Pervez Musharraf's offer

Sep 19th 2007 From The Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWireWould Pakistan's president really take off his uniform?

On September 18th the chief lawyer for General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military leader, reportedly told the country's Supreme Court that the general would step down as army chief if re-elected as president. In principle, such a pledge removes one of the key obstacles to the president's re-election efforts. It could indicate that an increasingly desperate General Musharraf is now more willing to accept the conditions for a power-sharing deal with Benazir Bhutto, an exiled former prime minister.

However, the political situation remains fluid and extremely uncertain, not least because Supreme Court rulings with crucial implications for General Musharraf's re-election bid are expected at any moment. Despite continuing speculation about a Bhutto-Musharraf power-sharing deal, all manner of unexpected outcomes remain possible.

The apparent signal that the president is at last prepared to give up his uniform is the latest manifestation of the intensifying political manoeuvring that is occurring in Pakistan as the mid-October deadline for General Musharraf's re-election by the current national and provincial legislatures rapidly approaches. The urgency of the situation for General Musharraf comes from the fact that the current parliament's term ends on October 15th while his own presidential term expires on November 15th. As the president's supporters are in the majority in the current parliament, General Musharraf is trying to secure his re-election by ensuring that the presidential ballot takes place before the expiry of its term. (The president is elected not by universal suffrage but by an electoral college of lawmakers from both houses of the national parliament and from the four provincial assemblies.

Many observers might wonder why General Musharraf is bothering to try to get re-elected, given the fact that he took power through a military coup and that, under his rule, Pakistan has become a quasi-dictatorship. (His opponents claim that he has unconstitutionally manipulated the political system to stay in power.) However, it remains in his interests, for the time being at least, to secure parliamentary endorsement for his presidency and to continue to work nominally within the political system, in order to avoid the more provocative option of declaring martial law.

The combination of General Musharraf's reluctance, thus far, to resort to direct rule and the rapid approach of the deadline for his re-election explains the recent flurry of tactical manoeuvres by various interested parties, of which the statement to the Supreme Court by General Musharraf's lawyer is but the latest example. As October 15th—the key date by which the presidential election must take place if it is to be held under the current parliament's tenure—approaches, all the players are making their moves.

Most notably, Nawaz Sharif, another exiled former prime minister, returned to Pakistan on September 10th in a bid to increase the pressure on General Musharraf to step down. Mr Sharif was deported immediately, but the incident highlighted the extent to which the electoral calendar is creating the opportunity for opposition politicians to stake their claim to a role in the next government (or, one could argue, forcing them to act whether or not they are ready to do so). In the same vein, on September 14th Ms Bhutto announced her intention to return to Pakistan on October 18th.

The date Ms Bhutto has chosen for her return has attracted particular interest. If the presidential election indeed goes ahead during the current parliament's term—which is by no means certain, given the claims by critics of General Musharraf that this would be unconstitutional—Ms Bhutto would thus remain safely out of the picture until after General Musharraf's re-election as president. According to his lawyer's statement, General Musharraf would step down as army chief soon after his re-election and before his swearing in for a new term. It is uncertain whether such a move, rather than resigning as army chief before running for re-election, would be acceptable to Ms Bhutto. However, it does represent an important concession on the part of General Musharraf, and if acceptable to Ms Bhutto it would go some way towards creating the basis for a power-sharing deal.

Speculation about such a deal--which would entail General Musharraf staying on as a civilian president with Ms Bhutto as prime minister--is likely to continue. However, there remain significant obstacles to it, as well as many other general uncertainties in the political situation. For one thing, it is not yet known whether General Musharraf has agreed to what are believed to be some of the other key conditions of the deal. These include granting Ms Bhutto amnesty from prosecution on charges of corruption that remain against her (which she claims were trumped up); giving up his power, as president, to dissolve parliament; and amending the constitution to allow prime ministers to serve a third term, which would be necessary for Ms Bhutto to return to office.

Adding to the uncertainty surrounding a deal with Ms Bhutto is that this is not the only rationale for a decision by General Musharraf to relinquish his uniform. Even if the power-sharing deal does not go through, much of the opposition to his rule may die down if he becomes a civilian president. Moreover, he might still be able to retain influence with the military by appointing a loyal army chief in his place. Such an arrangement might actually produce a reasonably stable situation in Pakistan.

The Supreme Court's judgements will also have a bearing on how the political crisis unfolds. The court could rule, for example, that the president must be elected not by the current assemblies but by those in place after the next parliamentary elections, when pro-Musharraf lawmakers may no longer have the numerical advantage. Such a ruling would be bad news for General Musharraf, and could persuade him to impose emergency rule as a last resort. Even this drastic step is by no means the only possible outcome. Bizarrely, it has been suggested that General Musharraf's wife could take his place, and that given Mr Sharif's enforced exile, his wife, too, could play some role in politics. It is a sign of the extent of Pakistan's political crisis that even the wackiest possibilities are now being aired.

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