Musharraf bolsters China-Pakistan bondBy Pallavi Aiyar BEIJING - The timing of Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's six-day visit to China this month imbued the interactions between the leaders of the "all-weather" friends with added significance. This was Musharraf's first official visit abroad after parliamentary elections in February saw a coalition of parties opposed to him come to power in Islamabad, leaving the president in a delicate political situation. The visit moreover came at a time when China faces increasing international censure over its handling of the Tibet protests last month. Musharraf's repeated strong and unequivocal statements in support of Beijing's position on every front, from Tibet to the Summer Olympic Games in Beijing and human rights, were thus a welcome respite from Western criticism for China and received much play in the domestic media. The Pakistan president held two rounds of meetings with his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao, who emphasized that Pakistan is a priority for China's foreign policy and that this "principle will not change, no matter what happens in international or domestic situations". Hu went on to up the rhetorical ante when he stated, "China considers Pakistan as a close neighbor, a good friend, a partner, and more importantly as a good brother." The visit thus gave Musharraf's credibility a shot in the arm while simultaneously establishing some international support for China at a time when the country is under attack. Yet, despite the many two-way declarations of enduring friendship made over the course of the visit, not that much was achieved of concrete substance. Both prior to and during the trip, Musharraf made several public announcements regarding his desire for Chinese assistance in building three more nuclear power plants, a cross-border oil and gas pipeline as well as a railroad along the Karakoram highway connecting Gwadar port in Balochistan province to western China. However, none of these proposals met with an official Chinese response. In the conspicuous absence of big-ticket deals on energy, trade or defense, the two sides instead signed a series of memoranda of understanding in fields such as the management of water resources, town planning, television production, sports and culture and science and technology. A joint statement announced that both sides "pledged to take steps to upgrade transportation and communication networks", to accelerate economic cooperation and to work together in several areas, including the energy, mineral and mining sectors. Beyond these broad-stroke agreements, however, the Chinese did not tie themselves down to any of Musharraf's specific requests. There is no single explanation for China's caution. It is instead the result of an amalgam of concerns and shifting circumstances that, when taken together, point to a Sino-Pakistan relationship the texture of which has subtly altered over the past decade, despite the declarations of immutability that both sides say mark their friendship. Perhaps most worrying of all for Beijing are the repercussions that Pakistan's recent internal political instability have for China's own national security, given the long border the country shares with the western province of Xinjiang. Xinjiang is a vast area comprising one-sixth of China's land mass and has been long settled by a Muslim population of Turkic origin called Uyghurs. Pro-independence Uyghur groups have been staging a low-grade secessionist movement in the region for decades. While a less high-profile cause than Tibet outside of China, separatist activity in Xinjiang is a major worry for Beijing. Since last month, the Chinese authorities have revealed a number of plots by groups in Xinjiang they say are terrorist organizations. Beijing is concerned that Uyghur militants have forged links with Islamist fighters across the border in Pakistan. There have for example been unconfirmed reports that a foiled attack on a Chinese domestic flight in early March involved people carrying Pakistani passports. In addition to the worry that Pakistan has become a convenient hideout and training ground for Uyghur separatists, the past few years have also seen a series of Chinese civilians working in Pakistan kidnapped and killed by Islamic militants. China responded to these incidents by demanding better protection of its citizens within Pakistan in usually forceful language. Furthermore, since Pakistan's role as a large-scale nuclear proliferator was brought into the global spotlight with the Abdul Qadeer Khan expose of 2004, lending open nuclear assistance to Islamabad is increasingly embarrassing for Beijing. Finally, the evolving Sino-Pakistan relationship needs also to be understood in the context of Beijing's new engagement with New Delhi, which has brought India and China closer together than at any point after their 1962 border war. China no longer automatically panders to Pakistan's position on Kashmir, referring to it as a bilateral matter instead. Again, even while refusing Musharraf's calls for more nuclear assistance, China has signed joint documents with India that specify cooperation in civilian nuclear energy as a goal. For all the infrastructure linkages and political closeness between China and Pakistan, their bilateral trade is currently only at about the US$7 billion mark, whereas despite some major unresolved problems with New Delhi, Sino-Indian trade is already close to the $40 billion mark. While China and Pakistan aim at increasing trade to $15 billion by 2010, India and China have a $60 billion target for the same year. China has had to delicately recalibrate its relationship with Pakistan over the past few years, taking care not to undermine its traditional friendship with Islamabad while simultaneously developing stronger ties with India. Nonetheless, although China-Pakistan relations may no longer be as straightforward as they once were, nor should they be assumed to be on the wane. While the containment of India alone may not provide the sole basis for their engagement, the geostrategic logic for a continuing long-term alliance between the two neighbors is strong. Not only is Pakistan the corridor for China's access to the Indian Ocean and thus to alternative energy-supply routes through Gwadar port, Beijing also needs Islamabad's support to ensure the stability and security of its restive Xinjiang province. It is no coincidence that Musharraf's last stop on his China visit was in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. In the past, the Pakistan president has appealed to Xinjiang Muslims to cooperate with China for peace and progress and to eschew extremism. On this trip as well he came out in strong support of Chinese efforts to combat separatism, a reference not only to Tibet but also to the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The chaos an unstable Pakistan could unleash across the Chinese border is a potential nightmare for Beijing, necessitating the bolstering of a strong government in Islamabad. In addition, although China's relations with India are improving, Beijing is acutely aware that New Delhi is far from the unequivocal supporter of its policies that Pakistan is. "The contrast between President Musharraf's statements on Tibet and the attitude we see in the Indian media to the issue is very noticeable to us," says Professor Rong Ying, a South Asia expert at the China Institute for International Relations. China has in fact proven to be Pakistan's only constantly reliable ally, providing it with the financing for several major infrastructure projects in addition to being its largest supplier of arms. Only a few days before Musharraf's visit, the first of four F-22P frigates ordered by the Pakistani navy from China under a $600 million deal signed in April 2005 was launched from Shanghai. In addition, Beijing has signed on to assist Pakistan in a range of strategic defense projects, including the production and purchase of JF-17 aircraft and the al-Khalid tank. The Pakistan Air Force also plans to buy new Chinese-made J-10 fighters in large numbers. So, despite Musharraf having returned home from China without much tangible gain by way of eye-catching deals, his visit not only went some way in buoying the beleaguered president's personal standing, but also underscored the fact that despite a few speed bumps, the road to Sino-Pakistan relations remains an all-weather one. Pallavi Aiyar is the author of the forthcoming book, Smoke and Mirrors: China Through Indian Eyes, (Harper Collins, April 2008.) (Copyright 2008 Pallavi Aiyar)
a welcome respite from Western criticism for China and received much play in the domestic media. The Pakistan president held two rounds of meetings with his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao, who emphasized that Pakistan is a priority for China's foreign policy and that this "principle will not change, no matter what happens in international or domestic situations". Hu went on to up the rhetorical ante when he stated, "China considers Pakistan as a close neighbor, a good friend, a partner, and more importantly as a good brother." The visit thus gave Musharraf's credibility a shot in the arm while simultaneously establishing some international support for China at a time when the country is under attack. Yet, despite the many two-way declarations of enduring friendship made over the course of the visit, not that much was achieved of concrete substance. Both prior to and during the trip, Musharraf made several public announcements regarding his desire for Chinese assistance in building three more nuclear power plants, a cross-border oil and gas pipeline as well as a railroad along the Karakoram highway connecting Gwadar port in Balochistan province to western China. However, none of these proposals met with an official Chinese response. In the conspicuous absence of big-ticket deals on energy, trade or defense, the two sides instead signed a series of memoranda of understanding in fields such as the management of water resources, town planning, television production, sports and culture and science and technology. A joint statement announced that both sides "pledged to take steps to upgrade transportation and communication networks", to accelerate economic cooperation and to work together in several areas, including the energy, mineral and mining sectors. Beyond these broad-stroke agreements, however, the Chinese did not tie themselves down to any of Musharraf's specific requests. There is no single explanation for China's caution. It is instead the result of an amalgam of concerns and shifting circumstances that, when taken together, point to a Sino-Pakistan relationship the texture of which has subtly altered over the past decade, despite the declarations of immutability that both sides say mark their friendship. Perhaps most worrying of all for Beijing are the repercussions that Pakistan's recent internal political instability have for China's own national security, given the long border the country shares with the western province of Xinjiang. Xinjiang is a vast area comprising one-sixth of China's land mass and has been long settled by a Muslim population of Turkic origin called Uyghurs. Pro-independence Uyghur groups have been staging a low-grade secessionist movement in the region for decades. While a less high-profile cause than Tibet outside of China, separatist activity in Xinjiang is a major worry for Beijing. Since last month, the Chinese authorities have revealed a number of plots by groups in Xinjiang they say are terrorist organizations. Beijing is concerned that Uyghur militants have forged links with Islamist fighters across the border in Pakistan. There have for example been unconfirmed reports that a foiled attack on a Chinese domestic flight in early March involved people carrying Pakistani passports. In addition to the worry that Pakistan has become a convenient hideout and training ground for Uyghur separatists, the past few years have also seen a series of Chinese civilians working in Pakistan kidnapped and killed by Islamic militants. China responded to these incidents by demanding better protection of its citizens within Pakistan in usually forceful language. Furthermore, since Pakistan's role as a large-scale nuclear proliferator was brought into the global spotlight with the Abdul Qadeer Khan expose of 2004, lending open nuclear assistance to Islamabad is increasingly embarrassing for Beijing. Finally, the evolving Sino-Pakistan relationship needs also to be understood in the context of Beijing's new engagement with New Delhi, which has brought India and China closer together than at any point after their 1962 border war. China no longer automatically panders to Pakistan's position on Kashmir, referring to it as a bilateral matter instead. Again, even while refusing Musharraf's calls for more nuclear assistance, China has signed joint documents with India that specify cooperation in civilian nuclear energy as a goal. For all the infrastructure linkages and political closeness between China and Pakistan, their bilateral trade is currently only at about the US$7 billion mark, whereas despite some major unresolved problems with New Delhi, Sino-Indian trade is already close to the $40 billion mark. While China and Pakistan aim at increasing trade to $15 billion by 2010, India and China have a $60 billion target for the same year. China has had to delicately recalibrate its relationship with Pakistan over the past few years, taking care not to undermine its traditional friendship with Islamabad while simultaneously developing stronger ties with India. Nonetheless, although China-Pakistan relations may no longer be as straightforward as they once were, nor should they be assumed to be on the wane. While the containment of India alone may not provide the sole basis for their engagement, the geostrategic logic for a continuing long-term alliance between the two neighbors is strong. Not only is Pakistan the corridor for China's access to the Indian Ocean and thus to alternative energy-supply routes through Gwadar port, Beijing also needs Islamabad's support to ensure the stability and security of its restive Xinjiang province. It is no coincidence that Musharraf's last stop on his China visit was in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. In the past, the Pakistan president has appealed to Xinjiang Muslims to cooperate with China for peace and progress and to eschew extremism. On this trip as well he came out in strong support of Chinese efforts to combat separatism, a reference not only to Tibet but also to the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The chaos an unstable Pakistan could unleash across the Chinese border is a potential nightmare for Beijing, necessitating the bolstering of a strong government in Islamabad. In addition, although China's relations with India are improving, Beijing is acutely aware that New Delhi is far from the unequivocal supporter of its policies that Pakistan is. "The contrast between President Musharraf's statements on Tibet and the attitude we see in the Indian media to the issue is very noticeable to us," says Professor Rong Ying, a South Asia expert at the China Institute for International Relations. China has in fact proven to be Pakistan's only constantly reliable ally, providing it with the financing for several major infrastructure projects in addition to being its largest supplier of arms. Only a few days before Musharraf's visit, the first of four F-22P frigates ordered by the Pakistani navy from China under a $600 million deal signed in April 2005 was launched from Shanghai. In addition, Beijing has signed on to assist Pakistan in a range of strategic defense projects, including the production and purchase of JF-17 aircraft and the al-Khalid tank. The Pakistan Air Force also plans to buy new Chinese-made J-10 fighters in large numbers. So, despite Musharraf having returned home from China without much tangible gain by way of eye-catching deals, his visit not only went some way in buoying the beleaguered president's personal standing, but also underscored the fact that despite a few speed bumps, the road to Sino-Pakistan relations remains an all-weather one. Pallavi Aiyar is the author of the forthcoming book, Smoke and Mirrors: China Through Indian Eyes, (Harper Collins, April 2008.) (Copyright 2008 Pallavi Aiyar)
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