VIEW: Partnership in the Hindu Kush — Ashley Bommer
Standing at Michni Post, staring down at the thousands of trucks and buses buzzing through Afghanistan into Pakistan under the shadows of the Hindu Kush, the answer is obvious: controlling the Afghan-Pakistan border requires a counterinsurgency policy that looks at Afghanistan and Pakistan togetherPakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Afghan President Hamid Karzai never had a shared border strategy. But, standing at Michni Post, the highest point of the Khyber Pass, staring down at the thousands of trucks and buses buzzing through Afghanistan into Pakistan under the shadows of the Hindu Kush, the answer is obvious: controlling the Afghan-Pakistan border requires a counterinsurgency policy that looks at Afghanistan and Pakistan together. Pakistan’s new government has a great opportunity to make this change. In order to cut off the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s recruitment and supplies, both countries should fight the militants in tandem.That means, first, improving security training for the border forces, starting with Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, the 50,000-man combat force along the 1,600-mile Afghan border. These “sons of the soil” are in bad shape. They receive no more than two dollars a day to patrol the area, which ranges from 25,000-foot-high mountains to barren deserts. They also fight with old weapons. As one senior commander told me, “the Taliban are better equipped and have more fire power.” They have no air mobility, and worse, no rapid reaction force to support them. Two Frontier battalions have been under siege at Ladha Fort in South Waziristan for the past few months.Security along the border can run on parallel tracks. Major General Muhammad Alam Khattak, the Frontier Corps’ Inspector General, made a suggestion to me: “Take our Frontier Corps. Train them somewhere and bring them back.” Afghanistan should do just that. Through NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghan National Army training program, it should rotate the Frontier Corps battalions with their Pashtun brothers one at a time. Additional resources provided by Pakistan for proper equipment and force buildup — including the creation of a Frontier Corps Rapid Reaction Force — should be committed so that Frontier Corps soldiers become the counterinsurgency partners in Pakistan that Afghanistan needs. Second, reconciliation with the insurgents should begin by inducing defections. This was recommended by a senior US military commander, who said that “60 percent of insurgent activity could be curbed by reconciliation.” Despite overwhelming support for this process, methods to do so are absent.In Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, 2,000 Taliban fighters were rounded up and vetted by ISAF forces, only to be abandoned after the initiative was not supported by Afghanistan’s central government. In Khost, dozens of former Taliban members from the Tribal Areas defected, promising to lay down their arms in exchange for — only to be given nothing.In both cases, the defecting insurgents said the same thing: they could recruit dozens more; they just need incentives. A regional reconciliation program targeting mid- and lower-tier Taliban and al-Qaeda commanders should be developed and implemented by Pakistan and Afghanistan. Third, the drug lords should be arrested and detained. As one senior Afghan government official said, “If you can’t remove a corrupt judge, how can you deal with the Taliban?” There are a hundred top drug lords in Afghanistan. Everyone knows who they are. Yet none has been arrested.Not doing so, due to fear of backlash, only enhances their power. And allowing them to continue to control the smuggling routes creates a ripple effect that bankrolls corruption of provincial officials and the Afghan National Police, which in turn feeds the insurgency.Finally, reform the madrassa system. Not all madrassas are hotbeds of terrorist training. The problem is that Afghan religious students must go to Pakistan for any religious education after 19 or 20 years of age. They are then quickly pressured to become “bad Taliban” through money, propaganda, and pressure from Pakistani mullahs.To address this problem, Afghan Education Minister Hanif Atmar — perhaps the most reform-minded member of the government — is seeking to build 34 new madrassas (his goal is 2,000) in Afghanistan for higher learning. His proposal, which aims to reform the curriculum to include Islamic studies, gender studies, computer science, and English, should receive overwhelming support.With fewer students from Afghanistan going to Pakistan, Pakistan could turn its attention to the country’s own madrassas and to the mullahs who convert students into suicide bombers. The curriculum for both countries, based on Minister Atmar’s proposal, should be coordinated. Madrassas that meet these curriculum standards should be registered, supported, and encouraged. Only an effective Afghan-Pakistan partnership can begin to control the insurgency in the border area. The war in Afghanistan, and destabilization in Pakistan, will not end without it. —
Standing at Michni Post, staring down at the thousands of trucks and buses buzzing through Afghanistan into Pakistan under the shadows of the Hindu Kush, the answer is obvious: controlling the Afghan-Pakistan border requires a counterinsurgency policy that looks at Afghanistan and Pakistan togetherPakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Afghan President Hamid Karzai never had a shared border strategy. But, standing at Michni Post, the highest point of the Khyber Pass, staring down at the thousands of trucks and buses buzzing through Afghanistan into Pakistan under the shadows of the Hindu Kush, the answer is obvious: controlling the Afghan-Pakistan border requires a counterinsurgency policy that looks at Afghanistan and Pakistan together. Pakistan’s new government has a great opportunity to make this change. In order to cut off the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s recruitment and supplies, both countries should fight the militants in tandem.That means, first, improving security training for the border forces, starting with Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, the 50,000-man combat force along the 1,600-mile Afghan border. These “sons of the soil” are in bad shape. They receive no more than two dollars a day to patrol the area, which ranges from 25,000-foot-high mountains to barren deserts. They also fight with old weapons. As one senior commander told me, “the Taliban are better equipped and have more fire power.” They have no air mobility, and worse, no rapid reaction force to support them. Two Frontier battalions have been under siege at Ladha Fort in South Waziristan for the past few months.Security along the border can run on parallel tracks. Major General Muhammad Alam Khattak, the Frontier Corps’ Inspector General, made a suggestion to me: “Take our Frontier Corps. Train them somewhere and bring them back.” Afghanistan should do just that. Through NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghan National Army training program, it should rotate the Frontier Corps battalions with their Pashtun brothers one at a time. Additional resources provided by Pakistan for proper equipment and force buildup — including the creation of a Frontier Corps Rapid Reaction Force — should be committed so that Frontier Corps soldiers become the counterinsurgency partners in Pakistan that Afghanistan needs. Second, reconciliation with the insurgents should begin by inducing defections. This was recommended by a senior US military commander, who said that “60 percent of insurgent activity could be curbed by reconciliation.” Despite overwhelming support for this process, methods to do so are absent.In Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, 2,000 Taliban fighters were rounded up and vetted by ISAF forces, only to be abandoned after the initiative was not supported by Afghanistan’s central government. In Khost, dozens of former Taliban members from the Tribal Areas defected, promising to lay down their arms in exchange for — only to be given nothing.In both cases, the defecting insurgents said the same thing: they could recruit dozens more; they just need incentives. A regional reconciliation program targeting mid- and lower-tier Taliban and al-Qaeda commanders should be developed and implemented by Pakistan and Afghanistan. Third, the drug lords should be arrested and detained. As one senior Afghan government official said, “If you can’t remove a corrupt judge, how can you deal with the Taliban?” There are a hundred top drug lords in Afghanistan. Everyone knows who they are. Yet none has been arrested.Not doing so, due to fear of backlash, only enhances their power. And allowing them to continue to control the smuggling routes creates a ripple effect that bankrolls corruption of provincial officials and the Afghan National Police, which in turn feeds the insurgency.Finally, reform the madrassa system. Not all madrassas are hotbeds of terrorist training. The problem is that Afghan religious students must go to Pakistan for any religious education after 19 or 20 years of age. They are then quickly pressured to become “bad Taliban” through money, propaganda, and pressure from Pakistani mullahs.To address this problem, Afghan Education Minister Hanif Atmar — perhaps the most reform-minded member of the government — is seeking to build 34 new madrassas (his goal is 2,000) in Afghanistan for higher learning. His proposal, which aims to reform the curriculum to include Islamic studies, gender studies, computer science, and English, should receive overwhelming support.With fewer students from Afghanistan going to Pakistan, Pakistan could turn its attention to the country’s own madrassas and to the mullahs who convert students into suicide bombers. The curriculum for both countries, based on Minister Atmar’s proposal, should be coordinated. Madrassas that meet these curriculum standards should be registered, supported, and encouraged. Only an effective Afghan-Pakistan partnership can begin to control the insurgency in the border area. The war in Afghanistan, and destabilization in Pakistan, will not end without it. —
DT-PS Ashley Bommer worked at the US Mission to the United Nations during the Clinton Administration and is writing a novel set in the Tribal Areas
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C06%5C15%5Cstory_15-6-2008_pg3_5
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