness. The help of the Government, I feel, will be available in your difficulties and problems and I am sure that the authorities concerned will in time deal appropriately with question of the power and status of the Corporation and its Mayor, questions which appear to worry you just now a great deal.
Karachi has the distinction of being the only town of importance where, during these times of communal disturbances, people have kept their heads cool and lived amicable, and I hope we shall continue to do so.
Pakistan is grateful to the Sindh Government and the Corporation and people of Karachi for welcoming its Central Government to have its headquarters here and for providing all facilities. With the arrival of Pakistan’s staff, Karachi already has, as its citizens, people from all parts of Pakistan and Hindustan. They will all live here together like true citizens and devote their energies to and avail themselves of the great opportunities that present themselves to us all to build up and reconstruct Pakistan in a manner which will command the respect of sister nations and find a place of honor along with great nations of the world as an equal.
It should be our aim not only to remove want and fear of all types, but also to secure liberty, fraternity and equality as enjoined upon us by Islam.
I thank you again, Mayor and Councillor for your address of welcome. Pakistan Zindabad”
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